Cite as People v. Straight, 873 P.2d 744 (Colo. 1994)

    The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant,

                               v.

            Debbie Sue STRAIGHT, Defendant-Appellee.

                          No. 93SA221.

               Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

                          May 2, 1994.

                 Rehearing Denied May 23, 1994.

     Appeal from the District Court, City and County of Denver,
Honorable Nancy E. Rice, Judge.

     A. William Ritter, Jr., Dist. Atty., Everett Engstrom, Deputy
Dist. Atty., Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.

     Cherner and Blackman, Barbara S. Blackman, Denver, for
defendant-appellee.

     PER CURIAM.

     Defendant, Debbie Sue Straight, was charged with contributing
to the delinquency of a minor in violation of section 18-6-701, 8B
C.R.S. (1993 Supp.), by aiding her minor son in violating section
38-130 of the Denver Revised Municipal Code which prohibits the
sale, possession, or manufacture of "assault weapons."  Denver,
Colo., Rev.Mun.Code art. IV, Sec. 38-130 (1989) (the ordinance).

     Defendant moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that the
Denver ordinance is unconstitutional.  The trial court granted
defendant's motion, observing that the ordinance was held
unconstitutional in Robertson v. City and County of Denver, No.
90CV603 (District Court, City and County of Denver, February 26,
1993).  The trial court adopted the opinion and order of the
Robertson court and ruled that, as a matter of law, the prosecution
of defendant could not go forward.

     In Robertson v. City and County of Denver, No. 93SA91 (Colo. 
May 2, 1994), we reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial
court's order holding the Denver ordinance unconstitutional and
remanded the case for further proceedings.  We held that with the
exception of one section, the ordinance was constitutional and
enforceable.  Because the trial court in this case adopted the
trial court's opinion and order in the Robertson case, which has
been overruled in large part by this court, we reverse the order of
dismissal in this case and remand the case for further proceedings
not inconsistent with our opinion in Robertson.