Cite as Jersey Arms Works, Inc. v. Secertary of Treasury, No. 83- 1130 (D.N.J. July 25, 1983) IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY JERSEY ARMS WORKS, INC., Civil Action No. 83-1130 A New Jersey Corporation By And Through Its President JOHN STRAUB, Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, STEPHEN E. HIGGINS, Director of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, FINDINGS OF FACT Defendants. AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW APPEARANCES: Glenn P. Callahan, Esquire Budd, Larner, Kent, Gross, Picillo & Rosenbaum 216 Haddon Avenue Westmont, New Jersey 08108 Attorney for Plaintiff W. Hunt Dumont, United States Attorney by: Jerome B. Simandle, Assistant U. S. Attorney 402 East State Street - Room 265 Trenton, New Jersey 08608 Attorneys for Defendants BROTMAN, District Judge This matter came before the court April 22, 1983, on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. By consent of the parties the hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction was consolidated with the trial of the action on the merits, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). Having considered the evidence, exhibits and submissions of the parties, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. -1- FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Plaintiff Jersey Arms Works, Inc. ("Jersey Arms") is a Westmont, New Jersey, corporation licensed by the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Forearms ("ATF" or "Bureau") to deal in firearms. 2. In June of 1982, ATF officials were advised that Jersey Arms was manufacturing a weapon which would be considered a "machinegun" under the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. section 5845(b). ATF launched an investigation to verify this information and to determine whether Jersey Arms was licensed to fabricate machineguns. Preliminary research of the Bureau suggested that Jersey Arms was not so licensed. 3. On July 23, 1982, agents of ATF met with Dominick Spadea, a principal officer of Jersey Arms. Spadea explained that the firearm under investigation was the "S-7 Avenger." He further explained that this weapon was being made by Hatton Industries, a federally licensed firearms manufacturer owned and operated by Spadea. He indicated that Jersey Arms had been formed to market the S-7 Avenger to the public. 4. At the July 23rd meeting Spadea agreed to furnish the Bureau with a sample S-7 Avenger for examination and classification. On August 10, 1982, having yet to receive a sample, ATF contacted Spadea. Spades pledged that a sample would be provided. He also indicated to ATF at that time that Hatton Industries had begun mass production of receivers for the S-7 Avenger in 500-unit runs. 5. On August 17, 1982, Spadea was again asked to provide the Bureau with an S-7 Avenger model. He stated that he had no working models of the firearm available for ATF inspection. As an alternative, he asked ATF to dispatch agents to Hatton Industries for on-site review of the S-7 Avenger and its component parts. -2- 6. On August 30, 1982, four representatives of the Bureau journeyed to the S-7 Avenger plant and met with representatives of Jersey Arms. Two ATF firearms technologists inspected a completed sample of the S-7 Avenger. 7. After examination the firearms experts informally notified the Jersey Arms personnel that the S-7 Avenger would most likely be classified as a machinegun as defined by 26 U.S.C. section 5845(b), because of the weapon's design, operation and components. Jersey Arms had planned to advertise the weapon as a .45 caliber semi- automatic pistol. As of August 30, 1982, approximately 2,000 lower receivers for the S-7 Avenger had been stamped out and components for approximately 500 finished weapons were available. 8. The experts' informal opinion was confirmed in a letter decision released by the Bureau on September 1, 1982. In pertinent part this decision stated: An examination of the completed sample of the S-7 Avenger firearm in caliber .45ACP,...indicates that the firearm...is of the same design and function as the SAP M10 firearm manufactured by RPB Industries, Atlanta, Georgia. The SAP M10 was classified as a machinegun by ATF Ruling 82-8, a copy of which is enclosed for your information. Since the S-7 Avenger is of the same basic design and function as the SAP M10 firearm, the S-7 Avenger is also classified as a machinegun as that term is defined in Section 5845(b), Chapter 53, Title 26, United States Code, the National Firearms Act (NFA). Additionally, the receiver for the S-7 Avenger firearm appears to possess a design feature found only in the M10 series of submachineguns, in that the sear bolt in the S-7 Avenger is in the same location as the selector shaft, which permits full automatic fire in the M10 submachinegun. A slight enlargement of this hole in the left side of the S-7 Avenger receiver, will permit the installation of the selector lever from a M10 submachinegun. Therefore, in our opinion, the receiver for the S-7 Avenger, as currently manufactured, is also a machinegun as defined. The letter concluded by encouraging the consideration of design modifications to permit the reclassification of the S-7 Avenger. -3- 9. By a letter dated September 14, 1982, ATF advised Hatton Industries that its machinegun classification applied to all S-7 Avenger firearms, regardless of their date of manufacture. The letter closed by reiterating the Bureau's offer to be of assistance in changing the design of the weapon so as to alter its classification. 10. By a letter dated September 16, 1982, Hatton Industries (through its legal counsel) requested that it be accorded the same treatment given RPB Industries by ATF in its ruling on the "SM-10" [footnote 1] firearm, A.T.F.B. 1982-2, 49. (See Finding of Fact #8). That ruling made the classification of the SM-10 prospective only. The ruling was issued on May 20, 1982, but limited the machinegun classification to those SM-10 firearms manufactured or assembled after June 21, 1982. 11. ATF responded to this request in a letter dated October 13, 1982. The Bureau announced that it would not give its classification of the S-7 Avenger a prospective effect. The Bureau set forth two main reasons why it believed the Jersey Arms-Hatton Industries case distinguishable from that of RPB Industries: (a) In the case of RPB, the Bureau had advised the manufacturer prior to its ultimate ruling that the SM-10 firearm was not a machinegun. The 30-day grace period allowed RPB was intended to mitigate the harm caused by this reversal in position. In the case of the S-7 Avenger ATF had not created the impression that the weapon was not a machinegun. (b) Hatton Industries and Jersey Arms had advance warning of the position that ATF would take on the S-7 Avenger, via ATF Rulings 82-8 (supra) and 82-2 (A.T.F.B. 1982-1,18). The latter ruling classified a firearm known as the "KG-9" as a machinegun, effective January 19, 1982. ATF Ruling 82-2 focused on the "disconnector" of the KG-9, which prevented more than one shot from being fired with a single function of the trigger. The ruling found that the disconnector could be simply modified by cutting, filing or grinding, so that the KG-9 would fire automatically. This shift to automatic fire was made possible by -4- the combination of design features in the KG-9 (blowback operation, firing from the open bolt position, and fixed firing pin), which combination the Bureau said "is normally not found in the typical sporting firearm." ATF Ruling 82-8 made nearly identical findings on the SM-10, again focussing on the "abnormal" combination of design features permitting a shift to automatic fire: a disconnector and a trip which could easily be modified, blowback operation, firing from the open bolt position, and a fixed firing pin. 12. Discussions were held between ATF and Hatton Industries-Jersey Arms representatives on November 10, 1982 toward the redesign of the S-7 Avenger, to permit its reclassification as a semi-automatic weapon. These discussions were followed by the delivery to ATF of a modified 5-7 Avenger. 13. ATF responded to these modification efforts in a letter dated December 2, 1982, ATF stated that a complete evaluation of the-revamped S-7 Avenger was impossible, due to breakage of the sample. The Bureau did come to five tentative conclusions, however, upon examination of the sample: a. "The MAC10 type trip lever was removed by means of a hammer and punch and the cam actuated disconnector was circumvented by means of a paper clip which was attached to the disconnector and sear. Although it was not possible to test fire the weapon it is felt that this modification will permit automatic fire." b. "With the MAC 10 type trip lever removed as indicated above and the trigger guard plates replaced, it appears that the trigger guard plates can be used to stop the travel of the trigger prior to the disconnector being actuated. This condition was achieved by placing the trigger finger through the trigger guard in such a manner that the trigger guard plate limits the distance that the trigger finger can pull the trigger. By changing the position of the trigger finger in the trigger guard, the trigger can be manipulated such that the bolt is released to fire without the disconnector being actuated; Mechanical cycling of the action in this condition indicates that the weapon could fire in the automatic mode. However, due to the above described parts breakage test firing was not possible." -5- c. "It was also noted that if the cam actuated disconnector were removed from the trigger and a piece of wire passed through the disconnector mounting hole and wrapped around the sear, the weapon would likely fire in the full automatic mode." d. "The cam actuated disconnector could also be removed from the trigger and the cam surface altered by cutting or grinding so that when reinstalled in the weapon the disconnector would not function. This method was not attempted since the weapon could not be test fired due to the previously described parts breakage." e. "The function of the cam actuated disconnector could also likely be circumvented by inserting a piece of material of the appropriate thickness into the slot in the trigger behind the disconnector. The modification would prevent the disconnector from functioning. This modification was not attempted due to the sample being non functional." In this letter the Bureau again suggested that it would be receptive to further design changes. 14. In a letter to counsel for Hatton Industries dated December 7, 1982, the Bureau amplified its remarks contained in its letter of October 13, 1982 (see Finding of Fact #11) as to why it believed the S-7 Avenger should be treated differently from the SM-10 and the KG-9 weapons. The Bureau preferred the following reasons: (a) Due to ATF Ruling 82-2, supra, effective January 19, 1982, Hatton Industries and Jersey Arms should have been aware that the Bureau would classify the S-7 Avenger as a machinegun. The Bureau stated that the S-7 Avenger and the KG-9, the subject of ATF Ruling 82-2, contain the same design features, including "blowback operation firing from the open bolt position, a fixed firing pin incorporated into the bolt, and a disconnector preventing more than one shot from being fired by a single pull of the trigger." (b) The prospective application of ATF Ruling 82-2 to the KG-9 was due to the fact "that the Bureau was stating its position with respect to this type of semi-automatic weapon for the first time," -6- (c) ATF Ruling 82-8, concerning the SM-10, was given prospective application because ATF had originally notified the weapon's manufacturer that the SM-10 was not a machinegun. (d) A consideration in the prospective treatment of both the KG-9 and the SM-10 was the fact that both weapons had been widely sold to the public prior to the issuance of the relevant ATF Rulings. According to the Bureau's information, as of September 1, 1982, the S-7 Avenger had not been offered for sale to the public. 15. In January, 1983, a new S-7 Avenger prototype was submitted for evaluation by the Bureau. By a letter dated March 1, 1983, ATF advised Hatton Industries that it regarded the latest version of the S-7 Avenger as a machinegun. The Bureau found the samples submitted in November and January to possess the same design and construction features, with minor variations. The Bureau reported that the January sample had been made to fire in the full automatic mode in two ways: a. "a piece of wire (paper clip) was used to tie the trigger and sear together. This modification required the use of one paper clip and a pair of needle nosed pliers. Time required to make the modification was approximately 3 minutes." b. "The bolt was removed from the upper receiver and the height of the sear engagement surface was reduced by approximately.030 inches by means of a file. The weapon was reassembled and with the safety set in the fire position the sample fired in the semiautomatic mode. The safety was moved to the safe position and the weapon fired in the full automatic mode. Time required to make this modification was approximately 5 minutes and required the use of one file." The letter further noted that "if the welds holding the pivot pins were broken, the weapon could be modified to fire in the full automatic mode in essentially the same ways as outlined in our letter of December 2, 1982," The letter closed with a renewed promise to lend assistance in any future redesign efforts. -7- The following Conclusions of Law, insofar as they may be considered Findings of Fact, are so found by this court to be true in all respects: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Jurisdiction. The court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. sections 1331 and 1336. 2. Scope of Review, The court's scope of review is traced by the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") at 5 U.S.C. section 706. As to questions of law, the court's reviewing powers are plenary. Id. As to questions of fact and applications of law to fact, the findings and conclusions of the Bureau are not to be set aside unless they are found to be, inter alia, "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. section 706(2)(A). The court may also overturn agency action for failure to comply with statutory, procedural or constitutional requirements. 5 U.S.C. sections 706(2)(B)(C)(D). 3. Adequacy of Administrative Procedure. The action of the Bureau in issue is an adjudication exempt from the APA's procedural requirements, since it involved "proceedings in which decisions rest solely on inspections, tests, or elections." 5 U.S.C. section 554(a)(3). Assuming arguendo that this adjudication was subject to additional procedural guarantees provided by the 5th Amendment's Due Process Clause, Kelly v. Railroad Retirement Board, 625 F.2d 486 (3rd Cir. 1980), the court concludes that the amount of process afforded plaintiff was "due." See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577 (1975) (discussing at length question of "what process is due"). The determination of how much process is adequate is made by balancing the plaintiff's interest in avoiding a grievous loss against the interests which the government seeks to promote by using summary proceedings. See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970). It has long been recognized, under this calculus, that limited procedural requirements attend to decisions which "turn either -8- upon physical facts as to which there is little room for difference of opinion, or else upon technical facts like the quality of tea or the condition of airplanes." Door v. Donaldson, 195 F.2d 764, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1952). This is just such a case. In this action plaintiff was on notice by July of 1982 that an investigation into the S-7 Avenger's proper firearm classification was pending. During July and August of 1982 there was an exchange of information between the parties on the subject of the weapon's classification, culminating in the August 30, 1982, encounter at the place of manufacture. ATF explained the basis of its decision in its September 1, 1982, letter ruling and expanded upon its reasoning through later correspondence. The Bureau gave plaintiff opportunities to comment on the ruling, to press for reconsideration and to modify the S-7 Avenger's design. Under the circumstances, sufficient process was afforded. 4. De Novo Review. The court may not consider de novo testimony in this matter. De novo review of agency action is only proper under two circumstances. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971). The inadequacy of an administrative record is not one of these circumstances. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973). In the case of an adjudicatory action, de novo review may only be had when "the agency factfinding procedures are inadequate." Overton Park, supra, 401 U.S. at 415. Since the fact-finding procedures in issue were adequate, Conclusion of Law #3, this is not an appropriate case for de novo review. The validity of the Bureau's action must stand or fall on the administrative record, judged by the relevant standard of review. Camp, supra, 411 U.S. at 142-43; see generally, Doraiswamy v. Secretary of Labor, 555 F.2d 832, 839-43 (D.C. Cir. 1976). [footnote 2] 5. Adequacy of the Record. The record before the court is adequate for purposes of review. The standards governing the contents of the record in an informal adjudication, as is this case, are extremely loose. 5 Mezines, Stein & Gruff, Administrative Law, section 52.03. The administrative record, to pass -9- muster, must be susceptible to effective judicial review and thereby must explain the determinative reasons for the final action taken and the facts underlying this reasoning. See Camp, supra, 411 U.S. at 142-43. These requirements are met here. Construction of 26 U.S.C. section 5845(b) 6. The construction of the statutory definition of "machinegun" advanced by the Bureau in ATF Rulings 82-2 and 82-8, supra, upon which the September 1, 1982, letter ruling was predicated, was not subject to the APA's "notice and comment" provisions (as argued by plaintiff). The definition reads: Machinegun.--The term "machinegun" means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any combination of parts designed and intended for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person. 26 U.S.C. section 5845(b). In ATF Ruling 82-2 the Bureau construed this definition as follows: The "shoots automatically" definition covers weapons that will function automatically...The "designed" definition includes those weapons which have not previously functioned as machineguns but possess design features which facilitate full automatic fire by simple modification or elimination of existing component parts. This language was repeated virtually verbatim in ATF Ruling 82-8. The Bureau maintains that its construction of the statute is merely an "interpretative rule" and not a "legislative rule." An interpretative rule is a "statement[] made by an agency to give guidance to its staff and affected parties as to how the agency intends to administer a statute or regulation." Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1258 (3rd Cir. 1978). "In contrast, a legislative rule, -10- rather than merely setting forth an agency's own interpretation of the meaning of a statute it administers, actually implements that statute and, in so doing, 'creates' new law 'affecting individual rights and obligations,'" State of New Jersey v. Department of Health and Human Services, 670 F.2d 1262, 1282 (3rd Cir. 1981), quoting from Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974). Plaintiff contends that the Bureau's construction of the statute is a legislative rule. The preferred approach for determining whether a rule is interpretative or legislative is to take the agency at its word and to accept its characterization of the rule. Cerro Metal Products v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 981 (3rd Cir. 1980); see State of New Jersey, supra, 670 F.2d at 1282; Joseph v. United States Civil Service Commission, 554 F.2d 1140, 1153 n.24, 1154 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Accordingly, the court accepts the Bureau's position that its construction of the phrase "machinegun" is an exercise in interpretative rulemaking. [footnote 3] Under the scheme of the APA, interpretative rules are exempt from the "notice and comment" provisions which ordinarily govern rulemaking activities. 5 U.S.C. section 553, The Bureau's construction of the phrase "machinegun" in ATF Rulings 82-2 and 82-8, therefore, was not issued in contravention of the APA's rulemaking procedures. 7. The Bureau's construction of 26 U.S.C. section 5845(b) must be sustained. The standard for review of interpretative rules is well settled in the Third Circuit. State of New Jersey, supra, 670 F.2d at 1282.. Interpretative rules are not controlling upon the courts; the courts may substitute their judgment for that of the agency in determining how the statute or regulation is to be implemented. Id. This apparently broad-sweeping standard is subject to two qualifications. First, substantial deference must be accorded the interpretation given a statute by the agency charged with its administration. Id. (relying on a long line of Supreme Court opinions). Second, to sustain an agency's interpretation of a statutory term, all that is needed to support -11- that interpretation is that it has "warrant in the record" and a "reasonable basis in law." Id. at 1283, quoting Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1946). When the phrase "designed to shoot" is read in vacuo, it is difficult to say with certainty what its outermost reaches are. Dictionary definitions lend support to a strict reading, such as that pressed by plaintiff, to the effect that the phrase only includes weapons which will fire automatically upon leaving the manufacturer's control, without the assistance of an intervening event. But Webster lends equal support to the Bureau's position--that the phrase embraces weapons which exit from the manufacturer's control incapable of firing automatically but which may easily be altered to fire in an automatic mode. Common sense and legislative history, however, tip the scale in the Bureau's favor. Plaintiff's reading of the statute would have Congress evince concern for: (1) weapons which fire (and which always have fired) automatically; (2) weapons which can be readily restored to fire automatically; and (3) combinations of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled but not (4) weapons which, with a modicum of effort, can be made to fire automatically. This is plainly inconsistent. Furthermore, plaintiff's reading would permit the evasion of a "machinegun" classification through simple subterfuges, whereas the second sentence of section 5845(b) and the statute's "readily restorable" clause demonstrate that the statute is designed to thwart such subterfuges. Taken as a whole, section 5845(b) is aimed not simply at machineguns, per se, but at the threat or prospect of machineguns, in their incipient or hidden forms. The Bureau's construction of the statute is in harmony with this regulatory aim; the plaintiff's construction is not. This analysis based on the face of the statute is reinforced by consideration of the legislative history of section 5845(b). The present contours of that section were drawn by the Gun Control Act of 1968, which augmented the pre-1968 definition by adding the language "can be readily restored to shoot" and the -12- second sentence ("The term shall also include...."). These amendments were part of the Gun Control Act's drive to strengthen control of interstate traffic in firearms. See H.R.Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4410-12; Conf. Rep. No. 1956, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4426. The purpose of the amendments was to extend the scope of the National Firearms Act to cover additional weapons, including but not limited to "machinegun frames and receivers, so-called 'conversion kits' for turning other weapons into machineguns, and combinations of machinegun parts when in the possession of a single person." Conf. Rep. No. 1956, supra, at 4434. Congress was patently concerned with nascent automatic firearms masquerading as other weaponry and with conversion of nonmachineguns into machineguns and the acceptance of plaintiff's construction of section 5845(b) would garble the statutory translation of that concern. When these considerations are coupled with the deference owed to the agency's interpretation of a statutory term, the court has no cause to depart from the agency's interpretative rule. There is warrant in the record for the agency's interpretation and a reasonable basis in law. 8. The facts found by the Bureau as to the design, function and characteristics of the S-7 Avenger are not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise contrary to law. 9. The Bureau's holding contained in its letter ruling of September 1, 1982, and subsequent holdings of December 2, 1982, and March 1, 1983, that on these facts the S-7 Avenger, both as originally constructed and as revised, is to be classified as "machinegun," as defined in 26 U.S.C. section 5845(b), are not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise contrary to law. The record indicates that the S-7 Avenger is a weapon which by simple modification of existing components will shoot automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. -13- 10. The Bureau's decision to apply the machinegun classification to all S-7 Avenger firearms, of any date of manufacture, rather than prospectively from September 1, 1982, does not violate the 5th Amendment's implicit equal protection guarantees. The Bureau's action must be "rationally based and free from invidious discrimination" in order to survive judicial scrutiny. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971). The disparate treatment accorded plaintiff and the manufacturers of the KG-9 and SM-10 weapons is supported by rational and relevant distinctions between plaintiff and the two other firms. See Findings of Fact ##11, 14. 11. Judgment will be entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff. [signed] STANLEY S. BROTMAN, U.S.D.J. Dated: July 25, 1983 -14- FOOTNOTES 1. The documents in the administrative record refer to the weapon manufactured by RPB Industries by various names including: "SM10," "SAP M10" and "SM-10." The court also uses the terms interchangeably. 2. Although the court will not consider de novo testimony in this decision, the court observes that the testimony offered does not controvert the findings and conclusions made herein. Indeed, the evidence offered by all the declarants tends to corroborate the court's determinations. 3. Although for the reasons stated in the text the court will refrain from deciding whether the Bureau's statutory construction was in substance an interpretative or legislative rule, the court notes that there is nothing in the record to suggest that the agency's rule was not indeed an interpretative rule. ATF Rulings spring from 27 C.F.R. section 71.41(d) which states in subpart (2)(i)(A) that "An 'ATF Ruling' is an official interpretation by the Bureau that has been published in the Bulletin for the information and guidance of taxpayers, Bureau officials, and others concerned." The regulation also states at subpart (2)(iii)(B): ATF Rulings published in the Bulletin do not have the force and effect of Department of the Treasury Regulations (including amendatory Treasury decisions) but are published to provide precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases, and may be cited and relied upon for that purpose. Other sections of the regulation echo the cautionary tenor of these quoted sections, warning that the rulings merely advise the public as to how the Bureau believes the law is to be applied. The ATF Rulings in issue here are consistent with the regulation's objectives and standards for ruling publications. -15- IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY JERSEY ARMS WORKS, INC., Civil Action No. 83-1130 A New Jersey Corporation By And Through Its President JOHN STRAUB, Plaintiff, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, STEPHEN E. HIGGINS, Director of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Defendants. ORDER The within matter having come before the court on April 22, 1983, on a trial without a jury; and The court having considered the administrative record and other evidence submitted; and For the reasons stated.in the court's opinion filed this date, It is on this 25th day of July, 1983, hereby ORDERED that judgment of no cause for action will be entered in favor of defendants Secretary of the Treasury and Stephen E. Higgins, Director of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and against plaintiff Jersey Arms Works, Inc., A New Jersey Corporation By And Through Its President John Straub. No costs. [signed] STANLEY S. BROTMAN, U.S.D.J.