Cite as Handgun Control, Inc., v. Lungren, No. 991752 (San Francisco, CA, Sup.Ct. July 21, 1998) JAMES P. BENNETT (Bar NO. 65179) D. CAMERON BAKER (Bar No. 154432) MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 425 Market Street San Francisco, California 94105-2482 Telephone: (415) 268-7000 DENNIS HENIGAN CENTER TO PREVENT HANDGUN VIOLENCE LEGAL ACTION PROJECT 1225 Eye Street, N.W, Washington, D.C. 20005 Phone: (202) 289-7319 Attorneys for Petitioners HANDGUN CONTROL, INC. and CENTER TO PREVENT HANDGUN VIOLENCE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO HANDGUN CONTROL, INC., a non- No. 991752 profit membership organization; CENTER TO PREVENT HANDGUN ORDER VIOLENCE, a non-profit organization, GRANTING PETITIONERS HANDGUN CONTROL, INC,'S Petitioners, AND CENTER TO PREVENT HANDGUN VIOLENCE'S v. CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING RESPONDENT DANIEL LUNGREN, as Attorney DANIEL LUNGREN'S CROSS General, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Respondent. Date: June 26, 1998 Time: 9:30 a.m. Dept.: 8 (The Honorable Raymond Williamson) The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment having come before this Court on regularly scheduled hearing on June 26, 1998 at 9:30 a.m., James Bennett and D. Cameron Baker appearing on behalf of Petitioners Handgun Control, Inc. and the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence and John Gordnier appearing on behalf of Respondent Daniel Lungren. Upon reviewing the papers submitted by the parties with respect to the cross-motions, the argument of counsel and the pertinent records on file in this matter and good cause appearing therefor, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 1. There are no disputed material facts and Petitioners are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 2. As Respondent admits in discovery, "All weapons must be registered under the provisions of Penal Code section 12285," Objections and Responses to Plaintiff's Form Interrogatories (Set No. One) at 2:6-7. Section 12285, specifically subsection 12285(f), unambiguously requires that assault weapons be registered no later than March 30, 1992. The language of section 12285 is mandatory and provides Respondent with no discretionary authority with respect to the registration deadline. 3. Respondent's lack of authority to register assault weapons after March 30, 1992 is confirmed by the legislative history of S.B. 263, which amended the AWCA in 1991. On December 27, 1990, then-Attorney General John Van de Kamp wrote to Senator Roberti stating, "We can find no authority to continue the registration process after that date [January i, 1991 as prescribed by section 12285(a)]." By letter dated January 14, 1991 to Senator Roberti, Attorney General Lungren also stated that the registration window closed on December 31, 1990. With these two statements before it, the Legislature chose to enact only a limited 90 day "forgiveness" registration period. Section 12285(f). In these circumstances, the Court cannot disregard the Legislature's decision not to provide any authority for registration after March 30, 1992. Estate of McDill, 14 Cal. 3d 831, 837-38 (1975). 4. The "step-down" provision of section 12280(b) does not separately authorize registration, but expressly incorporates the limited registration authority set out in section 12285. Section 12280(b) ("registration ... pursuant to section 12285"). Thus, a "step-down" through registration (as opposed to relinquishment) could only be obtained during one of the two statutory registration periods, either the calendar year 1990 (section 12285(a)) or the 90 day "forgiveness" period (section 12285(f)). 5. The Attorney General incorrectly contends that the "step down" procedure operates without any time limitation (and outside of the two registration periods of section 12285). However, as the statutory language and its history make clear, pre-June 1, 1989 owners were subject to penalty under section 12280(b) within the two registration periods. Section 12285(g) plainly renders such persons liable under section 12280(b) during the 40 day period of section 12285(f) if "law enforcement was aware of the violation before the weapon was registered." Section 12285(g); see also Senate Committee on Judiciary Report on S.B. 253 at 4, Baker Decl., Exh. C (noting that no amnesty for persons caught prior to registration). As initially enacted, the Legislature intended the same carrot-and-stick approach for calendar year 1990 although it subsequently modified its approach, enacting section 12280(e) in June, 1990. This is why the registration prong of the "step down" procedure is limited to the time periods specified in section 12285(a) and (f). Nothing in section 12280(b) warrants the implication of the open-ended registration the Attorney General has engaged in. 6. Moreover. Respondent's position rests on the incorrect belief that the Legislature intended persons legally possessing assault weapons as of June 1, 1989 to retain their weapons without regard to whether these persons registered their weapons within one of the two statutory time periods. To the contrary, as originally enacted "the Legislature permitted individuals lawfully possessing [assault weapons] prior to June 1, 1989, to retain them if duly registered by January 1, 1991." Senate Committee on Judiciary Report on S.B. 263 at 3, Baker Decl., Exh. C (emphasis added). As noted above, the Legislature subsequently gave assault weapons owners a "second chance" to retain their weapons by providing a 90 day registration period in section 12285(f). The Legislature thus did not intend to permit persons to retain possession of assault weapons unless registered within the statutory deadlines of section 12285. Respondent's continued registration, thus, permits illegal assault weapons to remain in the State posing significant risk to the safety and welfare of the public contrary to the expressed intent of the Legislature. 7. Adoption of Respondent's interpretation of section 12280(b) engenders a conflict with section 12285. Section 12285, as the specific section applicable to registration, governs over the general (section 12280(b)). Additionally, Respondent's effort to insert ambiguity into section 12280(b) is self-defeating given the unambiguous terms of section 12285. "In cases of conflict between the provisions of the same statute, those susceptible of only one meaning will control those susceptible of two if the statute can thereby be made harmonious." People v. Moroney, 24 Cal. 2d 638, 643 (1944). 8. The infirmity of Respondent's position is underscored by Respondent's conduct. By definition, each "step-down" registrant has violated section 12280(b) and, thus, is subject to the step-down penalty of between $350 and $500. However, Respondent does not prosecute these individuals or report them to local law enforcement officials. Stipulation and Order, para. 4f. Respondent does not even require any documentation establishing that the "registrant" lawfully possessed the weapon prior to June 1, 1989 other than the registration form. Id., para. 4c. The Court cannot assume that the Legislature intended the Attorney General, the chief law enforcement official in the State, to be operating in this way. 9. People v. Venegas, 32 Cal.App.4th 1847 (1995), does not support Respondent as the Court of Appeal there accepted Respondent's concession that he had continued registration authority without any analysis. Accordingly, Venegas has no precedential effect on the issue before this Court. 10. Petitioners' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Respondent's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENiED. 11. Judgment shall be entered in favor of petitioners and against Respondent. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 21, 1998. [signed] Raymond Williamson Judge of the Superior Court