Cite as City and County of Denver v. Chidlaw, 197 Colo. 566 (1979)

           The City and County of Denver, Petitioner,

                               v.

                  James C. Chidlaw, Respondent.

                           No. C-1660.

               Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

                          May 29, 1979.

     Max P. Zall, City Atty., Lee G. Rallis, Don K. DeFord, Asst.
City Attys., Denver, for petitioner.

     William W. Webster, P. C., Gary L. McCorkhill, Kent E. Hanson,
Denver, for respondent.

     GROVES, Justice.

     We granted certiorari to the Superior Court and consolidated
this matter for argument with City and County of Denver v. Waits,
197 Colo. 563, 595 P.2d 248, announced contemporaneously with this
opinion.  The Superior Court reversed Chidlaw's conviction in
county court for flourishing a revolver in contravention of section
845.1-1 of the Denver Revised Municipal Code.  We reverse.

     The county court found Chidlaw guilty of flourishing a deadly
weapon pursuant to the following provision:

     ".1-1. It shall be unlawful for any person to wear under his
     clothes, or concealed about his person, or to display in a
     threatening manner, or to flourish any dangerous or deadly
     weapon, including, but not by way of limitation, any pistol,
     revolver, rifle, shotgun, air gun, gas operated gun, or spring
     gun, sling shot, Nunchaku, brass knuckles, or artificial
     knuckles of any substance whatsoever, or any knife having a
     blade greater than three and one-half inches (3 1/2") in
     length, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon."  Section
     845.1-1, Denver Revised Municipal Code.

     The Superior Court reversed Chidlaw's conviction on the ground
that the ordinance did not define adequately "dangerous and deadly
weapon," that a proper definition would provide for a loaded weapon
capable of firing, and that the City had failed to  meet its burden
of proof under such a definition.

     As we noted in Denver v. Waits, supra, the City Council
defined certain weapons by enumeration in the ordinance.  The
ordinance specifically states that, for its purposes, dangerous and
deadly weapons include any revolvers.  In view of the plain
language of the ordinance, the City had no burden of proving that
the revolver here in question was either loaded or capable of being
fired.

     The Superior Court believed a definition necessary, despite
the clear wording of the ordinance, because " 'any pistol' could
include a cap pistol, a water pistol or a toy pistol."  To construe
the ordinance so broadly is contrary both to common sense and to
the rule of interpretation which requires giving words their
ordinary meaning.  Hiatt v. City of Manitou Springs, 154 Colo. 525,
392 P.2d 282 (1964).  In this context, the ordinary meaning of the
enumerated weapons does not encompass children's toys.

     We discussed the preemption issue in Denver v. Waits, supra,
and, for the same reasons, find Chidlaw's arguments on this
question to be without merit.  We do not find it necessary to
discuss Chidlaw's arguments regarding the purpose of the ordinance
in view of our conclusions as to its plain meaning.

     We reverse and return the case to the Superior Court for
remand directing reinstatement of the verdict of guilty.

     ERICKSON and CARRIGAN, JJ., dissent.

     ERICKSON, Justice, dissenting:

     I respectfully dissent for the same reasons which I set forth
in Denver v. Waits, 197 Colo. 563, 595 P.2d 248 (1979).  The
superior court, in my view, correctly determined that a more
precise definition of a deadly weapon was necessary to prevent the
jury from being misled.  Every child engaged in play with a water
pistol or any type of toy pistol is guilty of flourishing a deadly
weapon under the ordinance as it is written.  Such a conclusion
strains credulity.

     CARRIGAN, J., joins me in this dissent.