Cite as Boston v. State, 952 S.W.2d 671 (Ark. 1997)

                   Sterling Boston, Appellant,

                               v.

                  State of Arkansas, Appellee.

                         No. CR 97-589.

                   Supreme Court of Arkansas.

                          Oct. 9, 1997.

     William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, Mike Castleman,
Deborah R. Sallings, Deputy Public Defenders, Little Rock, for
Appellant.

     Winston Bryant, Attorney General, Kelly Terry, Assistant
Attorney General, Little Rock, for Appellee.

     ARNOLD, Chief Justice.

     Appellant Sterling Boston was convicted in violation of
Ark.Code Ann. section 5-73-120 (Supp. 1995), the unauthorized
carrying of a weapon. An officer approached Boston while he was
sitting in his taxicab and asked for his license and registration.
The officer requested that Boston get out of the vehicle; upon
getting out, Boston informed the officer that he had a weapon in
his back pocket. The officer arrested Boston for carrying a weapon
without a license. Boston appeals the conviction claiming that the
statutory defense for carrying a weapon in one's place of business
authorized Boston's carrying the weapon in his taxicab because this
was his place of business.

     This case involves interpretation of the Arkansas Code and
whether the term "business" includes a taxi cab or any motor
vehicle used for commercial purposes. Specifically, Ark.Code Ann.
section 5-73-120 provides:

     (a) A person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if he
     possesses a handgun, knife, or club on or about his person, in
     a vehicle occupied by him, or otherwise readily available for
     use with a purpose to employ it as a weapon against a person.
     . . . .
     (c) It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that
     at the time of the act of carrying:

          (1) The person is in his own dwelling, place of business,
          or on property in which he has a possessory or
          proprietary interest.

There is no definition of the term "place of business" in this
statute.

     Appellant contends that a vehicle should be considered a
"business" in certain instances for purposes of section
5-73-120(c)(1); although this specific code section does not define
the term "place of business," appellant contends that a definition
in the commercial burglary statute should be persuasive. Ark.Code
Ann. section 539-101(2)(A) criminalizes commercial burglary; this
statute defines "commercial occupiable structure" as any vehicle
where any person carries on a business or calling." Relying upon
the definition contained in the commercial burglary statute,
appellant argues that his cab should be considered a business for
Ark.Code Ann. section 5-73-120(c)(1).

     In subsection (a) of section 5-73-120, the legislature clearly
criminalized the carrying of a weapon in "a vehicle." Appellant
relies on the term "business" in the exemptions to the rule found
in subsection (c)(1). However, the specific language of that
section exempts certain areas clearly relating to real property.
Specifically, (c)(1) excludes from criminal prosecution the
carrying of a gun in a person's "own dwelling, place of business,
or on property in which he has a possessory or proprietary
interest." The plain meaning of this exception does not include
automobiles, nor is there general language which suggests that the
list is expandable.

     The fundamental rule in considering the meaning of a statute
is to construe the meaning of the statute just as it reads, giving
the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning. Rush v.
State, 324 Ark. 147, 151, 919 S.W.2d 933 (1996). The rule of
construction applicable in this case is nonscitur a sociis. This
doctrine means "it is known from its associates." The practical
application means that a word can be defined by accompanying words.
See, McKinney v. Robbins, 319 Ark. 596, 892 S.W.2d 502 (1995);
citing Weldon v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 271 Ark. 145, 607
S.W.2d 395 (1980).

     The exemption for a "business" is contained in a subsection of
the statute which pertains to real property; therefore, we conclude
that the legislature did not intend for this exception to include
automobiles. In three of the other exemption sections, the
legislature created exceptions in instances where a person was in
an automobile. In section 5-73-120(c)(8), a person is free to carry
a weapon in an automobile if he or she has a license to carry a
concealed weapon. In section 5-73-120(c)(4) persons may carry
weapons when on a journey and in section 5-73-120(c)(6) while
traveling to and from hunting. It is clear that the legislature
considered vehicles when it crafted the exemptions. If the
legislature had intended for a vehicular business to be included,
it would have specified. This is particularly clear given the fact
that the legislature has utilized such a definition before, in the
commercial burglary section.

     We apply the principle of construction nonscitur a sociis, and
we hold that the word "business" does not include vehicular
businesses. Therefore, the statute does not provide a defense to
Boston, and the trial court is affirmed.

     Affirmed.