Cite as Fleish v. Johnston, 145 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1944)

                   FLEISH v. JOHNSTON, Warden.

                           No. 10672.

            Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

                         Sept. 29, 1944.

    Writ of Certiorari Denied Feb. 5, 1945. See 65 S.Ct. 587.

     John Bennett King, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.

     Frank J. Hennessy, U. S. Atty., and Joseph Karesh, Asst. U. S.
Atty., both of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

     Before MATHEWS, STEPHENS and HEALY, Circuit judges.

     STEPHENS, Circuit judge.

     On the ground that he has already served the authorized  
portion of his sentence of imprisonment, Louis Fleish petitioned
the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied. 
He appeals.

     Appellant was originally tried and convicted under six counts
of an indictment charging violations of the National Firearms Act,
26 U.S.C.A. sections 1132-1132q (1934 Ed.) [26 U.S.C.A.
Int.Rev.Code, sections 2700 (b)(2), 2720 et seq., 3260 et seq.].  
On April 7, 1939, he was sentenced to be imprisoned for consecutive
terms of five years on each of the six counts and to pay a fine of
$2,000.  Having served his sentence for one count, appellant
requests his release from imprisonment.

     Count One of the indictment under which sentence was
pronounced charged that appellant bad received and possessed a de-
scribed firearm on which the transfer tax had not been paid.  Count
Three charged that he possessed the same described firearm without
registering it.  Counts Twelve, Fifteen, Eighteen, and Twenty-one
contained the same charge as Count Three except that firearms were
variously described in each.  All counts designated the same time
and place for the occurrence of the alleged offenses.

     Appellant claims that the trial court had no jurisdiction to
impose more than one sentence under the indictment since the Na-
tional Firearms Act created but one punishable offense and since
the six counts charged but one offense.

     The first contention is based on the seetion of the National
Firearms Act fixing the penalty of a $2000 fine or five years'
imprisonment, or both, upon "any person who violates or fails to
comply with any of the requirements" of the Act, 26 U.S.C. A. 
section 1132m (1934 Ed.) [26 U.S.C.A. Int.  Rev.Code, section
27291.  Appellant insists that this penalty provision is the key to
the Act with respect to the problem herein involved, that the words
"any of the requirements" can mean only "one or more of 'the
requirements," and that therefore only a single punishment is
authorized by the statute irrespective of how many sections were
violated by a single event.  Identical phraseology was held not to
impose a single punishment in Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299, 305, 52 S.Ct. .180, 76 L.Ed. 306.

     The claim that all six counts in the indictment charge one
crime is unfounded. The offense alleged in Count One is distinct
from that alleged in the other five Counts.  This court has
recently held that the possession of a firearm which has not been
registered and the possession of the same firearm upon which the
transfer tax has not been paid constitute two distinct offenses,
Crapo v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 144 F.2d 863.  The reasoning of that
decision is equally applicable to the facts herein.

     Counts Three, Twelve, Fifteen, Eighteen, and Twenty-one charge
offenses distinct from each other.  They allege violations of
section 1132d, Title 26 U.S.C.A. (1934 Ed.) [section 3261 (b), 26
U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code:]

     " (a)  Within sixty days after the thirtieth day after June
26, 1934, every person possessing a firearm shall register, with
the collector of the district in which he resides, the number or
other mark identifying such firearm, together with his name,
address, place where such firearm is usually kept, and place of
business or employment * * *"

     It is evident that the statute requires every firearm to be
registered.  The registration involves a complete identification of
each individual firearm as well as a statement concerning its
present possessor and whereabouts.  A record of the latter
statement without the identification of the weapon itself obviously
would fail to satisfy the terms of the Act.  The crime defined by
the statute is the failure to register a specific firearm in one's
possession, not the failure to indicate generally that one
possesses firearms.  Cf. the statute in People v.  Puppilo, 100
Cal.App. 559, 280 P. 545.  Therefore, the nonregistration of any
one firearm in one's possession constitutes a complete offense
separate and distinct from the nonregistration of any other such
firearm.  Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625, 35 S.Ct. 710, 59 L.Ed.
1151; McKee v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 109 F.2d 273.

     Affirmed.