Cite as Doe v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 1997 WL 852086 (D.Conn. 1997). Jane Doe, Plaintiff, v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Thomas J. Sweeney, Defendants. United States District Court, D. Connecticut. No. 3:94CV1699 JBA. Sept. 12, 1997. Paul F. Thomas, New Haven, CT, for Jane Doe, plaintiff. Carl J. Schuman, Hartford, CT, for ATF, defendant. John H. Barton, Bridgeport, CT, for Thomas J. Sweeney, defendant. RECOMMENDED RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FITZSIMMONS, Magistrate J. Jane Doe [footnote 1] brings this action challenging certain provisions of the National Firearms Act ("NFA"), 26 U.S.C. section 5801, et seq., as unconstitutional. The defendants in this action are Thomas J. Sweeney, the Bridgeport Chief of Police, and the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF"). Plaintiff claims that the ATF application and regulation process developed pursuant to 27 C.F.R. section 179.85 violates the Fifth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. Plaintiff asserts three grounds for relief- 1) that defendant Sweeney's refusal to certify plaintiff s application to transfer certain weapons violates her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; 2) that the regulation and application form promulgated by the ATF violate her Fifth Amendment right to due process; and 3) that the ATF regulation and application form violate the Tenth Amendment by impermissibly delegating federal regulatory authority to local and/or state officials. Pending before the court are motions for summary judgment filed by defendant ATF [doc. # 341 and defendant Sweeney [doc. # 401 and a motion for partial summary judgment as to liability only filed by plaintiff [doc # 301. For the reasons that follow, defendants' motions are both GRANTED and plaintiffs motion is DENIED. NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT The transfer, receipt and/or possession of certain firearms is regulated by federal and state statutes and regulations. (See Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts para. 17.) The NFA establishes a system whereby certain regulated firearms are registered to their owners in a central registry and all transfers are required to be approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. (See Def's Mem.Supp.Mot.Summ.J. at 3.) See also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 608, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (noting that NFA was intended by Congress to "regulate and restrict the circulation of dangerous weapons"); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971) (noting NFA is "regulatory measure in the interest of public safety"). Under the NFA, it is unlawful for any person to transfer, receive or possess covered firearms in violation of the Act. See 26 U.S.C. section 5812(a). To lawfully transfer a firearm, an applicant must comply with the provisions of 26 U.S.C. section 5812(a). A transfer will be denied if it would place the transferee in violation of the law. See 26 U.S.C. section 5812(a). To implement 26 U.S.C. section 5812, the ATF promulgated a regulation, 27 C.F.R. section 179.85, which provides that an application to transfer a covered firearm shall be filed on ATF Form 4 (Firearms). [footnote 2] Moreover, a transferee completing a Form 4 application must obtain a certificate [footnote 3] from the local chief of police, sheriff of the county, head of the state police, state or local district attorney or prosecutor, or such other person whose certificate may in a particular case be acceptable to the ATF Director. 27 C.F.R. section 179.85. FACTS Plaintiff possesses various firearms as a collector of military-type weapons. (See Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts para. 4.) In 1993, plaintiff submitted to defendant Sweeney a Form 4 application for the transfer of an UZI machine gun. On January 12, 1993, defendant Sweeney certified plaintiff's application, it was approved by the ATF and she took lawful possession of the gun. (See Id. para. 10.) In June 1993, plaintiff submitted another Form 4 application to be certified by defendant Sweeney for the transfer of a second UZI machine gun. Defendant Sweeney refused to sign the certification. (See Id. para. 14.) Also in June, 1993, plaintiff submitted a third Form 4 application to be certified by Sweeney for the transfer of a Sear machine gun. Again, defendant Sweeney refused to sign the certification. [footnote 4] (See Id. para. 18.) Subsequently, Connecticut enacted a law which specifically banned various assault-type weapons. [footnote 5] After the effective date of the statute, the possession of an assault weapon in Connecticut became a class D felony, with certain exceptions which are inapplicable here. [footnote 6] In addition, "no assault weapon covered by the state statute may be sold or transferred on or after January 1, 1994, to any person within this state other than to a licensed gun dealer ... or by bequest or intestate succession." [footnote 7] On March 25, 1994, after the effective date of the assault weapons ban, plaintiffs attorney sent a letter to defendant Sweeney requesting that he execute the required certifications. (See Def.'s Mem.Supp.Mot.Summ.J.Ex. 1.) In a letter dated April 11, 1994, defendant Sweeney refused to execute the certifications and advised plaintiffs attorney that it appeared that the weapons could no longer be lawfully transferred under Connecticut law. (See Id. Ex. 2.) On April 22, 1994, Plaintiffs attorney sought certification from State's Attorney Donald Browne. (See Id. Ex. 3.) In July 1994, similar requests were sent to United States Attorney Christopher Droney, High Sheriff Edward Mak, Chief State's Attorney John Bailey, and Commissioner of Public Safety Nicholas Cioffi. (See Id. Ex. 4, 5, 6, 7.) These officials each declined to certify plaintiffs application. (See Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts para. 26.) In addition, on August 12, 1994, plaintiffs attorney sent a letter to ATF Director John Magaw inquiring about the certification requirement. (See Def's Mot.Summ.J.Ex. 8.) STANDARD OF REVIEW In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court must grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965 (1992). The court resolves "all ambiguities and draw[s] all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party in order to determine how a reasonable jury would decide." Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 523. Thus, "[o]nly when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir . 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849, 112 S.Ct. 152, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991). DISCUSSION Plaintiff alleges that the regulation and application process promulgated by the ATF to implement the NFA violates the Fifth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. She contends that the due process rights guaranteed her by the Fourteenth Amendment have been violated because defendant Sweeney's refusal to certify her ATF forms for the transfer of weapons was an arbitrary decision, not based upon any adverse information about plaintiff, but upon personal unwillingness. (See Am.Compl. First Count para. 28.) Plaintiff alleges that her Fifth Amendment due process rights have been violated because the application process provides no meaningful opportunity for an applicant to overcome a local official's unwillingness to certify a Form 4 application. (See Id. Second Count para. 28.) In addition, plaintiff contends that the mandatory certification process required by Form 4 impermissibly delegates federal regulatory authority to local and state officials in violation of the Tenth Amendment. (See Id. Third Count para. 28.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, and monetary damages. [footnote 8] Plaintiff has filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to liability only on each of the specified claims. In opposition to plaintiffs motion, defendants ATF and Sweeney have filed motions for summary judgment. Defendant ATF argues that the court should not consider the merits of plaintiffs claims because she lacks standing to challenge the law enforcement certification requirement imposed pursuant to 27 C.F.R. section 179.85. (See Def. ATF's Mem.Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 10.) Defendant Sweeney contends that 27 C.F.R. section 179.85, although lacking a formal review process where a local official declines to sign the certification, does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. Because plaintiff had the opportunity, prior to the implementation of Connecticut's assault weapons ban, to apply to numerous other state and local officials to obtain the required certification, her own inaction was the cause of her alleged injuries. (See Def. Sweeney's Mem.Supp.Mot.Summ.J. at 14-15.) Moreover, defendant Sweeney asserts that the plaintiff does not have a property right to possess machine guns. (See Id. at 15.) Defendant Sweeney argues that the Tenth Amendment is not violated because the certification by state or local officials is not mandatory, but discretionary. Finally, defendant Sweeney contends that this court lacks jurisdiction to render injunctive relief against him. (See Id. at 3.) The court examines the merit of each of these claims below. I. Defendant ATF's Motion for Summary Judgment Defendant ATF contends that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the regulatory provisions contained in 27 C.F.R. section 179.85. Before a litigant may present his claim to the district court for a final decision on the merits, he must have standing. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Although general factual allegations that defendants' conduct caused plaintiffs injuries may suffice to show standing at the initial pleading stage, a more particularized showing is required to proceed to a determination of the claims. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 58 (2d Cir. 1994). A constitutional minimum to demonstrating standing requires a showing of three elements: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"- -an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' ". . . Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be "fairly ... trace [[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." ... Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations omitted). In addition, plaintiff must "be asserting a claim that falls within the zone of interests the statute aims to protect or regulate." Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe, 39 F.3d at 58 (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). In this case, plaintiff fails to establish that she has standing to challenge the certification requirement established by 27 C.F.R. section 179.85. Plaintiffs alleged injury was caused by her failure to obtain the appropriate certification, required by section 179.85, prior to the effective date of Connecticut's ban on the receipt, transfer or possession of covered assault weapons, and her resultant inability to take possession of two machine guns. The Fifth Circuit has recently considered a similar case, Westfall v. Miller, 77 F.3d 868, 870, 871 (5th Cir. 1996). In Westfall, plaintiff filed suit against the Chief of the National Firearms Branch of the ATF in his official capacity and the United States seeking a declaration that the certification requirement of 27 C.F.R. section 179.85 violated the Fifth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Because plaintiff had failed to request the required certification from all persons specified in the regulation before he filed suit, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. 77 F.3d at 869. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, stating, "Westfall has failed to establish that he has suffered an injury in fact which is fairly traceable to actions taken by the ATF." Id. at 873. The Fifth Circuit determined that Westfall "lacked standing to challenge the law enforcement certification because he failed to exhaust all certification options prior to filing suit." Id. Although the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the certification process may be "cumbersome, frustrating and inconvenient," it noted that completion of the statutory procedure was necessary to establish a legally cognizable injury. Id. at 872. Here, as in Westfall, plaintiff has failed to complete the prescribed statutory procedure required to establish an injury which is redressable by this court. Any injury which the plaintiff has suffered is fairly traceable not to actions by ATF but to her own inaction and the passage of Connecticut's law banning certain assault weapons. Plaintiffs inability to take possession of the weapons in question might arguably be traceable to the defendants' allegedly improper conduct only if all of the eligible signers specified in the regulation had been contacted prior to October 1, 1993, and all had refused to c6rtify plaintiffs application for transfer of the weapons. See Steele v. National Firearms Act Branch, 755 F.2d 1410, 1414 (11th Cir. 1985) (plaintiffs inability to sell inventory fairly traceable to purportedly unlawful conduct of local officials' refusal to sign required certification, pursuant to section 179.85, only if all eligible signers listed in regulation refused to sign application form). It is irrelevant that plaintiff sent letters to all of the local and state officials specified in section 179.85 because she did so after the effective date of the Connecticut statutory ban; even if one of the designated officials had executed the required certification, [footnote 9] the ATF would have denied plaintiffs request for transfer because a transfer would have violated state law. See 26 U.S.C. section 5812(a) ("Applications shall be denied if the transfer, receipt, or possession of the firearm would place the transferee in violation of law."). Because plaintiff has failed to establish that her alleged injury is fairly traceable to defendant ATF, she fails to establish the second element required to demonstrate her standing to sue. . Accordingly, defendant ATF's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and plaintiffs motion for partial summary is denied on all claims against defendant ATF. Because the court has determined that plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims against defendant ATF, the court addresses the remaining arguments raised by defendant ATF in its motion for summary judgment only as they apply to and have been adopted by defendant Sweeney. II. Defendant Sweeney's Motion for Summary Judgment Defendant Sweeney contends that he is entitled to summary judgment in this action on three grounds. First, he argues that his refusal to sign the certification did not deprive plaintiff of due process because plaintiff caused her own injury by failing to timely request certification from other specified state and local officials, and because plaintiff has no protected property interest in assault weapons. Second, defendant Sweeney maintains that the certification procedure is discretionary rather than mandatory and does not violate the Tenth Amendment. Finally, defendant Sweeney contends that the district court lacks jurisdiction to award injunctive relief against him. [footnote 10] A. Due Process Claim The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." A property right exists only when the claimant has a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the property. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Thus, a person may not claim an entitlement to property merely because of some "abstract need or desire ... [[or] unilateral expectation." Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Accord Karan v. Adams, 807 F.Supp. 900, 908 (D. Conn. 1992). See Dunn& Bradstreet v. U.S. Postal Service, 946 F.2d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 1991) (to have constitutionally protected property right, person needs more than unilateral expectation of some benefit). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides: "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." The Due Process Clause was enacted primarily "to secure individuals from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government." Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, 17 U.S. 235, 332, 4 L.Ed. 559 (1819)). See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) ("By requiring the government to follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to 'deprive any person of life, liberty or property,' the Due Process Clause promotes fairness in such decisions."). Defendant Sweeney first argues that plaintiff has no property interest in possessing assault weapons which would invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause. The courts have consistently held that an individual has no constitutional right to possess firearms. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939) (Second Amendment protects right to bear arms which have "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia"; thus, Court found no right to possession of sawed-off shotgun); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992) (declining to conclude that Second Amendment protects possession of military weapons by individuals), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997, 113 S.Ct. 1614, 123 L.Ed.2d 174 (1993); United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (right to possess firearm not fundamental right); Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971) ("Since the Second Amendment right 'to keep and bear Arms' applies only to the right of the State to maintain a militia and not to the individual's right to bear arms, there can be no serious claim to any express constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm."); but see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 2386 n. 1, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (Thomas, J., concurring) (since deciding United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939), Supreme Court has not "define[d], or otherwise construe[d], the substantive rights protected by the Second Amendment). In light of this precedent, this court concludes that plaintiff has no constitutionally protected interest in possessing assault weapons. Even if plaintiff could demonstrate a property interest in possessing assault weapons, however, her due process claim fails. Plaintiff contends that her right to due process was violated by the regulation promulgated by the ATF and by defendant Sweeney's refusal to certify her application for a tax paid transfer. As discussed above, any alleged harm suffered by plaintiff is attributable to her own inaction, not the ATF regulation. Thus, the court cannot find that the application process operated to deny plaintiff due process. Defendant Sweeney's refusal to certify plaintiffs application did not violate her due process rights. Plaintiff had the opportunity to request certification from other state and local officials specified in 27 C.F.R. section 179.85, yet she failed to do so until after the effective date of Connecticut's assault weapons ban. [footnote 11] In addition, if a prospective transferee, like plaintiff, were unable to obtain the required certification from those officials explicitly listed in 27 C.F.R. section 179.85, she still might obtain the required approval from "such other person whose certificate may in the particular case be acceptable to the director." See 27 C.F.R. section 179.85. Here, although plaintiff sent an inquiry to ATF director John Magaw, she did so on August 12, 1994, almost one year after Connecticut's assault weapons ban went into effect. Thus, any alleged property deprivation suffered by plaintiff was the result of her own failure to comply with ATF regulations governing the transfer of certain weapons before the enactment of Connecticut's law banning certain assault weapons. Furthermore, when a deciding official retains considerable discretion over an application, the applicant does not have a constitutionally protected property interest. Karan, 807 F.Supp. at 910 (citing Charry v. Hall, 709 F.2d 139(2d Cir. 1983)). See Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188, 192-93 (2d Cir . 1994) (zoning board decision not to enforce zoning laws did not implicate property right protected by the Due Process Clause because board retained broad discretion in decision making); Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1985) (no legitimate claim of entitlement since certificate of location for junkyard location was discretionary); but see Karan, 807 F.Supp. at 911 (holding that psychologist had constitutionally protected property interest in sitting for licensure because "the discretion of the licensing agency is minimal, particularly in comparison with the broad discretion exercised" by other types of agencies). In this case, plaintiff argues that defendant Sweeney was required, pursuant to 27 C.F.R. section 179.85, to certify her application for the transfer of certain firearms. This court disagrees, holding that the act of certifying plaintiffs application was discretionary. The requirement that plaintiff obtain the required certification was a burden placed solely on her by the ATF application and regulation process. See Westfall, 77 F.3d at 870 (noting that district court had determined that regulation imposed no duty upon state officials to grant certification); Steele, 755 F.2d at 1411 (recounting that district court concluded that decision to sign certification was discretionary matter that could not be compelled). Accordingly, plaintiff cannot establish that she has been deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest in certain firearms by defendant Sweeney's refusal to certify her application. B. Tenth Amendment Claim Plaintiff contends that the certification requirement impermissibly delegates federal regulatory authority to local or state officials in violation of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. This court disagrees. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, not prohibited to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Accordingly, Congress 19may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). Plaintiff professes no knowledge of any federal decision addressing whether the regulation at issue violates the Tenth Amendment. She analogizes the certification regulation to the requirements contained in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act ("Brady Act"), 18 U.S.C. section 922(s), which the Supreme Court determined violated the Tenth Amendment. The Brady Act required state law enforcement officers "to participate, albeit only temporarily, in the administration of a federally enacted regulatory scheme." Printz v. United Stater, 521 U.S. 898, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 2369, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997). It required that, upon receipt of the required notice of a proposed transfer from a firearms dealer, the chief law enforcement officer "must 'make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days whether the receipt or possession would be in violation of the law, including research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available and in a national system designated by the Attorney General.'" Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. section 922(s)(2)). The Supreme Court held that this Brady Act requirement was an unconstitutional intrusion on state sovereignty. "The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program." Id. at 2384. Unlike the Brady Act requirement, the regulation in question in this case does not require action on the part of any state or local official. Although the regulation [footnote 12] contains mandatory language, this language is directed toward the transferee and not any state official. Once a state official agrees to provide the certification, however, the regulation mandates the content of the certificate. As noted above, courts considering this regulation have concluded that action on the part of state officials under section 179.85 is discretionary, not mandatory. See Westfall, 77 F.3d at 870 (noting that district court had determined that regulation imposed no duty upon state officials to grant certification); Steele, 755 F.2d at 1411 (recounting that district court concluded that decision to sign certification was discretionary matter that could not be compelled). This court, like other courts which have considered this question, concludes that the ATF regulation imposes no mandatory duty on state or local officials. Thus, plaintiff cannot prevail on a claim that the regulation violates the Tenth Amendment. C. Claim for Injunctive Relief Defendant Sweeney contends that plaintiffs request for relief in the form of a mandatory injunction directing him to issue the requested certifications should be denied. The court has concluded that the ATF regulation and the actions of defendant Sweeney in declining to issue the requested certificates have not violated plaintiffs rights under the Fifth, Tenth or Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, defendant Sweeney's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Because summary judgment has been granted in favor of both defendants on all claims, there remains no legal basis upon which the court may award injunctive relief to plaintiff, and the court need not address this argument by defendant Sweeney. See Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., Civ. A. No. 88-A-1621, 1990 WL 8028, at *13 (D.Colo. Jan.31, 1990) (request for injunctive relief depends on legal claims in suit and has no independent basis). III. Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Plaintiff has filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability only on the three claims raised in the complaint, namely 1) that defendant's Sweeney's refusal to provide the requested certification violated her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, 2) that the ATF form and regulation violate her right to due process under the Fifth Amendment, and 3) that the ATF form and regulation constitute an impermissible delegation of federal regulatory authority in violation of the Tenth Amendment. The court has addressed all three of these arguments and determined that plaintiff lacks standing to raise any claims against the ATF, that defendant Sweeney's actions did not deprive plaintiff of due process, and that the ATF form and regulation do not violate the Tenth Amendment. Thus, for the reasons already set forth, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is DENIED. CONCLUSION Defendant ATF's motion for summary judgment [doc. # 34] is GRANTED because plaintiff lacks standing to sue defendant ATF. Defendant Sweeney's motion for summary judgment [doc. # 40] is also GRANTED while plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment [doc. # 30] is DENIED. Any objections to this recommended ruling must be filed with the clerk of the Court within ten (10) days of the receipt of this order. Failure to object within ten (10) days may preclude appellate review. See 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure; Rule 2 of the Local Rules for United States Magistrates; Small v. Secretary of H.H.S., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam); F.D.I.C. v. Hillcrest Assoc., 66 F. 3d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1995). FOOTNOTES 1. Plaintiff was granted permission by the court to proceed under a pseudonym. (See Pl.'s Motion Proceed Under Pseudonym, doc. # 9.) 2. ATF Form 4 (Firearms), hereafter called a Form 4, is an application for tax paid transfer and registration of firearms. 3. "The certificate shall state that the certifying official is satisfied that the fingerprints and the photograph accompanying the application are those of the applicant and that the certifying official has no information indicating that the receipt or possession of the firearm would place the transferee in violation of local or state law or that the transferee will use the firearms for other than lawful purposes." 27 C.F.R. section 179.85. 4. In refusing to certify plaintiffs applications Sweeney was acting pursuant to a personal policy he had adopted in regards to assault weapons. (See Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts para. 16.) 5. The assault weapons ban was enacted into law pursuant to 1993 Connecticut Public Act No. 93-306 and became effective on October 1, 1993. It is codified at Conn.Gen.Stat. sections 53-202a through 53-202k. 6. Assault weapons may be lawfully possessed by .members or employees of the Department of Public Safety, police departments, the department of correction or the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States for use in the discharge of their official duties." Conn.Gen.Stat. section 53-202c(b). 7. Conn.Gen.Stat. section 53-202d(b). 8. To receive money damages against the United States, a plaintiff must file her claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. sections 2671-2680. The FTCA, a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, defines the scope and conditions of the government's consent to be sued for money damages. In addition, the appropriate jurisdictional basis for suits against the United States is 18 U.S.C. section 1346(b) in conjunction with section 2675(a). Both sections provide that, as a prerequisite to suit under the FTCA, the claim must first be presented to the appropriate federal agency and a final denial issued. Here, plaintiff fails to allege that she presented a FTCA claim to the ATF and, as a result, she is now unable to sue defendant ATF for money damages. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 111, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) ("FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit until they have exhausted their administrative remedies"). 9. Issuance of a certificate after the effective date of the assault weapons ban is unlikely because Form 4 requires the local official to certify that there is no information indicating that the receipt or possession of the firearm would place the transferee in violation of state or local law. See 27 C.F.R. section 179.85. 10. For the first two grounds, defendant Sweeney has adopted the arguments set forth by defendant ATF in its motion for summary judgment. 11. The Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the assault weapons ban in Benjamin v. Bailey, 234 Conn. 455, 662 A.2d 1226 (1995), determining that the statute violates neither the right to bear arms as provided in Article first, section 15 of the Connecticut Constitution nor the right to equal protection of the laws as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and Article first, section 20 of the state constitution. 234 Conn. at 471, 476-78, 662 A.2d at 1235, 1237-38. 12. The regulation provides: If the transferee is an individual, such person shall securely attach to each copy of the application, Form 4 (Firearms), in the space provided on the form, a photograph of the applicant 2x2 inches in size, clearly showing a full front view of the features of the applicant with head bare, with the distance from the top of the head to the point of the chin approximately 1 1/4 inches, and which shall have been taken within I year prior to the date of the application. The transferee shall attach two properly completed FBI Forms FD-258 (Fingerprint Card) to the application. The fingerprints must be clear for accurate classification and should be taken by someone properly equipped to take them. A certificate of the local chief of police, sheriff of the county, head of the State police, State or local district attorney or prosecutor, or such other person whose certificate may in a particular case be acceptable to the Director, shall be completed on each copy of the Form 4 (Firearms). The certificate shall state that the certifying official is satisfied that the fingerprints and photograph accompanying the application are those of the applicant and that the certifying official has no information indicating that the receipt or possession of the firearm would place the transferee in violation of State or local law or that the transferee will use the firearm for other than lawful purposes. 27 C.F.R. section 179.85.