Cite as Township of Ray v B & BS Gun Club - N.W.2d - (Mich.App. 1997) STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS TOWNSHIP OF RAY, FOR PUBLICATION December 12, 1997 Plaintiff-Appellant, 9:15 a.m. v No. 195027 Macomb Circuit Court B & BS GUN CLUB, LC No. 95-000288 Defendant-Appellee. Before: Markman, P.J., and McDonald and Fitzgerald, JJ. McDONALD, J. Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant. We affirm. The facts in this case are essentially undisputed. Defendant has operated an outdoor shooting range located in Ray Township since 1958. When defendant first began its operations, plaintiff township had no ordinances regulating shooting ranges. Plaintiff enacted the Ray Township Shooting Range Ordinance regulating the construction and operation of shooting ranges in 1973. Defendant complied with this ordinance. In 1993, plaintiff adopted Ordinance 27-93-1, amending several provisions of the 1973 ordinance. Among other things, Ordinance 27-93-1 required shooting ranges to obtain an annual permit in order to operate, increased the amount of liability insurance they were required to carry, and restricted the hours and days that shooting ranges could operate. Defendant protested this ordinance, but initially complied with its provisions. In December 1994, after the Legislature passed Public Act No. 250 (1994 PA 250) amending the Sport Shooting Ranges Act (the Act), MCL 691.1541 et seq.; MSA 18.1234 et seq., defendant wrote plaintiff a letter indicating that because of these recent amendments to the Act, it was no longer required to comply with Ordinance 27-93-1. Subsequently, plaintiff filed suit seeking an injunction to prevent defendant from operating until it complied with the ordinance and a declaratory judgment that 1994 PA 250 was unconstitutional on two grounds. [footnote 1] Plaintiff argued the Act violated the title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution and was unconstitutionally vague. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition, the trial court upheld the Act against both constitutional challenges and ruled that plaintiff was precluded from enforcing its ordinance against defendant pursuant to the Sport Shooting Ranges Act. The Sport Shooting Ranges Act was originally enacted in 1989.The Act was modeled after the Right to Farm Act, MCL 286.471 et seq.; MSA 12.122(1) et seq., and was passed in response to problems that arose as urban sprawl brought new development into rural areas, creating conflicts between shooting ranges and their new neighbors. The Act provides various forms of protection to shooting ranges, including providing immunity from certain nuisance actions to shooting ranges that comply with generally accepted operation practices. [footnote 2] MCL 691.1542; MSA 18.1234(42). The Legislature amended the Act through 1994 PA 250, which took effect July 5, 1994. As part of 1994 PA 250, the legislature added section 2a to the Act. Section 2a included a provision that permitted a shooting range not in violation of existing law at the time an ordinance is adopted to continue operation even if the range does not conform to a new ordinance or an amendment to an existing ordinance. MCL 691.1542a(1); MSA 18.1234(42a)(1). On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in ruling 1994 PA 250 does not violate the title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution. We review this question de novo, beginning with the presumption that the legislation is constitutional. Mooahesh v Dep't of Treasury, 195 Mich App 551, 562-563; 492 NW2d 246 (1992). The title-object clause provides in relevant part: "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." Const 1963, art 4, section 24. There are three ways to challenge a statute on the basis of the title-object clause: "a 'title body' challenge, (2) a multiple-object challenge, and (3) a change of purpose challenge." People v Kevorkian, 447 Mich 436, 453; 527 NW2d 714 (1994). In this case, plaintiff brings a title-body challenge and a multiple-object challenge. When legislation is challenged on constitutional grounds, it is presumed to be constitutional. Ace Tex Corp v Detroit, 185 Mich App 609, 614; 463 NW2d 166 (1990). We will first address plaintiff's title-body challenge. A title-body challenge claims that the title of an act does not adequately express its contents. Kervorkian, supra at 453. In this case, plaintiff argues the provisions of section 2a exceed the scope of the Act's title by providing for zoning and land use regulation. The title of an act must express its general purpose or object. Mooahesh, supra at 566-567. However, an act's title is not required to serve as an index to all of its provisions. Id. Instead, the test is whether the title gives the legislature and the public fair notice of the challenged provision. Rohan v Detroit Racing Ass'n, 314 Mich 326, 356; 22 NW2d 433 (1946); Mooahesh, supra at 567. The title of the Sport Shooting Ranges Act states that it is: AN ACT to provide civil immunity to persons who operate or use certain sport shooting ranges; and to regulate the application of state and local laws, rules, regulations, and ordinances regarding sport shooting ranges. [MCL 691.1541; MSA 18.1234(41).] Section 2a provides: (1) A sport shooting range that is operated and is not in violation of existing law at the time of the enactment of an ordinance shall be permitted to continue in operation even if the operation of the sport shooting range at a later date does not conform to the new ordinance or an amendment to an existing ordinance. (2) A sport shooting range that is in existence as of the effective date of this section and operates in compliance with generally accepted operation practices, even if not in compliance with an ordinance of a local unit of government, shall be permitted to do all of the following within its preexisting geographic boundaries if in compliance with generally accepted operation practices: (a) Repair, remodel, or reinforce any conforming or nonconforming building or structure as may be necessary in the interest of public safety or to secure the continued use of the building or structure. (b) Reconstruct, repair, restore, or resume the use of a nonconforming building damaged by fire, collapse, explosion, act of God, or act of war occurring after the effective date of this section. The reconstruction, repair, or restoration shall be completed within 1 year following the date of the damage or settlement of any property damage claim. If reconstruction, repair, or restoration is not completed within 1 year, continuation of the nonconforming use may be terminated in the discretion of the local unit of government. (c) Do anything authorized under generally accepted operation practices, including, but not limited to: (i) Expand or increase its membership or opportunities for public participation. (ii) Expand or increase events and activities. [MCL 691.1542a; MSA 18.1234(42a).] We find the title of the Act gives fair notice of the provisions of section 2a. The title provides that the Act regulates the application of state and local laws and ordinances to sport shooting ranges. The challenged provisions do no more than that which is expressed in the title. Subsection (1) of section 2a regulates the application of local ordinances regarding sport shooting ranges by setting forth when an existing range may continue to operate although possibly in violation of a local ordinance. MCL 691.1542a(1); MSA 18.1234(42a)(1). Subsection (2) of section 2a regulates the application of local ordinances by enumerating actions certain ranges may take despite the existence of local ordinances prohibiting such actions. MCL 691.1542a(2); MSA 18.1234(42a)(2). Therefore, this case is clearly distinguishable from Maki v City of East Tawas, 385 Mich 151; 188 NW2d 593 (1971), where the Michigan Supreme Court found a violation of the title-object clause where a governmental immunity act stated in its title that it provided immunity for injuries caused by negligence but within its body provided for immunity from all tort liability. Moreover, the present case is distinguishable from Rohan, supra, where the Michigan Supreme Court found the title-object clause was violated where an act regulating horse racing meets and the types of betting allowed at the meets also included a provision authorizing the department of agriculture to lease state-owned land for horse racing. Next, plaintiff raises a multiple-object challenge to the Act. Our review is again de novo, and we presume the legislation is constitutional. Mooahesh, supra at 562-563. Const 1963, art 4, section 24 prohibits a law from embracing more than one object. City of Livonia v Dep't of Social Services, 423 Mich 466, 496; 378 NW2d 402 (1985). A law's "object" is its general purpose or aim. Builder's Square v Dep't of Agriculture, 176 Mich App 494, 497; 440 NW2d 639 (1989). When determining whether an act embraces more than a single object, the body of the law, not merely its title, is examined. Kervorkian, supra at 459. A law "may contain all matters germane to its object and any provisions which directly relate to, carry out, and implement the principal object." City of Livonia, supra at 497. Legislation will not be found to violate the title-object clause solely because it contains more than one means of attaining its primary purpose. Hawkins v Dep't of Corrections, 219 Mich App 523, 526; 557 NW2d 138 (1996). Instead, a violation only exists where the law contains subjects so diverse that they have no necessary connection. Id. at 526. In this case, the title of the Act specifically states that it regulates the application of local laws and ordinances regarding sport shooting ranges. Subsection (1) of section 2a directly relates to this purpose because it addresses when an existing shooting range is not required to comply with an ordinance or an amendment to an ordinance to continue operation, i.e. when it was in compliance with existing law at the time the change took place. MCL 691.1542a(1); MSA 18.1234(42a)(1). Subsection (2) of section 2a also regulates the application of local laws and ordinances because it sets forth specific actions that an existing sport shooting range is allowed to take regardless of whether local ordinances permit such actions. MCL 691.1542a(2); MSA 18.1234(42a)(2). Accordingly, the challenged provisions do not address a subject so diverse that they have no necessary connection to the stated purpose of the Act, and the title-object clause is not violated by their inclusion. Hawkins, supra at 526. Finally, plaintiff argues the Sport Shooting Ranges Act is void for vagueness. This Court reviews this question de novo. People v Hubbard, 217 Mich App 459, 484; 552 NW2d 593 (1996). A statute may be declared void for vagueness if: (1) it is overbroad and impinges on First Amendment freedoms; (2) it does not provide fair notice of the conduct it regulates; or (3) it gives the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited discretion in determining whether the statute has been violated. Woll v Attorney General, 409 Mich 500, 533; 297 NW2d 578 (1980). Vagueness challenges that do not involve First Amendment freedoms are analyzed in light of the facts of the particular case. People v Lino, 447 Mich 567, 575; 527 NW2d 434 (1994). Plaintiff argues that the standard set forth in section 2a to determine which activities a shooting range may engage in, "generally accepted operation practices," does not provide adequate guidance to either those whose conduct is regulated or the trier of fact. We disagree. The term "generally accepted operation practices" is defined in section 1(a) of the Act, which provides: "Generally accepted operation practices" means those practices adopted by the commission of natural resources that are established by a nationally recognized nonprofit membership organization that provides voluntary firearm safety programs that include training individuals in the safe handling and use of firearms, which practices are developed with consideration of all information reasonably available regarding the operation of shooting ranges. The generally accepted operation practices shall be reviewed at least every 5 years by the commission of natural resources and revised as the commission considers necessary. The commission shall adopt generally accepted operation practices within 90 days of the effective date of section 2a. [MCL 691.1541(a); MSA 18.1234(41)(a), emphasis added.] Plaintiff argues the definition creates uncertainty because what might be considered proper under one organization's generally accepted operation practices might not be considered proper under another. However, it is clear under the statute that the "generally accepted operation practices" used to determine the propriety of a shooting range's activities will be standard. The statute charges the commission of natural resources with the responsibility of adopting a set of practices and reviewing them periodically. In fact, the parties indicate the commission has adopted the National Rifle Association's range manual for this purpose. Shooting ranges may refer to these standards to determine whether their operation conforms, and if there is a question for a trier of fact, these adopted practices would provide guidance. Therefore, plaintiff's argument is without merit. Affirmed. /s/ Gary R. McDonald /s/ Stephen J. Markman /s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald FOOTNOTES 1. Plaintiff's complaint included a fourth count not relevant to this appeal alleging violations of Michigan's Environmental Protection Act, MCL 691.1201 et seq.; MSA 14.528(201) et seq. 2. The term "generally accepted operation practices" is defined in section 1 of the Act as "those practices adopted by the commission of natural resources that are established by a nationally recognized nonprofit membership organization that provides voluntary firearm safety programs that include training individuals in the safe handling and use of firearms, which practices are developed with consideration of all information reasonably available regarding the operation of shooting ranges." MCL 691.1541; MSA 18.1234(41).