Descriptions of various gun court cases (u-z)

Various gun court case links with no descriptions (same cases as this document)

Cases a-t

• U.S. v. Adams, 11 F.Supp. 216 (S.D.Fla. 1935)
  This is the first reported case I have found interpreting the NFA. Adams got caught with an unregistered Thompson SMG right after the law was enacted. The court finds that, based on the cases interpreting the Harrison Narcotics Act, the NFA is constitutional as an exercise of the taxing power. The court decides that the tax power can be used as a substitute for the general police power Congress allegedly doesn't have under the Constitution; Congress can tax things it dislikes out of existence. The court also directly addresses the second amendment issue, and decides that the amendment only protects the rights of states to have national guards, and cites a whole host of cases, carefully avoiding both Supreme court, and other state court cases directly to the contrary. Too bad Adams wasn't appealed, instead of Miller. It would have at least disposed of the "short shotgun is not a military weapon" issue that Miller hangs on.
• U.S. v. Adams, 438 F.2d 644 (8th Cir 1971)
  This very short case really only has one point of law; can you be in "possession" of a sawed off shotgun such as to constitute a violation of the NFA if the only evidence is that the police saw you throw down a sawed off shotgun? Yup.
• United States v. Adams, No. 96-4970 (11th Cir. 2/36/98)
  In this case the court decides that in order for a person to be convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, the government need not show whether the firearm was operable, nor whether the defendant knew whether it was operable. If the gun was described as a Winchester shotgun, and the characterization as a firearm was not rebutted by the defendant in his case, then the jury could conclude that the item fell within the statute, whether it in fact worked or not, and regardless of whether the defendant knew it worked or didn't work.
• U.S. v. Aiken, 787 F.Supp. 106 (D.Md. 1992)
  
• U.S. v. Alborola-Rodriguez, 153 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1998)
  In this case the court decides that for purposes of the sentencing enhancement for using a sawed off shotgun in a crime, the determination as to whether a sawed off shotgun was in fact used is for the court to make, not the jury, as part of sentencing. The court thus disagrees with several other circuits, setting up a situation where the Supreme Court may agree to decide the issue.
• U.S v. Allah, 130 F.3d 33 (2nd Cir. 1997)
  
• U.S. v. Alston, 112 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 1997)
  In this case a convicted felon got a mandatory 15 year sentence for possessing a rusted shut Colt model 1908 .25 caliber pistol. ATF was able to get the gun to work after the use of WD-40 and a mallet, according to the opinion. Because the defendant had three felony convictions, all over 20 years old, he is subject to a mandatory 15 year prison term. The main point of interest in this (to me, anyway) is the court's approval of the thinking that a pistol that is incapable of firing a shot when seized is still a firearm as defined by the the GCA, because it was "designed" to fire a shot, even though it wasn't able to do so when seized.
• U.S. v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1982)
  
• U.S. v. Amparo, 68 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 1995)
  In this case the 9th circuit decides that possessing two guns, a sawed off shotgun and a pistol permits the defendant to be convicted of both possessing a sawed off shotgun, and possessing a firearm while committing a crime of violence, under the setencing enhancement at issue in Harris, Bailey and Smith. The court decides, without much basis, that mere possession of an unregistered NFA weapon is a "crime of violence." Possesing a pistol at the same time, therefore, kicks in the sentencing enhancement, assuming the jury finds he possessed a second gun besides the sawed-off.
• U.S. v. Anderson, Transcript of decision, No. 15951, (D.Colo. May 6, 1959)
  
• U.S. v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1989)
  Anderson is a precursor to the Staples supreme court case, where the 5th circuit (the whole circuit, rehearing the case en banc, and voting 8-7) reversed its own precedent and decided that in order to get a conviction under the NFA the government must prove the defendant knew the gun was the sort subject to the NFA, not that it was a gun in the general sense of the term. A lot of this decision was adopted by the Supreme court, both the majority opinion, and the dissent took a lot from this case.
• U.S. v. Anderson, 987 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1993)
  
• United States v. Andrade - F.3d - (1st Cir. 1998)
  
• U.S. v. Arce, - F.3d - (5th Cir. 1997)
  In this case the court upholds the conviction of the defendant for possessing machine guns and unregistered silencers. The court decides that the NFA is not a taxing statute, but can also be justified on the power to regulate interstate commerce, thus the fact that the NFA both precludes registration of existing NFA guns, and punishes non-registration, is just fine, citing their Ardoin case. The court also upholds upward sentencing departures for having made NFA weapons, and for having made a video describing how to make silencers out of junk and crap from the hardware store, and for claiming on the tape that the defendant was a licensed NFA manufacturer.
• U.S. v. Ardoin, 19 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 1994)
  Ardoin is a silly case. The main point of it is that the 5th circuit decided that the 10th was wrong, in Dalton, and that the making ban (922(o)) does not preclude a prosecution under the NFA for possessing a post-may mg. In this case Ardoin was a class 3 who made several post May mg's for a local PD, on Form 10. He apparently had possession of the guns although they were registered to the PD, as he was a deputy or officer or like thing. ATF prosecuted him, claiming the guns could have and should have been made on a form 1; for possessing untaxed mg's. This despite the fact that ATF had sent out a memo that no longer would mg's be registered on form 1, after the making ban, they wanted them on form 10's. ATF agents lied on the stand and claimed the memo didn't exist, Ardoin couldn't scrounge up a copy till after the trial. A real travesty. Anyway the main thrust of the case was that these guns were for a PD, not Ardoin, and that he let his class 3 lapse (for like two months, I suspect ATF screwed up his renewal, intentionally or otherwise) and thus was an individual in possession of post-May guns, not taxed and not registered to him. The court claimed that he could pay the tax and register the guns, even though 922(o) precludes ATF from accepting them from him. The court just claimed that wasn't true, that interpretation of the law was wrong. The upshot is that between the lies and total retardation as to the law on the part of the court, Ardoin is in the can. I urge class 3 dealers to reconsider possessing post-May mg's. If your SOT lapses for any reason at all, apparently, you can and will be prosecuted. Cheap shooters maybe, but clearly a problem in the current environment. It seemed Ardoin wanted cheap shooters, and he got the chief of police to agree to his making the guns and keeping them, as cheap shooters, while they were nominally registered to the department. The supreme court refused to review this case, despite the lies,and despite the conflict with the 10th circuit Dalton case.
• U.S. v. Bailes, 10 F.Supp.2d 607 (S.D.W.Va. 1998)
  In this case the judge throws out a charge of possessing a firearm while subject to a domestic violence restraining order, since the judge finds that the order was revoked by operation of West Virginia law when the judge that made the order modified the divorce orders. The judge also refuses to permit the government to base its case on a second restraining order, since that order was not listed in the indictment, and because the constitution only permits trials on indictments from grand juries, and the government may not alter them halfway through trial after finding they cannot support the charge they got from the grand jury.
• U.S. v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381 (11th Cir. 1997)
  In this case the 11th circuit affirms convictions of a gun dealer for mail fraud, and dealing without an FFL, and possessing unregistered NFA weapons. The dealer had his license on premises which he didn't actually use for his business, and instead did his business from his home, which was not his licensed premises. He also cheated two customers on the sales of machine guns. He also made orders to H&K for police guns, which he intended to sell to private persons, even though they were ordered as government sales, and thus were FET exempt. Lastly, when his house and storage locker were searched unregistered machine guns and grenades were found. The court rejects arguments that ATF agents perjured themselves while testifying, although one clearly testified falsely, and rejected arguments that the government failed to reveal government witnesses were informants, and failed to turn over evidence in their possession.
• U.S. v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1999)
  
• U.S. v. Balanga, - F.3d - (8th Cir. 1997)
  In this case the court of appeals upholds the defendant's conviction for possessing firearms and ammunition as a felon, where the guns and ammo were found in a locked basement room of the defendant's house. He contended he didn't have access to the room, and thus wasn't in "possession" of the items. While the court agreed that if he really didn't have access to the guns he wasn't in possession, the court and jury apparently didn't believe he really didn't have access to the basement room - perhaps because it had the washer and dryer in it, including his laundry.
• U.S. v. Barno, 340 F.Supp. 1326 (D.D.C. 1972)
  
• U.S. v. Barr, 32 F.3d 1320 (8th Cir. 1994)
  In this case the 8th circuit looks at the mens rea required for a conviction for possessing an unregistered NFA weapon (sawed off shotgun) in the post-Staples era. The court however severely limits Staples, saying the jury need only find the defendant had seen the weapon, and knew its characteristics, in a situation where the weapon is does not appear to be a traditional sporting weapon, and is a "quasi suspect" weapon. They claim that applies, based on Staples, and that the state need not prove the defendant knew of the characteristics of the weapon which brought it under the NFA (in this case the short barrel and overall length). This severely limits Staples, almost to its facts, to cases where the gun appears ordinary (like an AR?). This is what happens when lower courts think the Supremes made a mistake, they try and undermine the decision as much as possible, knowing the court in unlikely to review their interpretation.
• U.S. v. Bascue, 5 F.Supp.2d 1139 (D.Or. 1998)
  In this case the trial court refuses to set aside the defendants convictions for possessing unregistered machine guns, and transferring unregistered machine guns. The defendants apparently made MAC style gun frame flats into guns. They claim here that the flats were required to be registered by the seller, and not by them, as well as that their lawyers did a crummy job. The court says the testimony shows the flats did not need to be registered, and that the lawyers did an acceptable job.
• U.S. v. Bayles, Case No. 2:00CR424K (D.Utah December 5, 2000)
  
• U.S. v. Beal, 810 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1987)
  This case applies the szymkowiak rationale to some "pen guns" seized during a search for other items. Again, as the contrbanad nature was not obvious, the court ruled the warrantless seizure was not permitted under the "palin view" exception to the 4th amendment, and the pen guns were not admissible in court, killing the whole case. The sole suspicion about the pens was their weight, far heavier than ordinary pens.
• U.S. v. Beason, 690 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1982)
  In this case the 5th circuit upholds a conviction for possessing unregistered, homemade, hand grenades. The court decides that the government does not have to prove the grenades are not designed as weapons, or that they are not likely to be used as a weapon, as an element of the offense, the defendant may raise those exceptions to the definition as affirmative defenses. The court also upheld the use of authenticated reports from the custodian of the NFA Registry as proof of non-registration of the grenades.
• U.S. v. Beavers, 206 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2000)
  
• U.S. v. Benner, 289 F.Supp. 860 (D.Or 1968)
  In this case the trial court decides that there is not a self incrimination problem with a prosecution under the pre-68 NFA for possessing a firearm made in violation of the NFA, even if the defendant is the one that made the firearm. This decision was reversed and remanded by the 9th circuit (see below.)
• U.S. v. Benner, 417 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1969)
  
• U.S. v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749 (6th Cir. 1978)
  In this case the court reverses a conviction for retaining scrap metal belonging to the government after being informed it was stolen. While the court finds that the facts could justify such a finding - the defendant scavenged at a military base open to the public, and didn't return all of the scavenged metal after being asked by the FBI to do so. However, as the US Attorney made improper statements to the jury aobut his personal beliefs that the defendant was guilty, the court reversed the conviction for a new trial.
• U.S. v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996)
  
• Motion from 5/31/90 in U.S. v. Billistics, Inc., No. N.90.25(EBB)
  Resulted in an 6/5/90 order.
• U.S. v. Billistics, Inc., No. N.90.25(EBB) (D.Conn. June 5, 1990)
  First very brief order resulting from 5/21/90 motion directing the ATF to return a number of guns seized in a raid of Billistics in 1989, to the registered owners; I guess the guns were at Billistics for repair or something, and were seized as not registered to them. Anyway the court directs their return.
• Motion from 6/18/90 in U.S. v. Billistics, Inc., No. N.90.25(EBB)
  Resulted in 6/19/90 order.
• U.S. v. Billistics, Inc., No. N.90.25(EBB) (D.Conn. June 19, 1990)
  Resulting from 6/18/90 motion.
• Motion from 12/19/91 in U.S. v. Billistics, Inc., No. N.90.25(EBB)
  Resulted in 12/23/91 order.
• U.S. v. Billistics, Inc., No. N.90.25(EBB) (D.Conn. December 23, 1991)
  Resulting from 12/19/91 motion.
• U.S. v. Birmley, 529 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976)
  This case is most notable for the 6th circuit saying that Congress need not have done the NFA, they could have, consistent with the 2nd amendment, and the enumerated powers of the Constitution, banned the transfer of NFA weapons altogether. This case is from 1976. Such a thought is relevant to whether 922(o) is an appropriate exercise of Congressional power, as in the Bownds case.
• U.S. v. Black, 431 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1970)
  In this case the court rejects the argument that a prosecution for possessing an unregistered NFA firearm under the post-1968 NFA violates the defendants right against self incrimination. The court notes that the offense does not call for registration, and in fact the defendant cannot register the firearm whether he wants to or not. He does not have a choice between registering the gun and incriminating himself for possessing it, or possessing it and being prosecuted for failing to register it, as defendants did under the pre-68 NFA. See also Kilcrease v. US
• U.S. v. Bosse, 1989 WL 95451 (9th Cir. 1989)
  In this unpublished 9th circuit court of appeals decision, the court affirms a trial court decision throwing out a sawed off shotgun seized from the defendant, because the ATF agent that obtained the search warrant lied to the magistrate to get the warrant issued. The appeals court finds that the ATF agent lied about the contents of a conversation with an undercover agent, and further finds that the agent deliberately omitted facts from the search warrant affidavit that would have suggested that the defendant did not commit the claimed violation, facts which were known to the agent when he made the application.
• U.S. v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718 (4th Cir. 1999)
  In this case the 4th circuit court of appeals upholds the conviction of a man for possessing firearms while subject to a domestic violence restraining order. The court decides that law is constitutional.
• U.S. v. Bownds, 860 F. Supp 336 (S.D. Miss. 1994)
  This case comes from the lowest federal court, the District court. It can therefore be appealed to the 5th Circuit court of Appeals, should the government want. And is being so appealed. And from there is could go to the US Supreme Court. Charles Bownds purchased two STEN machine guns and parts at a gun show in New Jersey in 1991 ($300, must have been parts kits or something...), and sold them in Miss. in the same year, at a profit. He argued that as Congress made no finding of any interstate commerce nexus in just banning post 1986 machine guns in 18 U.S.C. 922(o) the clause was void, under the Tenth amendment, as beyond the power of Congress. The court agreed, relying heavily on the 5th Circuit opinion in U.S. v. Lopez where that court voided the Gun Free School Zones Act, an opinion which is now under appeal to the Supreme court. If Bownds made a 2nd amendment argument, the court did not address it.

  The opinion notes that the 5th Circuit has not followed the 10th Circuit (in US v. Dalton) in finding that 922(o) impliedly repealed the NFA registration and tax requirements. This was also the holding in the Rock Island case, which the government elected not to appeal. Thus, unless the ruling was stayed during appeal, persons in the area comprising the Southern District of Mississippi may lawfully make machine guns for private ownership, while complying with the requirements of the NFA.

  The opinion also notes that both the 8th Circuit and 9th Circuit have upheld the constitutionality of 922(o). This opinion flies directly in the face of those, and assuming the 5th circuit upholds this, it is very likely the Supreme Court would hear the case. Otherwise, if the 5th Circuit upheld it, one could make legal machine guns in Miss., La. and Texas, and not in the rest of the US...

  This is a very exciting case, in my opinion, if it holds up, the 1986 ban will be voided, and there will be a court decision that such a ban is beyond the power of Congress under the Constitution.

  As a footnote, I believe this case will come out in favor of the constitutionality of 922(o), as the 5th circuit has already ruled that way, after this case was decided, in US v. Kirk.

• U.S. v. Boyd, 211 F.3d 1279 (table) (10th Cir. 2000)
  
• U.S. v. Bradley, 892 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1990)
  In this case the court decides that the defendant was properly convicted of transferring a set of parts to convert a gun into a machine gun. He transferred a pre-11/81 drop-in AR auto-sear, a M16 selector, disconnector, trigger and hammer. A few weeks later he sold the same person a M16 bolt carrier, allegedly as part of the same transaction. The court decided that all 6 parts were a machine gun under the statute, and he didn't escape the purview of the NFA by breaking up the transaction that way. He argued the set of parts was exempt because the auto-sear was from before 11/81, when ATF ruled the sear in itself was a conversion part. The court said that just because the sear in itself wasn't covered didn't mean the sear with all the other parts wasn't covered, it was.
• U.S. v. Brady, 710 F.Supp. 290 (D.Colo. 1989)
  In this case Brady is charged with possessing an unregistered AOW weapon, a coyote getter. The coyote getter is sort of like the "Game Getter" guns of the pre-1934 era, except that it is very lightly constructed, as it only uses a primed .38 special case to fire a cyanide capsule into the mouth of the animal tugging at the bait. The old game getter type guns fired a real bullet, to kill the animal.

  As even the ATF expert was too cautious to fire the gun with a real round of ammo, the court decides the thing is not an AOW, as while it is strictly speaking capable of discharging a shot (a primed .38 case with a bullet, the bullet went a few feet), it is not capable of using regular ammo. The court points out that in a number of old Revenue Rulings ATF ruled based on whether the device in question could use conventional ammo. Without requiring that the thing be able to do so, without suffering structural failure, would bring a whole host of items under the definition, says the court, like a hammer and nail. Things no sane person would use to fire a shot should not be considered capable of doing so, even if they theoretically can, says the court.

  The court also acquitted the defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm, as the defendant was told at his sentencing on the prior felony that he could possess a gun as part of his trapping and hunting livelihood. The court says that while he legally could not, the government was estopped from charging him because of his justifiable reliance on legal advice from the sentencing judge.

• U.S. v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699 (5th Cir 1996)
  This is an appeal from the criminal prosecution of some of the surviving Branch Dividians, from the shootout with ATF that started the seige there, and for making machine guns and grenades before hand. The court upholds nearly all aspects of the defendants convictions.
• U.S. v. Brantley, 68 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 1995)
  In this case several people who were induced by an ATF informant to rip off an ATF run "crack house" were convicted of various gun and drug charges. The court reversed a charge of possessing a machine gun, since it was a converted (open bolt most likely) M-10 pistol, and there was no evidence the guy knew it would fire full auto. But it upheld the sentencing enhancement (30 years max, potentially) for carrying such a gun in a crime of violence, saying that as a sentencing enhancement to another crime the principles of Staples did not apply, and strict liability was acceptable for one who had already committed a crime.
• U.S. v. Breeland 53 F.3d 100 (5th Cir. 1995)
  This case concerns a guy busted for having a short barreled shotgun that wasn't registered to him. This case addresses an issue that has come up before, as the court notes, how the definition of a short barreled shotgun, an NFA weapon, and shotgun interact. A shotgun is a shoulder fired weapon, the defendant contended that the weapon in question wasn't a short barreled shotgun because it wasn't a shotgun, because it now had a pistol grip as well as short barrels, even if it used to be a shotgun. Basically the question is what does the language about guns made from shotguns mean in this context? The court decides, as common sense might dictate, that a short barreled shotgun, by the plain language of the definition, can either be a shoulder fired smooth bore with barrel(s) less than 18", or an overall length less than 26", or a weapon made from a shotgun (ie no longer shoulder fired, or at least meant to be) falling into the same length parameters. This is why you cannot make an AOW out of something that used to be a shoulder fired type smooth bore gun; because the definition was drafted to avoid what Breeland was asserting also meant a smooth bore pistol, an AOW, cannot have ever been a shoulder fired gun, or it is then a weapon made out of a shotgun, and thus a short barreled shotgun.
• U.S. v. Bright, 471 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973)
  
• U.S. v. Brimage, 115 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 1997)
  
• U.S. v. Britton, 306 F.Supp. 94 (S.D.Tx. 1969)
  In this case the district court rejects a suggestion that a charge of possessing a sawed off shotgun w/o a serial number violates the right against self incrimination, since the law says that ATF has to assign the gun a new serial number.
• U.S. v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1980)
  
• U.S. v. Broom, 742 F.Supp. 574 (D.Colo. 1990)
  In this case the court upholds the seizure of non-contrband books and guns, during a search with a warrant for some contraband guns (machine guns). The court decides that the agent was objectively reasonable in thinking the guns, which were supposedly in plain view, might be contrband, and should be seized for further evaluation.
• U.S. v. Broussard, 80 F.3d 1025 (5th Cir. 1996)
  In this case, among other issues, the court decides that the sentencing enhancement for possession of an otherwise legal firearm with drugs does not chill any right to bear arms. The court decdied that the 2nd amendment would not apply to private possession of firearms, and further that there was no right to own guns in the 9th amendment reservation of rights.
• U.S. v. Brown, 438 F. Supp. 1002 (D.Conn 1977)
  
• U.S. v. Brown, 548 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1977)
  In this case a Chicago shop owner is convicted of possessing an unregistered short shotgun, apparently based on a tip from the street gang he got the shotgun to protect himself from. The court in unsympathetic. ATF, of course, assists the gang in continuing to run amok. The court decides that the fact that the transferee cannot register the gun is not a defense, and that somehow the NFA has an unwritten duty imposed on transferee's to insure that the transfer of possession is legal. Additionally the court holds that a requested jury instruction on jury nullification was properly denied, as a suggestion to the jury to disregard the judge's discussion of the law and the jury's duty to follow same is improper. The court suggests that if the street gang theory is true (the trial judge refused to let it be discussed, or to force ATF to identify the informant who reported the defendant's possession of the gun) it is not a defense to the charge. He should have gotten a firearm not subject to the NFA, or gotten a registered example, they say.
• U.S. v. Bryan, 122 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1997)
  Hey, the defendant's nickname is "Uzi"...
• U.S. v. Bumphus, 508 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1975)
  In this case decided under a now repealed felon in possession statute 18 USC 1202, the court decides that the defendant need not have obtained the firearms he is accused of possessing in interstate commerce, as long as the firearms traveled in intersstate commerce at some point in the past, even before he possessed them. His possession can be totally within one state and still violate the statute.
• U.S. v. Burgard, 551 F.2d 190 (8th Cir. 1977)
  
• U.S. v. Butler, 793 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1986)
  
• U.S. v. Caldwell, 49 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 1995)
  This is a case from the 6th circuit as to whether dealing off premises when one has an FFL is illegal. The court says no, at least it cannot be "dealing w/o a license". If a person has an FFL, they have an FFL, and can never be unlicensed regardless of where they are dealing from. Theoretically dealing from premises other than those on the license is a violation of other parts of the GCA though.
• U.S. v. Campbell, 427 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1970)
  
• U.S. v. Canestri, 518 F.2d 269 (2nd Cir. 1975)
  
• United States v. Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1997)
  In this case the 1st circuit upholds the ban on trasferring handguns to juveniles, following the 9th circuit (see US v. Michael R). The court claims that there is a substantial effect on interstate commerce by juveniles possessing handguns, and congress can ban intrastate transfers to control those interstate effects, whatever they are. The challenge was of course based on the orphaned US v. Lopez supreme court decision. The court also upholds a 20 year prison sentence for that offense and for possessing a single round of 9mm ammunition by a felon, based on the defendant's prior record.
• U.S. v. Carney, 356 F.Supp. 855 (M.D.Tenn. 1973)
  
• U.S. v. Caron, 77 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996)
  In this case the 1st circuit decides that for a felon to be considered to have had his civil rights restored under state law after a state felony conviction, and thus be able to own a gun, an automatic restoration of his civil rights by state law will suffice.
• United States v. Cash, 149 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 1998)
  In this case the court upholds the defendants' conviction for transferring unregistered drop in sears. The court rejects the defendants arguments that the sears could have been made before the sears were classified as machine guns, i.e. "pre-81 sears", saying that it is still illegal to transfer even pre-81 sears. The court also decided that the odds that these sears were pre-81 was very remote, given the low price they sold them for, and the clandestine manner in which they sold them.
• U.S. v. Casson, 288 F.Supp. 86 (D.Del. 1968)
  In this case the disctrict court decides that a charge under the pre-68 NFA of possessing a short shotgun made in violation of the Act does not require one to incriminate oneself, so that the logic of the Haynes case does not apply. The court does note that if one was already suspected of criminal activity requiring one to register one's guns, even before they were "made" might be self incrimination, but the court said that danger was remote and not very realistic. The court also notes in a few sentences that the second amendment was no protection from the prosecution.
• U.S. v. Castillo, 179 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted - U.S. -, (2000)
  
• U.S. v. Catanzaro, 368 F.Supp. 450 (D.Conn. 1973)
  
• U.S. v. Cecil, 457 F.2d 1178 (8th Cir. 1972)
  In this case an underage member of the Black Panthers was guarding the door to their house in Omaha, NE, with a sawed off shotgun. When the cops came by he was caught and arrested. Apparently the cops used him as a human shield while clearing the rest of the house... Anyway, the main point of interest in this case is whether the mere sight of a sawed-off shotgun provides probable cause of a crime such that you can be arrested, or whether the police have to also think the gun is unregistered in order to arrest you. After all, registered possession is not a crime. The court holds that the gun itself provides all the probable cause, and the police need do no investigation as to the registration status before they may arrest one in possession of such a gun. This of course is bad news for owners of legal guns, who may not have their paperwork on them when they have the gun. The dissent makes just that point, and says that checking the registration status is not such a burden as to waive such a requirement. The dissent sort of dilutes its point by suggesting the police could be made aware of who owns legal NFA weapons in their jurisdiction, to solve the problem. Such a scheme was done away with in the 1968 revisions of the NFA, because making the tax records open to the public created 5th amendment self incrimination problems with the registration plan. The dissent also notes, without citing any authority, and I thought ATF didn't have this sort of info until after 1980, that approximately 15000 short shotguns are registered, "most of which are registered to governmental agencies for training purposes, or to residents of Western states." Interesting. Those darn Westerners.
• U.S. v. Cerri, 753 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1985)
  In this case the 7th circuit upholds the validity of an administrative search of the home of a gun dealer under the Gun Control Act. While the home was not the licensed premises, the home was where the dealer was in fact dealing from. As it was the premises in fact, the court decided the ATF could conduct an administrative search of the entire home.
• U.S. v. Chamberlain, 159 F.3d 656 (1st Cir. 1998)
  In this case the 1st circuit court of appeals decides that a 5 day involuntary commitment to a mental institution without due process under Maine law suffices to disqualify one from oever owning a firearm, under the firearms disability for persons adjudicated mentally defective or committed to a mental institution.
• U.S. v. Clements, 471 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1972)
  
• U.S. v. Coleman, 441 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1971)
  
• U.S. v. Combs, 762 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1985)
  This case is the prosecution of a guy for putting a SMG length barrel on his Uzi semi auto. He gets acquitted of making the gun in violation of the NFA because the judge at trial messed up. But he got convicted of possessing the unregistered NFA weapon. He had been "rapid-fire" shooting with some buds and someone called the cops.
• U.S. v. Cooper, 409 F.Supp. 364 (M.D.Fla. 1976)
  In this case the court decides that the warrantless seizure of the defendant's FFL acquisition and disposition logbook was a proper exercise of the ATF authority to conduct warrantless "administrative" inspections of FFL dealers records and firearms.
• U.S. v. Copus, 93 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1996)
  In this case a fight the defendant got into with his wife turned out to be a bummer. He called the cops; they discovered part of his homemade machine gun/silencer/grenade collection. He was convicted, and the appeals court let the convictions stand. The court decides that, following their case of US v. Kenney, that 922(o) is a valid exercise of Congressional power; that the convictions under the NFA are not affected by 922(o); he did not show legal making of silencers or DD's was absolutely prohibited, such that ATF will not accept the tax on such items. He didn't show that because it isn't true. The court also upheld the determination that his "detonators" were DD's, in that they were complete, and could be used as a weapon. The court rejected cases looking at the defendant's intent in possessing a fully assembled item to see if it was a weapon. They would apply such a standard to a DD "parts kit"; ie unassembled, but complete, but not to a completed device.
• U.S. v. Corso, 20 F.3d 521 (2nd Cir. 1994)
  
• U.S. v. Cosey, 244 F.Supp. 100 (E.D.La. 1965)
  This case is a counterpart to US v. Thompson, which found that a sawed off shotgun that was not in shootable condition due to the lack of a firing pin was not an NFA weapon. In this case the court finds that a sawed-off shotgun that lacks a firing pin is an NFA weapon, since the firing pin can be substituted for by a nail. Although it was left to the jury, a similar conclusion was reached under the Colorado state law in People v. Vigil. The court distinguishes Thompson by saying in that case no one tried to use the gun with a nail, if they had the result might have been different. Theoretically both this case and Thompson were rendered obsolete by 1968 revisions to the NFA adding the "readily restored" language to the definition of short shotgun and short rifle.
• U.S. v. Coston, 469 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1972)
  
• U.S. v. Coward - F.Supp.2d - (E.D.Pa. 2001)
  
• U.S. v. Cowley, 452 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1971)
  In this case the defendant's conviction for possessing an unregistered short shotgun (which the indictment mistakenly called a shotgun with a barrel less than 16 inches, not 18, as it is in the law, although the mistake meant nothing to the defendant) is upheld by the appeals court. The defendant argued that because the law wouldn't let him register the gun, it violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the US constitution. The court, without much discussion disagreed; although this was the essence of the argument the same circuit (the 10th) accepted as to post 1986 machine guns in US v. Dalton - the government couldn't prosecute someone for failing to register or pay tax on a gun the government could not accept tax or registration on. The defendant also objected to the indictment calling the gun a 12 gauge, when the gun was in fact a 20 gauge shotgun. The court rejected that objection, saying it didn't interfere with either the attachment of jeapordy as to a second charge based on that gun, nor prevent the defendant from knowing what gun he was being charged with possessing. As a side note, this case was prosecuted by the feds, in all likelihood, because New Mexico had no state law prohibiting possession of short shotguns (or any NFA weapon) at this time. As the case notes, there was a city ordinance against short shotguns for which the defendant was first arrested, but in all likelihood the penalties for violating that law are fairly light.
• U.S. v. Cowper, 503 F.2d 130 (6th Cir. 1974)
  In this case the court upholds the conviction of a Cleveland police officer who made an unregistered M2 carbine. The court decides that the government did not have to prove that he knew the gun would fire automatically, in order to convict him. This holding was overruled a number of years later, in US v. Staples, although not as to this particular case.
• U.S. v. Cox, 696 F.2d 1294 (11th. Cir. 1983)
  This case concerns Roger Cox the guy who wrote one of the Thompson MG books out there. He was convicted of making false statements on an import permit for DP type machine guns he brought in from Guatemala. He said the guns were made in Guatemala, the gov't thought they were made in Russia, and further thought he knew that. I think the reason to lie would have been that ComBloc guns were basically blocked from import at the time. The case is from 1983, but it says he first went to look at the guns in 1971, and doesn't say when the importation, or prosecution happened. In any case it is an interesting story of what happens when the gov't appears to have a grudge. Dr. W told me he understands that Cox later was pardoned, or otherwise got his conviction nullified, and is now a lawyer. Some people never learn, I guess. Oh I believe the Ed Faust of Sacramento, CA, mentioned as helping to bankroll this importation is the guy who runs ARMEX International.
• U.S. v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329 (6th Cir. 1973)
  
• U.S. v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 1998)
  In this case the court upholds a conviction for possessign an unregistered sawed off shotgun, based on testimony from someone who helped the defendant saw it off, and based on the fact that it was shown to have originally been a regular shoulder stocked shotgun, and that it was not registered to the defendant, a drug dealer.
• U.S. v. Cumbee, 84 F.Supp. 390 (D.Minn. 1949)
  
• U.S. v. Cunningham, 161 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 1998)
  In this case the 11th circuit court of appeals uphold the ban on persons subject to a domestic violence restraining order possessing firearms, against a claim that it is outside Congress' interstate commerce power.
• U.S. v. Currier, 621 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1980)
  
• U.S. v. Dalpiaz, 527 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1975)
  In this case the defendant was caught with a military artillery simulator device as he tried to get on a plane. Hard to say what he thought he was doing. The case addresses whether the device is a "destructive device", and concludes it is not. The court agrees it has over .5 ounce of explosive or incinciary powder in it, and thus could be a DD. But the court decides that the thing was neither designed nor redesigned as a weapon, but was made as a training device for the military, and had not been modified in any way from that configuration. The court says they think that while the government need not prove the thing was intended as a weapon, that the defendant's intent as to the device is not important. Only the device itself will indicate whether it is a weapon or not.
• U.S. v. Dalton, 960 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1992)
  This is the case where the 10th circuit decided that the ban on owning post May 1986 mg's meant that a person could not be prosecuted for violating the NFA for possessing such a gun. An NFA violation is a failure to pay the tax, or comply with the registration procedures. As ATF won't and can't accept the tax or registration from an individual on a post-May gun, they cannot prosecute folks for not paying the tax. 922(o) impliedly repealed the NFA, at least as applied to post May guns. Incidentally, for those who care about the facts, Dalton was a Colorado attorney who accepted a converted "P.W.A. Commando 5.56 millimeter machine gun, serial number 6671", from a client as a retainer, the gun never having been registered, and having been made after 5/19/86.
• U.S. v. Dalton, 990 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1993)
  In this case the 10th circuit decided Dalton could be re-charged with violating 922(o) by possessing a post-May mg, after the charges under the NFA were thrown out by Dalton 1. After someone asked, I checked and after two trials on the 922(o) charge, one ending in a hung jury, the other ending in a conviction that was reversed on appeal, the US attorney let Dalton plead guilty to a misdemeanor violation, 18 USC sec. 922(n).
• U.S. v. Dalton, 795 F.Supp 353 (D.Colo. 1992)
  This is the district court decision that was reversed in Dalton2. I include it because I think the judge was right, Dalton should not have been re-prosecuted, and because it includes facts on the case not in the other opinions.
• U.S. v. Daniels, 527 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1975)
  
• U.S. v. David, 83 F.3d 638 (4th Cir. 1996)
  
• U.S. v. Davis, 346 F.Supp. 405 (W.D. Penn. 1972)
  In this case the defendant is acquitted of possessing an unregistered sawed off shotgun. It was in a car he had borrowed, and was pulled over in. The judge decides that while the law requires no knowledge the gun is unregistered, there must be some evidence linking the defendant to the gun to support a conviction for possession. In this case the fact that he was in the car with it, sitting on the seat it was under, was not enough, given the circumstances tending to show he didn't know about it.
• U.S. v. Davis, Cr. No. 8:93-106, Report of Magistrate, (S.C.Dist.Ct. June 21, 1993)
  
• U.S. v. DeBartolo, 482 F.2d 312 (1st Cir. 1973)
  This is the case that started the idea, only refuted in Staples, that the government need not prove the firearm at issue in an NFA prosecution was known to the defendant to be the type covered, but only was a "gun" in the general sense. As might be expected their logic is not too convincing, and seems to be partly the product of an era that was hoping guns would soon be outlawed altogether. The court decides, like the misdemeanor penalties for shipping unlabeled acid, the 10 year sentence for possessing a sawed off shotgun was justificable without proof the defendnat knew the gun was sawed off, because shotguns, like acid, are dangerous instruments, and a reasonable person would know they were regulated by the all powerful, and all reaching, state. Really. The court chooses an interpretation of dicta in the acid case, rather than the language to exactly the opposite rule, in Freed, because it disliked that interpretation of the NFA law. And this logic was followed by nearly every court of appeals for 20 years, resulting in hundreds of persons with no criminal intent being sent to jail. This court believes that by choosing to handle a gun, they led to that result, and prudent people would know they could go to jail for 10 years if the barrel of the shotgun they helped to sell was less than 18 inches.
• U.S. v. Decker, 292 F.2d 89 (6th Cir 1961)
  This case concerns whether a tear gas "pen" is an Any Other Weapon, under the NFA. The court decides that it is, as it could also fire a .410 gauge shot shell. Part of that test, says the court, is whether it can survive such a test, as well as whether it is capable of doing it once.

  The court also decides that the government need not prove the defendants knew the gun was capable of shooting real ammo, as well as tear gas, which made it subject to the NFA. Another holding overruled by Staples.

  This court also incorrectly cites Sonzinsky for the proposition that the Supreme court has passed judgment on the constitutionality of the non SOT provisions, and particularly, that requiring the defendant satisfactorily explain his possession of an NFA weapon, or have mere possession be sufficient for a jury to convict, is not too vague a standard. This clause was removed when the Act was revised in 1968; no explanation is solicited any more, although a defendant can still testify on his own behalf.

• U.S. v. Decker, 335 F.Supp. 1168 (W.D.Mo. 1970)
  In this case the court upholds the conviction of the defendant for selling firearms to out of state residents, and for selling handguns without requiring a permit required by state law for handgun purchases. ATF went to the defendant and got him to sell them handguns and so on pretending to be out of state residents, when in fact they were state residents.
• U.S v. Decker, 446 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1971)
  In this case the appeals court affirms a conviction of a firearms dealer for selling firearms to out of state residents, who also didn't have a permit required by state law to acquire a handgun.
• U.S. v. Della Rocca, 388 F.2d 525, judgment vacated 88 S.Ct. 1443 (1968)
  In this case the court upholds the defendants conviction for selling an undercover agent a machine gun. The court decides that the registration provisions of the pre-68 NFA at issue do not violate the self incrimination clause of the constitution, even though NY law prohibited private posssession of machine guns. The case was reversed by the Supreme Court based on its decision in the Haynes case.
• U.S. v. DePugh, 266 F.Supp. 417 (W.D.Mo. 1967)
  
• U.S. v. DePugh, 266 F.Supp. 435 (W.D.Mo. 1967)
  
• U.S. v. DePugh, 266 F.Supp. 453 (W.D.Mo. 1967)
  
• U.S. v. Dewalt, 92 F.3d 1209 (D.C.Cir. 1996)
  This is another case that sort of addresses the issue raised in a host of post-Staples cases - whether the defendant needs to know the barrel of a sawed-off shotgun is less than 18 inches. In this case the government stipulated that that was an element, agreeing with Edwards, Starkes, and Mains, and rejecting the Barr case. However the court notes that it does not necessarily agree with that reading of Staples, and the dissent attacks that logic. As the defendant was not told, the government needed to prove he knew the barrel was under 18 inches, (it was 16 1/4 inches; a 16 gauge J.C. Higgins bolt action shotgun, perhaps cut by someone misinformed about the differing lengths for shotguns and rifles) the guilty plea of the defendant was reversed, and the case can go to trial, or doi another guilty plea. The fact that the defendant appealed suggests he no longer wants to plead guilty. The dissent tries to pretend Starkes wasn't remanded by the Supremes for the issue of whether the defendant knew the barrel was under 18 inches, but whether the gun in that case was a sawed off shotgun. What the difference is isn't clear. Starkes is important because the remand suggests the court thinks that Staples requires the prosecution to show the defendant knew the actual characteristics of the gun that brought it under the Act. The dissenting judge would just have the prosecution show the defendant saw the barrels were short; what the legal limit is doesn't count. It could have been set at 20 inches, she says in a footnote; anything under 26 inches she suggests has no legitimate use. She is also seriously misinformed about how short shotugns work, pattrn wise, and apparently took judicial notice about the destructive power cause by a short barrel (as opposed to a short overall length, which she suggests is less evil; the gun in this case was 29+ inches, but that it was so long, over the overall length parameter does not sway her) without any basis in reality. She claims the evil was the tremendous power of a sawed off shotgun, and the spread to the shot, not a concealable firearm made from a long gun, flouting the laws of the states that repressed handguns at the time.
• U.S. v. Dillon, 150 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 1998)
  In this case the court upholds a conviction for lying on a 4473 form, on a firearm purchase from a licensed dealer.
• U.S. v. Djelaj, 842 F.Supp. 278 (E.D.Mich. 1994)
  In this case a federal trial court rejects the application of the Dalton doctrine (it is unconstitutional to convict a defendant of possessing an unregistered weapon, when the feds would never, by law, accept a registration application for the gun) to molotov cocktails possessed by Michigan residents. While the feds would have refused to register the weapons, because Michigan forbids possession of such items (and the feds would have rejected the application if the cocktails were already made - a distinction the court seems unaware of, and presumes existing weapons are registerable, under federal law) the defendants were not in an impossible situation, since they could have avoided the law by not possessing the molotov cocktails. However, it seems to me the situation in this case is identical to Dalton. It is also identical if the defendant possesses an existing gun, which is also unregisterable. If the feds are forbidden, by any law, not just 922(o), from accepting a registration on an NFA weapon, how can it be fair to prosecute them for failing to register a gun the feds would not let them register? Either Dalton is right, or it is wrong. However, even the 10th circuit, the court that originated Dalton, rejected its application to an existing short shotgun, in a second case, claiming that the requirement that the person take possession, or make the gun, in compliance with the NFA is acceptable, and the inability to register after the fact was too bad. This is the same argument as this case, which rejects Dalton.
• Brief 1 in U.S. v. One DLO A/C 30.06 Machine Gun
  
• Brief 2 in U.S. v. One DLO A/C 30.06 Machine Gun
  
• Brief 3 in U.S. v. One DLO A/C 30.06 Machine Gun
  
• Brief 4 in U.S. v. One DLO A/C 30.06 Machine Gun
  
• Brief 5 in U.S. v. One DLO A/C 30.06 Machine Gun
  
• Brief 6 in U.S. v. One DLO A/C 30.06 Machine Gun
  
• U.S. v. One DLO A/C 30.06 Machine Gun, 904 F.Supp. 622 (N.D. Ohio 1995)
  
• U.S. v. Dodge, 846 F.Supp. 181 (D.Conn. 1994)
  In this decision the trial court denies Dodge pre-trial release on bail, finding that the charges of conspiracy to possess a silencer and possession of an unregistered destructive device are crimes of violence, and that, as well as other factors means the defendant poses a danger to the public if released before trial.
• Claim of Louis Katona, III to BATF.
  See US v. One DLO machine gun
• Motion in civil forfeiture of firearms case
  See US v. One DLO machine gun
• U.S. v. Dollar, 25 F.Supp.2d 1320 (N.D.Ala. 1998)
  
• U.S. v. Doucet, 994 F.2d 169 (5th Cir 1993)
  In this case a guy was set up by his brother to take a fall for possessing an unregistered machine gun. By the end of the case the government thought they had a poor case and tried to refocus their arguments to possessing a unregistered machine gun conversion part (an AR auto sear, ATF got Doucet to install it in an AR by having his brother beg him to do so, for the brother's use). The court throws the conviction out, saying that while both may be a "machine gun" under the NFA, the indictment must indicate what definition(s) they are proceeding under, and may not switch from it being an assembled machine gun, to a conversion part, midway through the case. This has to do with the constitutional right to be informed of the charges against you, by a grand jury indictment. The court was also disgusted by ATF's use of the brother to set up Doucet, although that was not the basis of their decision.
• U.S. v. Douglas, 974 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1992)
  In this case the 9th circuit throws out a conviction for being a felon in possession of firearms, as the defendant had a valid FFL, and was disposing of his inventory and or personal firearms. The GCA provides a specific exception for that activity, and therefore the defendant was not a felon in possession at the time claimed. ATF claimed the exception didn't apply because he was dealing in violation of his license, by selling at an out of state gun show. The court said that whether he was violating gun show sales rules or not, he had a FFL, and that was all that mattered. ATF claimed he was violating the gun show sales regs because he was selling through a local dealer, and delivering the firearms in person to the out of state dealer, at the gun show. The court noted in a footnote that there was no law or regulation that said that was prohibited, and that dealing outside of the rules, as long as one had an FFL, did not make it as if one did not have an FFL. See US v. Caldwell for a similar holding, and US v. Bailey for the rejection of this idea, agreeing that dealing off of licensed premises was the same as dealing w/o an FFL.
• U.S. v. Drasen, 665 F.Supp. 598 (N.D.Ill. 1987)
  This is the trial court's decision that was overturned in part by the 7th Circuit court of appeals. That dealt with the issue of what constitutes a short barreled rifle, and that holding was upheld by the Supreme Court in the Thompson/Center case, although I would tend to agree with the judge in this case. Interestingly, the 1950's Revenue Ruling that both this case and the appeal hinge on was declared obsolete and no longer valid by ATF in 1972. Neither court picked up on that, although it is noted in the T/C supreme court case. Pretty unethical to be arguing law on behalf of the government that the government repudiated....

  However this opinion also deals with counts against the defendant related to machine guns and machine gun parts, which were not appealed to the 7th circuit. Specifically the issue of whether a mini-gun "housing" was a receiver, whether a set of receive parts, cut up, could be a machine gun receiver within the statute, and whether the GE mini-gun is a machine gun or not. The court decides that the sheet metal housing to a mini-gun is the receiver, and that the gut up parts of one, even if they need welding, can be a receiver within the statute, at least so as to preclude summary judgment on that issue. The court also goes over the 1954 ruling as to when an electric Gatling gun is not an mg, and apparently ATF was sticking to that, in 1987. ATF said they would prove the housing was for a gas operated Gatling gun, and not an electric one...so the court did not grant summary judgment. It is conceivable that ATF considers the GE mini-gun to be an mg not because it is an mg, but because the receiver and some other parts can be used to make a fully auto, gas operated mg. In other words, the GE mini-gun might be considered a semi-auto on an mg receiver. I am not familiar with any rulings as to the mini-gun in particular, but that seems to be the position they take in this case. The court also decides that selling a conversion kit to one person, is still covered, even if the parts are doled out over several days, if the intent is there to sell a conversion kit, and not just part of a conversion kit.

• U.S. v. Drasen, 845 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1988)
  This case concerns whether an unassembled set of parts to make a rifle out of can be a short barreled rifle under the NFA, if the parts have never been assembled into a rifle. Basically the issue is whether the definition covers it. Although the law doesn't say that, the court decides it does. ATF has long argued, and been bolstered by cases such as this, that an NFA weapon, that is not otherwise defined as parts of such a weapon, is still one if someone possesses all the parts to assemble it. They apply the same logic to semi-auto "assault" weapons, and large capacity magazines. This holding was not altered by the supreme court case in Thompson/Center, which was similar to this. In that case the court agreed with this case, but distinguished the situation with T/C in that the parts had dual use, either for a legal gun(s), or for a SBR. In this case the folks were selling the AR kits with short barrels and a flash hider you were supposed to silver solder onto the end, or otherwise permanently attach. Either that or register the thing as a SBR before you put it together. Since the flash hider wasn't permenetly attached they didn't count it toward the overall length of the barrel, and the kit could only turn into a SBR, unless you bought parts of your own into the equation.
• U.S. v. Dupaquier, 74 F.3d 615 (5th Cir 1996)
  
• U.S. v. Edwards, 90 F.3d 199 (7th Cir. 1996)
  In this case the court addresses the distortion of the Supreme court decision in Staples by other courts, in particular the Imes and Barr cases. The question is whether Staples applies to a sawed off shotgun; ie does the government need to prove the defendant knew the characteristics of the weapon that put it within the purview of the NFA? Staples says yes. Imes and Barr say no, because the thing that makes the gun subject to the Act is not something hidden, but if the defendant has ever seen the gun he has seen the characteristics that make it subject to the Act, its length. The Imes case in particular wants to believe that Staples didn't overrule the 9th circuits precedent on this issue, the Herbert case. However the Supreme court did, and whether the characteristic that brings the gun under the Act is hidden or not, makes no difference. In Staples the defendant was supposedly on notice because one of the external selector stops on his AR had been ground off, leaving bright metal. Made no difference. As this court points out, if the alteration is obvious, that makes it that much easier for the government to prove the defendant knew the gun was withing the NFA. If it is close, as in Imes, I believe it was less than 1 inch under legal, the government should have to prove it. When the Supremes render a decision some circuit court judges disagree with they will undermine it as best they can - knowing in part the court is unlikely to revisit an issue they just decided. This court correctly, in my opinion, decides that Staples applies to short shotguns, and in fact they say, to all items that might appear to be conventional firearms, that someone might reasonably think are OK, given the heritage of legal firearms ownership in the USA, as the Staples court pointed out. There is a nice split in circuits on this issue, and while the Supremes should grant cert. in one of these cases, it is unlikely they will.
• Transcript, U.S. v. One FAL Rifle, Case No. 71-2747-HP, and U.S. v. One Browning Automatic Rifle, Case No. 72-642-HP (C.D.Cal 1972)
  
• U.S. v. One Lot of Eighteen Firearms, 325 F.Supp. 1326 (D.N.H. 1971)
  In this case the trial court decides that the pardon of the defendant for his felony conviction, for which the government was trying to forfeit his firearms operates to stop the forfeiture of his firearms, even though the pardon was granted after the firearms were seized, but before they were ordered forfeited.
• U.S. v. Eighteen Various Firearms, 148 F.R.D. 530 (E.D.Pa 1993)
  In this case the court dismisses the case over the objections of the gun owner, after ATF agreed to let him register the guns that were the subject of the forfeiture. The gun owner contended that if the case continued on he could get attorney fees, and a judgment letting him register other guns, that weren't the subject of the forfeiture.
• 1993 ATF Memo on US v 18 firearms case
  
• U.S. v. Elliott, 128 F.3d 671 (8th Cir. 1997)
  
• U.S. v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1986)
  
• U.S. v. Emerson, 46 F.Supp.2d 598 (N.D.Texas 1999)
  In this decision a US district court decides that the ban on posssessing firearms while subject to a domestic violence restraining order violates the 2nd and 5th amendments to the US Constitution. In his decision he decides that the 2nd amendment does pertain to a personal individual right to own firearms, and that the restraining order ban violates that right.
• Brief of Gun Owners Foundation in appeal of U.S. v. Emerson
  
• U.S. v. Endicott, 803 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1986)
  This case deals with a lot of issues, the main interesting one being whether a silencer kit was a silencer, before the 1986 change in the law defining silencers to explicitly include parts. In this case, as in Luce and Poulos, the "kit" was apparently really ALL the parts, in unassembled form. The issue of the kits, and the lack of an Amnesty to register them, has yet to be settled, but I don't doubt there are a lot of them still out there. In any case, as part of a line of such cases, the court holds that the silencer definition includes complete weapons in disassembled form, and the ATF takes the position that anytime a law bans a certain firearm it also bans the gun in unassembled form, even if the language doesn't say so.
• U.S. v. Evans, 712 F.Supp. 1435 (D.Mont. 1989)
  
• United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1991)
  Evans was peddling STEN receiver blanks with a template for doing them up. He was working with a buddy who sold complete STEN parts kits. The feds charged him with conspiring and aiding and abetting in the illegal making of machine guns, based on the idea that his motive in selling the things, and assisting folks in getting all the parts was to have his customers make illegal machine guns. They never said that the receiver blanks were machine guns, or that the blanks and parts kit together were a machine gun (although ATF apparently considers that a "set of parts from which an mg may be readily assembled"). Just the conspiracy, and aiding and abetting, based on what his customers did with the stuff, and what ATF contended he intended his customers do with the stuff. There is no reason why this logic couldn't be extended to anyone who sells receiver blanks, or parts. Apparently ATF has a policy that selling one or the other is fine, selling them both, or selling them together is not. This is major twilight zone stuff. Anyway the 9th circuit, the most reversed circuit by the US Supreme Court, approves of this. This case is one, with Hale, that approves of the constitutionality of 922(o), as an exercise of the commerce clause power of Congress. This is the view Bownds rejects. The court does not give it much thought, and basically says Congress may do as it wishes without interference from the courts.
• U.S. v. Farrell, 69 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 1995)
  In this case a guy who brought two AK's home from the Gulf war was arrested when he had a friend try and sell them. The court has to decide whether the "knowing" requirement for a violation of 922(o) means specific intent, the guy knew he was violating the law, or more general intent, he knew he had machine guns, but didn't know they were prohibited. The general intent requirement is all that is needed for an NFA violation; even that wasn't needed before the Supreme court decision in Staples. However this is not an NFA violation case, it is under 18 USC 922(o). The court decides that the government only need show he knew they were machine guns. The court also decides that the guns, as "select fire" were "inherently suspect" and the government need not show he knew they could fire full auto, but only that he had seen them, and they bore external reflectons of being full auto (3 position selectors, apparently, in this case). This follows the 8th circuit decision in Barr, which also works to undermine Staples, and somehow waive the requirement that the government prove the defendant knew the nature of the weapons that made them subject to the statute. The logic of this case, and Barr, makes Staples a nullity.
• U.S. v. Ferguson, 788 F.Supp. 580 (D.D.C. 1992)
  In this case a guy was charged with stealing machine guns from the US State Dept. mailroom. The fed dist. ct for D.C. approved of the logic of the Rock Island and Dalton cases but said they did not apply here, because the guns he stole were pre-86 guns, and thus were not covered by 922(o). The court said that the government intended to prove the guns were also registered under the NFA, something that guns possessed by the US government need not be.
• U.S. v. Fisher, 353 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1965)
  This is a case from 1965, on whether a smooth bore pistol was really an AOW. Before 1968 the AOW definition was not what there is now, but basically said, any concealable gun that isn't a pistol or revolver is an AOW. ATF, then and now, administratively defined a pistol and revolver as only guns with rifled bores. Before 1968, for example, a Mossberg 500 shotgun with a 18" barrel and a pistol grip would have been considered an AOW. The AOW definition was re-written in 1968. Anyway the court approves of the ATF administrative definition of pistol, and rejects the testimony of experts who say the definition is wrong, and the gun in question, a pre-34 Stevens single shot .410 pistol is a pistol, and not an AOW, despite its smooth bore.
• U.S. v. Fleish, 90 F.Supp. 273 (E.D. Mich. 1949)
  In one of his many challenges to his conviction and sentence, Fleish's argument that his NFA convictions violate double jeapordy, and that his sentence is cruel and unusual are rejected.
• U.S. v. Fleish, 227 F.Supp. 967 (E.D.Mich. 1964)
  After serving 20 years for being caught with 8 unregistered machine guns, and after numerous unsuccessful legal challenges, in this case Fleish gets out of prison after the court strikes down all but one of the crimes he was sentenced for, based on the Russell case. The court finds that the failure to register firearms charges he was convicted of, in 1939, were unconstitutional in that they compelled Fleish to incriminate himself in violation of the 5th amendment.
• U.S. v. Fleming, 19 F.3d 1325 (10th Cir. 1994)
  Bill Fleming arranged two separate transactions, one where machine guns and DD's were transferred from a Texas seller to the Seminole, OK police department, as well as a second where he transferred guns and silencers through the Creek County DA's office in Oklahoma, and then from those agencies to the true purchasers. While these transactions are within the law, and they do not require a transfer tax, the court decided they were really "sham" transactions, and were illegal. They interpret the government agency exception to the tax to apply only when the agency is acquiring the weapon for its use (or possibly another legitimate reason). The agency may not acquire the weapons for the purpose of re-transferring them to someone else and thus avoid the transfer tax to individuals in the process. The court decided that when Fleming made out the Form 5's indicating the weapons were going to the law agencies for their use he was making a false statement, because the weapons weren't going to the agencies they were going to private buyers. In the case of the guns transferred to the DA's office they were apparently never even delivered to the agency; Fleming kept them while the paper to the final purchaser was completed.

  In my opinion, from reading the case, Fleming got screwed. What he did was within the law; there is no statutory limitation on the reasons why a governmental agency may transfer weapons into and out from itself. The court made up this "sham" exception; the law impliedly relies on governmental agencies not using their tax exemption to facilitate avoidance of the tax, but if they do abuse it in that manner, nothing in the law prohibits that. The prosecutor in the Fleming case is the same one who lost big time in the Staples v. US case, when that was appealed to the US Supreme Court. Fleming was the expert witness for the defense in the Staples case. Not that anyone was holding a grudge or anything.

• U.S. v. Fogarty, 344 F.2d 475 (6th Cir. 1965)
  In this case the court upholds a finding by the trial court that a gun made out of a .22 rifle with barrel less than 16", and equipeed with a device that muffled the report was a firearm under the NFA, even though the device was made to break into telephone coin boxes, and not use as a weapon.
• Motion to dismiss the indictment in U.S. v. Forgett, No. 23652
  
• Brief in support of dismissal of indictment in U.S. v. Forgett, No. 23652
  
• Reply brief in support of dismissal of indictment in U.S. v. Forgett, No. 23652
  
• Government answer to reply brief in U.S. v. Forgett, No. 23652
  
• U.S. v. Forget, No. 23652 (N.D. Ohio December 20, 1963)
  
• U.S. v. Forgett, 349 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1965), reversed and remanded w/o opinion, 390 U.S. 203 (1968), indictment dismissed, (April 10, 1970, N.D.Ohio)
  In this case the 6th circuit upholds a conviction under the pre-68 NFA for transporting interstate unregistered NFA weapons. The defendant was a dealer (whose family runs Navy Arms today) who bought a bunch of machine guns from a dealer in Wisconsin, and whose trucking company got stopped by the police, and the unregistered guns were discovered. The court states that it doesn't think the statute violated his right against self incrimination, since the offense wasn't failing to register, but transporting unregistered guns interstate.
• U.S. v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 1997)
  In this case, the en banc 9th circuit decides that in order for someone to "carry" a firearm within the prohibition on carrying a firearm while committing a drug crime, they must not be just transporting the gun. In this case the gun was in the bed of a pickup, covered by a snap on tarp. The judges decided that was not carrying the gun within the statute, that there had to be more contact with the gun than just transporting it from one place to another.
• U.S. v. Fourteen Various Firearms, 889 F.Supp. 875 (E.D.Va. 1995)
  In this decision the court throws out an attempt to forfeit firearms seized from a gun shop, whose owner was later convicted of making a false statement to the government. The court decides that the forfeiture action was started too late, after 120 days from the date of seizure, as required by the Gun Control Act. The court rejects the argument that as long as the government started an administrative proceeding, it can start the judicial forfeiture whenever it feels like it, saying the statute requires that any and all proceedings begin within 120 days of seizure. This view was rejected by the courts in the US v. Twelve Misc. Firearms case, as well as in the U.S. v. Twelve Firearms decision.
• United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1998)
  In this case the 2nd circuit joins all other circuits that have considered the issue, and upholds the constitutionality of the ban on new manufacture of machine guns, 18 USC 922(o).
• U.S. v. Fredman, 833 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987)
  
• United States v. Funches - F.3d - (11th Cir. 1998)
  In this case the court decides that erroneous advice from state prison officials that the defendant could possess firearms when released from jail is not the sort of promissory estoppel that prevents the federal government from prosecuting him for being a felon in possession of firearms. The court also takes the opportunity to rail against jurors being able to render a decision based on their conscience, rather than the law as instructed by the judge, so called jury nullification.
• U.S. v. Gambill, 912 F.Supp. 298 (S.D. Ohio 1996)
  In this case the district court judge decides to follow the US v. Dalton line of cases, rather than the US v. Ardoin line, and decides that the NFA, as applied to machine guns (only) has been repealed by 18 USC 922(o), and thus Gambill cannot be convicted of violating the NFA as to a SKS rifle he converted to full auto. However his convictions for making destructive devices (pipe bombs he claimed were for killing groundhogs) and an unregistered silencer were upheld.
• U.S. v. Garcia, 77 F.3d 274 (9th Cir. 1996)
  
• U.S. v. Gardner, 448 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1971)
  In this 1971 case the 7th circuit holds that the Freed case means that the government need not prove the defendant knew his gun, a pre-1934 smooth bore pistol, was in fact a smooth bore pistol. As with Ranney, this case was overturned by Staples. It is interesting to read about how immediately after the GCA was enacted, the investigation in this case was in 1969, the ATF immediately goes to work trying to entrap folks into dealing without an FFL. The smooth bore pistol was a gift they found during their search; the defendant was acquitted of the unlicensed dealing charge.
• U.S. v. Garnett, - F.3d - (4th Cir. 2001)
  
• U.S. v. Garrett, 583 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1978)
  
• U.S. v. Gates, 491 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1974)
  In this case the court overturns the defendants conviction for possessing an unregistered NFA gun (they don't mention what sort of gun, I bet it was a sawed off shotgun). The defendant was a passenger in a car in which the gun was found; under his seat. The court said that was not enough - there was no other evidence linking him to the gun. They said there could be an inference of possession to the driver, he was acquitted separately. There were no fingerprints on the gun. The government needed more facts linking the defendant to the gun than sitting on top of it in the car, to show possession.
• U.S. v. Gergen - F.3d - (9th Cir. 1999)
  
• U.S. v. Giannini, 455 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1972)
  In this case the 9th circuit rejects a challenge to multiple NFA convictions on the basis that the NFA is not a proper exercise of the commerce power, noting that it is an exercise of the taxing power and not the commerce power. The court also noted that there is no requirement that the defendants know they are violating the NFA, just a requirement that they have done the acts that constitute the violation intentionally.
• Administrative inspection warrant application, and affidavit for same, dated May 30, 1986, and the warrant
  
• U.S. v. Goff, affidavit for 6/4/86 search warrant of ARDCO
  
• U.S. v. Goff, affidavit for 6/6/86 search warrant
  
• U.S. v. Goff, search warrant affidavit for warrant of July 21, 1986
  
• U.S. v. Goff, No 86-CR-168, Indictment of November 20, 1986
  
• U.S. v. Goff, Motion for Protective Order of April 15, 1987
  
• U.S. v. Goff, July, 1987 Government Trial Brief
  
• United States v. Goff, 677 F. Supp. 1526 (D. Utah 1987)
  A federal district court opinion denying a motion by the Goffs to suppress evidence seized both with and without a search warrant. The Goffs ran the Utah company that made American 180 machine guns, and apparently papered several thousand guns they hadn't made yet, in the few days before 5/19/86, the day the making ban took effect. NFA Branch asked the local ATF to look at the guns, to make sure they existed. A world of hurt followed. The case has a good summary of the rather bogus state of the law in terms of warrantless "administrative" searches of FFL holders. I don't know what ultimately happened to the Goffs in terms of criminal convictions.

  And note the judge's brilliant logic that a warrant that authorized the seizure of "firearms" included unmachined aluminum blocks, because the law defines a SILENCER as any part designed and intended for use in a silencer. From this he decides that also any part designed and intended for use in a machine gun is also a "firearm" and subject to seizure. That should have been appealed; that is clearly wrong, and a scary leap of logic, all machine gun parts are machine guns also. BULL. Where does he get off using the definition of silencer to define what a "firearm" (in the NFA sense) is, or what a machine gun is. Damn that's stupid. But the value of getting the blocks thrown out as evidence (having been seized w/o a valid warrant) was probably pretty minimal. Not worth appealing. I also like the comment about how a machine gun receiver is the part that lets it fire fully automatic.

• U.S. v. Goff, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, July, 1990
  
• U.S. v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 1996)
  In this case the court reverses a conviction for possessing a firearm by a felon. The felon was not permitted to put on his defense, which was that he had an immediate need to protect himself, which the court said is generally a defense to a charge under sec. 922(g). In this case the reason the felon needed protection was because the government, after getting his help in convicting a fellow inmate in a murder for hire scheme, told the other guy who the informant was, and refused to help protect him after he began getting very serious threats to his life. On top of refusing to help protect him, they (the same prosecutors as on the first case where he was an informant) then prosecuted him for possessing a shotgun he had to protect himself. One interesting feature of this case is footnote 7, where the judge states uneqivacally that the second amendment protects the rights of persons to own guns, and that if there was no exception to sec. 922(g) for felons to possess guns to protect themselves from immediate threats, the law might well be unconstitutional, under the second amendment. The other judges on this panel wrote separate concurrences to distance themselves from the footnote. One even notes that it directly contradicts a decision from another 9th circuit panel from almost the same time, as to the second amendment (referring to the Hickman v. Block case). Compare this case to the US v. Bernard Brown case, where the court upheld the exclusion of this sort of defense to a charge of possessing an sawed off shotgun. In part, the Brown court says, because Brown could have resorted to a non-NFA firearm for defense from the street gang. No such issue in this case.
• U.S. v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928 (5th Cir. 1997)
  In this case the 5th circuit upholds a conviction for violating 922(o), as well as some drug trafficking counts. The court fiollows US v. Just, and decides that the fact that a machine gun is registered and thus exempt from 922(o) is an affirmative defense, and not something the government needs to prove. The court also decided that the 30 year sentencing enhancement for possessing or using a machine gun in a drug trafficking crime is not so harsh as to violate the 8th amendment by any disproportionality between the crime and the sentence. Lastly the court rejected the claim that the government failed to prove the defendant knew the gun was a machine gun. The court just said they found it inconceivable the owner of a converted semi-auto rifle wouldn't know it fired as a machine gun, and noted a witness claimed the defendant claimed to have a machine gun.
• U.S. v. Goodman, 639 F.Supp. 802 (M.D.Pa. 1986)
  In this case a FFL dealer, who also was an attorney, is convicted to conspiring to import unimportable firearms, specifically Walther TPH pistols. Goodman operated under the name American Armaments. He got a local PD to order 24 Walthers, where he would pay for them, and keep 22 of them. ATF found out, and persecuted. Goodman argued the literal words of the law allowed a PD to use its purchase order to import otherwise unimportable guns for commercial resale, and the purchase need not be for its use. The court agreed the words said that, but claimed it would subvert Congress' will not to read the law to prohibit the plan at issue. This case also features a classic quote from current class 2 manufacturer, Doug Oefinger, testifying he told the defendant he "was fucking nuts" when the scheme was described to him. Maybe not nuts, but he definitely underestimated ATF.
• U.S. v. Goodson, 439 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1971)
  In this prosecution under the pre-68 NFA, the 5th circuit reverses a conviction for possessing a short shotgun made in violation of the NFA. The court decides that since the shotgun was made in Canada originally, the government needs to prove the short shotgun was made in the USA, as it is not a crime to make one outside the USA, and possession of such a gun is not covered by the section of the NFA the government prosecuted under. As the government admitted it could not prove the short shotgun was made in the USA, the court reverses the conviction. While it is still true that NFA weapons outside the USA are not regulated, the statute has been revised to sort of eliminate this issue.
• U.S. v. Gravenmeir, 121 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1997)
  In this case the 9th circuit agrees with the 8th circuit case US v. Just, and decides that whether a machine gun is registered is an affirmative defense to a charge under 18 USC 922(o), and the government does not have to prove non-registration as an element of the offense. The court also agrees that the Staples decision applies to 922(o), as well as to the NFA; in other words the government has to prove the defendant knew the gun was a machine gun, in order to win a conviction. In this case the court said that was demonstrated by the defendant showing the converted Uzi to another person and saying it was full-auto, the defendant possessing machine gun conversion books, his subscription to the magazine Machine Gun News, and the three position selector on the pistol grip of the gun.
• U.S. v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1973)
  In this case the court upholds a finding that stolen rifles were seized during a search for illegal liquor without a warrant or probable cause, and thus as the rifles were seized in violation of the 4th amendment they cannot be used as evidence against the defendant.
• U.S. v. Green, 515 F.Supp. 517 (D.Md. 1981)
  
• U.S. v. Griley, 814 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1987)
  In this case the court upholds a conviction for possessing an unregistered machinegun, and for transporting an unregistered machine gun across state lines. The defendant was alleged to have obtained a M16 stolen from Ft. Meade, in Maryland, and to have taken it to his mothers house in North Carolina. Among points of interest, the court decides that it was proper to have the jury hear testimony that the parts found at his mother house were a machine gun, even though it was incomplete, and may have consisted only of a receiver. The court also upholds the prosecutor represnting that a witness would not get favorable treatment on pending charges he was facing, then actually giving favorable treatment when the witness was later sentenced.
• U.S. v. Gross, 313 F.Supp. 1330 (S.D. Ind. 1970)
  In this case the trial court upholds the defendants conviction for dealing in firearms without a license. The court says that the Gun Control Act does not violate the constitution, in that it is a regulation of interstate commerce, and that it is also an exercise of Congress' taxking power, and further that it does not offend the second amendment to the Constitution. Also see the Appeals court decision, which tackles different issues, for the most part.
• U.S. v. Gross, 451 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1971)
  In this case the court upholds the conviction for dealing in firearms without an FFL of the gun department manager of a K-Mart store. He was buying and selling guns with the store customers on the side, as well as dealing guns to other folks on the side. One turned out to be an undercover police officer. The court rejected arguments that the definition of being a dealer was too vague to be sure whether it applied to his conduct, as well as his argument that part of the question and answer section in the gun law guidebook published by the predecessor to ATF said that you didn't need a license to occasionally buy and sell guns, and therefore the government was estopped from claiming otherwise.
• U.S. v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992)
  This is a case which upheld the constitutionality of 922(o) under both the second amendment and the commerce power. In the case of the commerce power, this is the logic that the Bownds case disagreed with. Bownds apparently did not raise a 2nd amendment claim. The court rather blithely disposes of the constitutional question claiming the 2nd amendment does not mean anyone has a right to own a gun, only that the feds may not interfere with militias. And as to the commerce power claim, they use the findings made when the 1968 GCA was enacted, not the 1986 ban, to say there was enough of a nexus with commerce for the feds to ban machine guns. A "we're not going to listen, see our hands are over our ears" type case. Depressing.
• U.S. v. Hall, 972 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1992)
  
• U.S. v. Hancock, - F.3d - (9th Cir. 2000)
  
• U.S. v. Hardgrave, 214 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1954)
  
• U.S. v. Hardy, 120 F.3d 76 (7th Cir. 1997)
  
• U.S. v. Harflinger, 436 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1970)
  In this case the appeals court upholds a conviction for possessing a bomb that was not registered. In part, the court decides that the provisions of the post-68 NFA regarding possessing unregistered NFA weapons do not violate the 5th amendment the way the pre-68 NFA provisions were held to do.
• U.S. v. Harrelson, 442 F.2d 290 (8th Cir. 1971)
  In this case the court rejects the contention that the defendant's conviction for possessing a sawed off shotgun made in violation of the pre-68 NFA should be thrown out. The defendant argued that the requirements to file an applicaiton to make the shotgun would violate his right against self incrimination. The court, without discussion, citing its decision in Reed v. US, as well as other courts reaching the same conclusion, rejects the argument.
• U.S. v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
  This case has defendants named "knot", "drago", "cheese" and "richmo".....drug dealers from Wash. DC. Of interest in this long case is the DC Circuit court agreeing with other cases, before Staples, that conviction under the NFA requres a showing by the government that the person knew the gun was a machine gun in order to convict (the gun was a MAC-10, "a favorite of drug dealers"). The court also says that such a requirement comes from the language of the law, or the lack of a waiver of requiring such proof, and Congress could constitutionally dispense with mens rea for possession of a firearm if it wished.

  The court also says that using a gun in a drug transaction can be just trading it for drugs, a conclusion also reached by the Supreme court in the Smith case.

• U.S. v. Harvey, 397 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1968)
  In this case the court throws out a conviction for possessing an unregistered sawed off shotgun based on an illegal search. The court also notes that it is not ruling on the defendant's self incrimination claims because of the alternate basis for reversal.