Steele v. NFA Branch, Motion to Dismiss of Federal Defendants, and Memorandum of Law, Case No. 82-2013-Civ-SMA (S.D. Fla. December 8, 1982) MAC:te UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA EUGENE STEELE, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT BRANCH, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JANET RENO, STATE ATTORNEY OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, STATE OF FLORIDA: STANLEY MARCUS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA AND CARLOS CRUZ, UNITED STATES MARSHAL, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, Defendants. CASE NO. 82-2013-Civ-SMA DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS Federal Defendants, National Firearms Act Branch, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Department of the Treasury (hereinafter "BATF"); Stanley Marcus, United States Attorney, Southern District of Florida; and Carlos Cruz, United States Marshal, Southern District of Florida, by and through their undersigned attorney, respectfully move this Court for entry of an Order dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. Rule 12(b)(1), (6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In accordance with Local Rule 10(A), Federal Defendants submit the annexed Memorandum of Law which sets forth the bases upon which the instant prayer for relief is grounded. Respectfully submitted, STANLEY MARCUS UNITED STATES ATTORNEY ________________________ BY: MARK A. COHEN ASSISTANT U. S. ATTORNEY 155 South Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33130 (305) 350-5475 DATED: Miami, Florida December 7, 1982 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion along with its accompanying Memorandum of Law was mailed by U.S. mail this 8th day of December, 1982, to Gene Steele, Esq., Plaintiff Pro Se, 155 South Miami Avenue, (Penthouse 1), Miami, Florida 33130; Janet Reno, State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, State of Florida, 1351 N.W. 12th Street, Miami, Florida; and Ralph C. Rocheteau, Assistant County Attorney, 1626 Dade County Courthouse, 73 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 33130. ________________________________ MARK A. COHEN ASSISTANT U. S. ATTORNEY MAC:te UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA EUGENE STEELE, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT BRANCH, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JANET RENO, STATE ATTORNEY OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, STATE OF FLORIDA: STANLEY MARCUS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA AND CARLOS CRUZ, UNITED STATES MARSHAL, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, Defendants. CASE NO. 82-2013-Civ-SMA MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS Federal Defendants, National Firearms Act Branch, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Department of the Treasury (hereinafter "BATF"); Stanley Marcus, United States Attorney, Southern District of Florida; and Carlos Cruz, United States Marshal, Southern District of Florida, by and through their undersigned attorney, submit this Memorandum of Law in support of their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. Rule 12(b)(1), (6); Local Rule 10(A). 1. Introduction: Statement of the Case The instant action was initiated on or about September 24, 1982, when Plaintiff filed his Complaint and accompanying Memorandum in Support. Plaintiff [footnote 1] is seeking a declaratory judgment that 27 C.F.R. section 179.85 is an unauthorized interpretation of 26 U.S.C. section 5812(a). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the law enforcement certification prescribed by 27 C.F.R. section 179.85 is beyond the scope of the statutory requirement contained in 28 U.S.C. section 5812(a). Plaintiff also seeks declaratory judgment that the named Defendants' refusal to sign the certification is arbitrary, capricious and improper. Plaintiff submits, in effect, that the execution of the certification is mandatory, not discretionary, for the named officials. The genesis of this lawsuit occurred some time in December, 1981, when Plaintiff requested that the portion of the law enforcement certification, wherein the law enforcement officer states that he/she has no information indicating the transferee will use the firearm or device for other than lawful purposes, be stricken from the transfer application form (attached hereto as Exhibit A). Plaintiff was advised by the Acting Chief, National Firearms Act Branch, by letter dated January 6, 1982, that the Bureau intended to delete the subject sentence when the form was next revised. Therefore, the Bureau contended, the statement could be deleted from the form. (Exhibit B). Subsequently, Mr. Steele advised that Bureau by mailgram dated January 25, 1982, that the United States Marshal for the Southern District of Florida had refused to sign the certification and that the Plaintiff intended to file a lawsuit challenging the Marshal's refusal to sign. (Exhibit C). By letter dated February 16, 1982, the Acting Chief of the National Firearms Act Branch stated that it was the Bureau's understanding that the Department of Justice did not permit either United States Marshals or United States Attorneys to sign the certifications. Plaintiff was advised that a certification from the Chief of Police for the transferee's city or town of residence, the Sheriff for the transferee's county of residence, the head of the State Police for the transferee's state of residence, among others, would be acceptable to the Bureau. (Exhibit D). Plaintiff advised ATF, by mailgram dated February 21, 1982, that none of the qualified local authorities would sign the certification. (Exhibit E). The Acting Chief of NFA Branch advised Plaintiff, by letter dated March 10, 1982, that an application to transfer an NFA weapon could not be approved if it would place the transferee in violation of State or local law. Further, Plaintiff was advised that the local authorities responsible for implementing State and local law would be best informed as to the provisions of those laws. (Exhibit F). Plaintiff was advised by the Acting Chief of the NFA Branch by letter dated May 11, 1982, that a signed law enforcement certification would be required before an application to transfer an NFA weapon would be processed. He was further advised that a certificate from a State or local district attorney or prosecutor having jurisdiction in the area of residence of the transferee would be acceptable. (Exhibit G). Finally, by letter dated June 4, 1982, Plaintiff was advised that the Bureau had determined that as a matter of public policy, the entire law enforcement certification would be required. (Exhibit H). The decision to maintain the certification without change was made by the Bureau in light of the requirement in the regulation. See 27 C.F.R. section 179.85. Any change in the certification could only be accomplished by a revision of the regulation. It is in the context of this extensive and ongoing correspondence between Plaintiff and Federal Defendants that the instant lawsuit must be considered. II. Statutory Background Before proceeding to an analysis of Plaintiff's claims and the spurious nature of those contentions, a brief review of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions appears necessary. Title 26 U.S.C. section 5812(a) provides that an NFA firearm may be transferred only pursuant to an application filed with and approved by the Secretary. Specifically, that section provides: (a) Application. A firearm shall not be transferred unless (1) the transferor of the firearm has filed with the Secretary a written application, in duplicate, for the transfer and registration of the firearm to the transferee on the application form prescribed by the Secretary; (2) any tax payable on the transfer is paid as evidenced by the proper stamp affixed to the original application form; (3) the transferee is identified in the application form in such manner as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe, except that, if such person is an individual, the identification must include his fingerprints and his photograph; (4) the transferor of the firearm is identified in the application form in such manner as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe; (5) the firearm is identified in the application form in such manner as the Secretary may be regulations prescribe; and (6) the application form shows that the Secretary has approved the transfer and the registration of the firearm to the transferee. Applications shall be denied if the transfer, receipt, or possession of the firearm would place the transferee in violation of law. (Emphasis added). section 179.85. Identification of transferee. If the transferee is an individual, he shall attach to each copy of the application, Form 4 (Firearms), a properly executed Form 4539, Identification of Transferee or Maker of Firearm, containing an individual photograph of himself, taken within one year prior to the date of such application, and shall affix his fingerprints to the form. The fingerprints must be clear for accurate classification and should be taken by someone properly equipped to taken them. The Form 4539 must be supported by a certificate of the local chief of police, sheriff of the county, U.S. attorney, U.S. marshal or such other person whose certificate may in a particular case be acceptable to the Director certifying that he is satisfied that the fingerprints and photograph appearing on the Form 4539 are those of the transferee and that he has no information indicating that the receipt or possession of the firearm would place the transferee in violation of State or local law or that the transferee will use the firearm for other than lawful purposes. (Emphasis added). As indicated above, the essence of Plaintiff's claim is that the required law enforcement certification is beyond the scope of the statutory requirement contained in 26 U.S.C. section 5812(a). The National Firearms Act was initially enacted by Congress in 1934. Pub. L. No. 474, 48 Stat. 1237. The applicable portion of current section 5812(a) was derived from section 4 of the 1934 Act. Specifically, section 4 provided in pertinent part: (a) It shall be unlawful for any person to transfer a firearm except in pursuance of a written order from the person seeking to obtain such article, on an application form issued in blank in duplicate for that purpose by the Commissioner. Such order shall identify the applicant by such means of identification as may be prescribed by regulations under this Act: Provided, That, if the applicant is an individual, such identification shall include fingerprints and a photograph thereof. (b) The Commissioner; with the approval of the Secretary, shall cause suitable forms to be prepared for the purposes above mentioned, and shall cause the same to be distributed to collectors of internal revenue. This section was implemented by Treasury Regulations No. 88, Art. 65 (1934). Article 65 provided in pertinent part: ART. 65. Written order required for transfer of firearm. --Except as otherwise provided, every person seeking to obtain a firearm must make an application in duplicate to the transferor on order Form 4 (Firearms). The application shall show (1) the name and address of the applicant, and, if the applicant is other than a natural person, the name and address of the principal officer or authorized representative thereof; and (2) the place where the firearm will usually be kept. If the applicant is an individual, he shall attach to each copy of the application an individual photograph of himself taken within 90 days prior to the date of such application, affix his fingerprints, and furnish other data as Form 4 (Firearms) requires. The fingerprints must be clear for accurate classification and should be taken before someone properly equipped to take them. The application must be supported by a certificate of the local chief of police, sheriff of the county, United States attorney, United States marshal, or such other person whose certificate may in a particular case be acceptable to the Commissioner, that he is satisfied that the fingerprints and photograph appearing on the application are those of the applicant and that the firearm is intended by the applicant for lawful purposes. (Emphasis added). Both the Act and the applicable regulations remained substantially unchanged until 1968. See Internal Revenue Code of 1939, section 2723, 53 Stat. 292; Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 5814, 68A Stat. 723. See also, 26 C.F.R. section 179.99, 20 Fed. Reg. 6739, (1955), as amended by T.D. 6557, 26 Fed. Reg. 2409 (1961). The National Firearms Act was substantially amended in 1968 in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) in which the court held that the hazards of self-incrimination created by the Act's registration requirements were real and appreciable and that a claim of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination would provide a full defense to prosecutions under the Act. In addition to certain other provisions not relevant to the instant matter, Congress amended current section 5812(a) to provide that applications to transfer NFA weapons would not be approved if the transfer, receipt, or possession of the firearm would place the transferee in violation of law. This sentence was new and was added after the decision in Haynes to provide an additional safeguard to ensure that firearms would not be registered to persons prohibited by law from possessing such weapons. III. Argument Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of the Complaint for Declaratory Judgment raises a number of issues which are addressed seriatim. 1. The Last Sentence of 27 C.F.R. section179.85 is a Valid Exercise of the Secretary's Authority to Promulgate Regulations. Plaintiff claims that there is no statutory authority for the promulgation of the last sentence of section 179.85. This contention is clearly without merit. The National Firearms Act was promulgated as Chapter 53 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Under the Code, the Secretary is authorized to promulgate regulations for the enforcement of Title 26. Specifically, 26 U.S.C. section 7805(a) provides: (a) Authorization. --Except where such authority is expressly given by this title to any person other than an officer or employee of the Treasury Department, the Secretary or his delegate shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any alternation of law in relation to internal revenue. This section gives clear and broad authority to the Secretary to prescribe the regulation in question. Plaintiff points to the repeal of former section 5847, Title 26, U.S.C, as evidence that Congress intended that this regulation is unauthorized. This section provided specific authority to promulgate regulations under the NFA. It was repealed at the time of the revision of the NFA in 1968. Contrary to Plaintiff's contentions, its repeal was merely a matter of clarification; it was actually unnecessary in light of the broad grant of authority contained in section 7805. Moreover, in order to find that there is no statutory authority to issue a regulation, the lack of authority must be "so manifest that the court has no choice except to hold that the [promulgator] has exceeded his authority and employed means that are not all appropriate to the end specified in the act of Congress." Review Committee, Venue VII v. Willey, 275 F.2d 264, 272 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 827 (1960). Clearly, no such inference can be drawn in the instant case. Quite the contrary, section 7805 clearly provides for the authority necessary to promulgate regulations to implement the National Firearms Act. It is well established that Federal regulatory bodies may not enact regulations which exceed the bounds of authority of the statute under which they are enacted. United States v. Maxwell, 278 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1960). However, where the enabling legislation contains language which allows such regulations to be made as are necessary to implement the provisions of a specific act, the regulatory body is accorded wide discretion in promulgating regulations. In Mourning v. Family Publication Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973), the Supreme Court was faced with determining the validity of regulations issued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1408 (United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended), which empowered the Federal ReserVe Board to "make... such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." In the course of holding the questioned regulations valid, the court stated: "Where the empowering provisions of the statute states simply that the agency may 'make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act,' we have held that the validity of a regulation promulgated thereunder will be sustained so long as it is 'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.' Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-281, 89 S. Ct. 518, 525, 21 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1969). Moreover, the courts may invalidate revenue regulations only if they are unreasonable and clearly inconsistent with the statute. Delta Metalforming Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 632 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1980). Therefore, in order to uphold the validity of the last sentence of 27 C.F.R. section 179.85, it must only be shown that law enforcement certification is reasonably related to the purposes of the National Firearms Act. 2. The Law Enforcement Certification is Reasonably Related to the Purposes of the National Firearms Act Section 5812 does not impose a ministerial duty upon the Secretary to approve the transfer of NFA weapons merely where the applicant supplies the requisite information on the required application form. Except as to those applications which must be denied because the receipt, transfer or possession would place the transferee in violation of law, the Secretary has discretion to approve or disapprove transfers. This is evidenced by Congress' desire to restrict possession of these intently dangerous weapons and is made manifest by the provision in section 5812(a) which states that a firearm shall not be transferred unless "the application form shows that the Secretary has approved the transfer...." 26 U.S.C. section 5812(a)(6). The implementation of Congress' desire to restrict transactions in these weapons is made clear in the applicable regulations. Section 179.85 provides that prior to the transfer of an NFA weapon, the transferee must obtain the signature of a law enforcement official. First, the officer certifies that he has no information indicating that the receipt or possession of the firearm would place the transferee in violation of State or local law. This provision is clearly related to the purposes of the enabling legislation. As noted above, section 5812(a) mandates that applications to transfer NFA weapons "will be denied if the transfer, receipt, or possession of the firearm would place the transferee in violation of law." Therefore, this portion of the certification merely ensures that possession of the NFA weapon will not place the transferee in violation of law. The requirement implements the language of the statute and provides that its provisions will be complied with. It is clearly within the scope of the enabling legislation. Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues that the phrase "violation of law" in the last sentence of section5812(a) does not apply to State or local law but only to Federal law. First, it is a well-established principle of statutory construction that words in a statute are to be given their common meaning. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979). Clearly, if Congress had intended to limit the scope of the applicable law only to Federal law, they would have done so. Furthermore, the legislative history of the Act makes clear that Congress intended that all laws, local, State and Federal be included. In this regard, one need only point to section 5822 of the Act which requires a person who intends to make an NFA firearm to file an application to make the firearm with the Secretary. The language of section section 5822 is very similar to that of section 5812(a). Indeed, the last sentence of section 5822 is virtually identical to the last sentence of section 5812(a); it states, "Applications shall be denied if the making or possession of the firearm would place the person making the firearm in violation of law." 26 U.S.C. section 5822. The legislative history of this section states, "Provisions have been added to preclude the approval of the application where the transfer would place the maker in violation of any law." (Emphasis added). S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 42 (1969). 1968-2 C.B. 858. Thus, it is apparent that the clear Congressional intent was to preclude not only the making of NFA weapons by persons who would be in violation of Federal, State, or local law, but also to preclude the transfers of NFA weapons to persons who would be placed in violation of any law. Plaintiff also maintains that the second part of the law enforcement certification in which the law enforcement official certifies that he has no information indicating that the transferee will use the firearm for other than lawful purposes, is invalid. Plaintiff argues that this provision requires the law enforcement officer to "read the transferee's mind." (Complaint, page 2). Again, Plaintiff misreads the intent of the regulation. As previously noted, this portion of the law enforcement certification requirement was initially promulgated at the time of the Act's enactment in 1934. Its necessity was obvious; Congress wanted to keep these dangerous weapons out of the hands of the criminally inclined. There was in 1934, as there is in 1982 [footnote 2], a legitimate need to regulate these types of weapons and to ensure that they do not fall into the hands of persons intent on misusing them. As the legislative history of the original Act states: The gangster as a law violator must be deprived of his most dangerous weapon, the machine gun. H. Rep. No. 1780, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1934). (Exhibit J). The questioned certification remains an integral part of the Act's regulatory scheme and is a necessary tool in the enforcement of the Act. The statement in the certification provides the local law enforcement official with a justification for refusing to sign the certification. For example, an official might have information concerning the individual applicant's reasons for wanting to acquire an NFA firearm that would influence the official's decision to refuse to sign the certification, even though the transfer of the weapon would not place the transferee in violation of State or local law. Further, this long-standing administrative construction of the Act is entitled to great weight, particularly when, as here, Congress had revisited the Act and left the practice untouched. Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 at 74 (1974); Eastern Airlines v. Mobil Oil Corp., 512 f.Supp. 1237 at 1241 (S.D. Fla. 1981). A court must accord great weight to the long-standing interpretation placed on a statute by an agency charged with its administration. This is especially so where Congress has re-enacted the statute without pertinent change. In these circumstances, Congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974). Moreover, such a contemporaneous construction deserves special deference when it has remained consistent over a long period of time. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972). In the almost 50 years during which the law enforcement certification has been required, Congress has never expressed its disapproval, and its silence in this regard suggests its consent to the Bureau's practice. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Associated Day Goods Corp., 101 S. Ct. 817 at 823 n. 17 (1981). It should also be noted that in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1968), the Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the amended Act, made specific reference to the law enforcement certification. The court stated that the application to transfer an NFA weapon must be supported by the photograph and fingerprints of the transferee and "by a certificate of a local or Federal law enforcement official that he is satisfied that the photographs and fingerprints are those of the transferee and that the weapon is intended for lawful uses." Id. at 605. By its review of these application requirements, the Court recognized that the Secretary had interpreted the statutory requirement as providing broad authority to establish the application procedures. The Court's opinion expressed no doubt, either directly or indirectly, as to the propriety of the Act's provisions. Based upon the foregoing, the last sentence of section 179.85 should properly be upheld as a valid exercise of the authority granted by 26 U.S.C. section 7805. 3. 27 C.F.R. section179.85 Imposes No Duty on Other Federal, State or Local Law Enforcement Officials to Perform an Affirmative Act. Plaintiff complains that the last sentence of 27 C.F.R. section 179.85 imposes a duty on other Federal, State, or local officials to perform an affirmative act. Plaintiff's reading of the regulation is incorrect. The regulation imposes no burden to act on any law enforcement official. In fact, the sole burden imposed by section 179.85 is upon the transferee--to obtain the certification. Further, the named individuals in section 179.85 and on the transfer form (Form 4) are merely examples of persons who are acceptable to the Bureau. The Bureau has already expanded this list to include to include State and local district attorneys and prosecutors having jurisdiction in the area of the residence of the transferee. ATF Rul. 77-25, A.T.F.B. 1977, 189. The regulation imposes no requirement on the law enforcement officer to act upon the request for the required statement. It is clearly within the discretion of the appropriate certifying official to determine whether or not to sign the certification. Further, the inclusion of State and local authorities as certifying officials is reasonable since they would be the most knowledgeable on State [footnote 3] and local law and any recent legislative enactments which might affect the legality of the proposed transfer. This claim is particularly groundless as to Defendant Cruz, because U. S. Marshal's Service Headquarters recently sent a teletype to all field offices forbidding the signing of these certificates by U. S. Marshal's Service personnel (a copy of said teletype is annexed as Exhibit 1). The Director of the Marshal's Service wrote to the Acting Director, BATF, requesting that the designation of the U. S. Marshal as an acceptable certifying official be deleted from both the forms and the corresponding regulations, 27 C.F.R. section179.85. (Exhibit J). The BATF responded that the U. S. Marshal would be deleted on the reprinted forms and that the change in 27 C.F.R. section 179.85 would soon be effected. (Exhibit K). Hence, Defendant Cruz clearly cannot be compelled to act as a signatory. 4. The Law Enforcement Certification does not Violate the Tenth Amendment Plaintiff argues that the required law enforcement certification is an impermissible encroachment on State sovereignty and, ipso facto, violative of the Tenth Amendment. This claim is totally without merit. The Tenth Amendment expressly declares the Constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function in a Federal system. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1974). In Sipes v. United States, 321 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1963), the defendant argued that the National Firearms Act was an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to regulate "under the guise of a revenue measure, namely, the regulation of firearms, which is reserved to the States." Id. at 176. The court held otherwise, stating that the statute did not violate the Tenth Amendment. See also, United States v. Tomlin, 454 F.2d 1976 (9th Cir. 1972). Likewise, Congress and the Secretary have not attempted to prevent the States from regulating firearms within their States. Instead, the regulation merely establishes a procedure by which persons who may possess firearms under State law can comply with a Federal statute. The only effect of the regulation is to require the transferee to obtain the law enforcement certification. This requirement does not infringe upon any power reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment. See., State of Florida v. Mathews, 526 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1976). See also, Peel v. Florida Department of Transportation, 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ohio Department of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1980). IV. Conclusion Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Federal Defendants pray that this Court enter an Order dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment; and for such other and further relief as to this Court may seem just and proper. Respectfully submitted, STANLEY MARCUS UNITED STATES ATTORNEY _______________________ MARK A. COHEN ASSISTANT U. S. ATTORNEY 155 South Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33130 (305) 350-5475 DATED: Miami, Florida December 7, 1982 FOOTNOTES 1. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. A cursory reading of the Complaint and Memorandum in Support discloses that Plaintiff pro se is, himself, an attorney. 2. It is clear beyond peradventure that the South Florida region has been acutely affected by weapons-related crimes. 3. Defendant Janet Reno interposed her Answer and Defenses on or about October 18, 1982.