Cite as U.S. v. Bradley, 892 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1990)

          UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

                               v.

              Brad C. BRADLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

                          No.  89-1279.

        United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

                      Argued Nov. 30, 1989.

                      Decided Jan. 4, 1990.

        Opinion on Petition for Rehearing Feb. 26, 1990.

     Maxine A. White, Asst. U.S. Atty., Christian R. Larsen, Ann M.
Kisting, Asst. U.S. Atty., Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiff-appellee.

     William S. Mautner, Atinsky, Kahn, Sicula & Teper, Milwaukee,
Wis., for defendant-appellant.

     Before POSNER, COFFEY, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

     EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.

     Melvin P. Deutsch busies himself trying to represent
defendants in federal firearms cases.  Last October Deutsch filed
a motion for admission to the bar of this court, representing that
he is a member of "Deutsch, McCormick, D'Amato & Associates" of
Milwaukee, has been an attorney for 33 years, and is admitted to
practice in Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, New York, California,
Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia.  His career, as he depicts
it, has soared; according to the affidavit attached to his
application, "from 1985 to 1987, I did appear, before the highest
court in the land eight (8) times, and I won seven (7) of the said
eight (8) times, in my appearances before the Supreme Court."
Perhaps out of a sense of noblesse oblige, Deutsch agreed to
represent Brad C. Bradley, the defendant in this weapons case. 
Before trial, Bradley fired his lawyer and asked the district judge
to approve the substitution of Deutsch, whom he described as an
expert in firearms defense.  The judge declined, and his refusal to
allow Deutsch to represent Bradley is the lead issue presented by
William S. Mautner, whom the district judge appointed in lieu of
Deutsch.

     Judge Curran churlishly looked up Deutsch in the register of
Wisconsin lawyers and found his name missing.  Then he looked up
Deutsch in another register and found him-in the federal prison at
Oxford, Wisconsin, serving time for mail fraud.  That was enough
for the judge but not for Mautner, who accepted Deutsch's word and
never checked his credentials.  We did.  Deutsch is not licensed to
practice in New York or anywhere else; the "law firm" in Milwaukee
does not exist; he has not appeared before the Supreme Court of the
United States, and during the years he said he was steamrollering
his opponents he was defending himself (unsuccessfully) against
criminal charges.  Deutsch is a con man, a fraud, a phony, a
humbug, a mountebank-in short, an impostor: See also United States
v. Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d 937, 939 n. 7 (7th Cir.1989); United
States v. Bintzler, No. 88-2508 (7th Cir.  Nov. 9, 1989)
(unpublished order denying Deutsch's application for admission to
our bar).  Indigent defendants cannot pick and choose among members
of the district court's bar, Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 103
S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983); they certainly are not entitled
to be represented by poseurs.

     That Deutsch has no respect for the law we know (that's what
landed him in prison): that real lawyers (Mautner is a member of
the bar) should act as procurers for such as Deutsch is more
surprising.  Although we appreciate the difficulties under which
appointed criminal defense counsel labor, their duties to their
clients do not include telling tall tales without attempting to
ascertain the truth.  Mautner was on notice-from the district
judge's opinion and from Deutsch's residence-that something was
amiss.  The bar as well as the bench ought to guard criminal
defendants against fakers, who are unlikely to protect defendants'
legal entitlements.  Our order in Bintzler asked Wisconsin's
officials to look into violations of the laws dealing with
unauthorized practice; for good measure, we are sending to the
United States Attorney the affidavit Deutsch filed in attempting to
gain admission to our bar, which raises substantial questions under
the perjury statute.  Judges should be on the lookout for Mr.
Deutsch, whose persistence suggests that he may have other marks in
sight.

     The argument that we should remand for a trial at which
Deutsch would represent Bradley is only the first of twelve issues
in Mautner's brief.  Spreading the brief so thin ensures that none
of the issues can be developed, and it has long been understood
that lawyers best serve their clients' interests by concentrating
on-and presenting fully-the subjects with the best chances of
producing a favorable result.  Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-
53, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3312-13, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983).  Only two of
the remaining eleven issues call for comment.

     Until 1984 Bradley was a registered firearms dealer.  A fire
at his shop in 1983 led to the discovery of a machine gun,
silencers lacking serial numbers, and other weapons that private
persons may not possess.  Inspectors also found some "assassination
kits"-modified briefcases from which concealed guns could be fired. 
Bradley pleaded guilty in 1984 to one count of possessing an
unregistered weapon, a conviction that excluded him from his trade. 
Bradley went back into business anyway.  In 1987 an informant (a
legitimate gun dealer trying to protect the reputation of his busi-
ness) bought several weapons and sets of parts from Bradley.  The
principal charge emerging from these purchases is that without the
necessary registration Bradley transferred a collection of parts
designed to turn semi-automatic weapons into machine guns (weapons
capable of firing multiple shots with a single pull of the
trigger), in violation of 26 U.S.C. sections 5812, 5845(b), and
5861.   Bradley's sentence was 24 months' imprisonment on the
counts subject to the Sentencing Guidelines, to run concurrently
with 60 months on counts not subject to the Guidelines (including
the machine gun counts)-which should come out roughly the same,
because parole is available on the pre-Guideline counts but not the
Guideline counts.

     Bradley delivered an auto sear, a selector switch, a
disconnector, a trigger, and a hammer to the informant in October
1987.  Two weeks later Bradley transferred a bolt carrier.  These
six parts will transform a semi-automatic rifle into an automatic
one.  The prosecution's theory is, that the six parts collectively
are a "machinegun" Within the meaning of section 5845(b), which
provides:

          The term "machinegun" means any weapon which shoots, is
     designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot,
     automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by
     a single function of the trigger.  The term shall also include
     the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed
     and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts
     designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a
     machine gun, and any combination of parts from which a
     machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the
     possession or under the control of a person.

So parts may be machine guns in any of three ways: (1) any part
"designed solely or exclusively ... for use in converting a weapon
into a machinegun" is a statutory machine gun; (2) a "combination
of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into
a machinegun" is a statutory machine gun; and (3) "any combination
of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled" is a statutory
machine gun if one person has possession or control of all of the
parts.

     Bradley protests that the six parts he transferred did not
fall into any of these categories.  His principal argument is that
the "auto sear"-an essential component of the kit-did not need to
be registered because it was manufactured before 1981, when 27
C.F.R. Part 179 was amended to require all auto sears to be
registered and bear serial numbers on the theory that they are
themselves "combination[s] of parts designed and intended, for use
in converting a weapon into a machinegun".   Ruling 81-4 of the
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division of the Department of the
Treasury (ATF 81-4) exercises the Secretary's power under 26 U.S.C.
section 7805(b) not to apply the regulation retroactively.  Because
he transferred an auto sear made before November 1981, Bradley
insists that he did not need to register,   This argument misunder-
stands ATF 81-4.  The ruling is not a safe harbor.  It provides
that auto sears made after a certain date must be registered even
if transferred in isolation.  The prosecution's, theory in this
case is not that Bradley violated the statute by transferring the
auto sear; it is that the six parts together are a "combination of
parts designed and intended for use in converting a weapon into a
machinegun".  That Bradley could not have been convicted for an
unregistered transfer of the pre-1981 auto sear by itself is
neither here nor there.

     An emphasis on the six parts sets up Bradley's next argument:
that he did not transfer the six together, and so did not need to
register.  Section 5861(e) makes it a crime "to transfer a firearm
in violation of the provisions of this chapter", and section 5812
requires both an application for permission to transfer, and the
permission of the Secretary of the Treasury, to precede the
transfer. United States v. Mayo, 498 F.2d 713 (D.C.Cir.1974).  Both
section 5812 and section 5861(e) refer to transfers of firearms;
but under section 5845(b), according to Bradley, only the
collection of six parts is the "firearm".  An auto sear, selector
switch, disconnector, trigger, and hammer (the first five parts)
are incapable of turning a semiautomatic weapon such as an AR-15
into a machine gun; it takes the bolt carrier to complete the job. 
So, too, the bolt carrier can't produce automatic fire without the
auto sear.  None of the sales amounted to the transfer of a
"firearm", making registration unnecessary.

     The argument is clever but unconvincing.  The statutes are
designed to require notice and approval to convert rifles to
machine guns.  No one transfers six parts at exactly the same time. 
Even if all six come in a box, the recipient will obtain control of
some parts ahead of the others.  Any complex act may be decomposed
into smaller acts. (The pitcher does not throw a bean ball; he toes
the rubber, nods his head at the catcher, rubs the ball, winds up,
accelerates his arm, releases his grip, and behold! the ball
collides with the batter's noggin-none of which is forbidden by
itself.) That two weeks, separated the turnovers can't be
dispositive.  Suppose the gap were two hours, or two minutes. 
Bradley transferred a collection of parts sufficient to create a
machine gun no later than the date he furnished the bolt carrier,
as surely as if all six had come tied in a red ribbon.

     It doesn't take much effort to imagine harder cases.  The
firearms laws define terms in surprising ways, causing all sorts of
problems.  United States.v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (5th
Cir.1989); United States v. Drasen, 845 F.2d 731 (7th Cir.1988).
Defining a "machinegun" to include a bunch of parts invites efforts
to transfer things at different times or from different sources. 
Suppose Bradley never had produced the bolt carrier, but that the
customer had one of his own.  Suppose Bradley had transferred the
two hard-to-get parts (the auto sear and the bolt carrier) and left
the customer to scrounge up others that are readily available
because they have legitimate uses in repairing lawful weapons. 
Suppose Bradley had transferred the first five parts and sent the
of customer to a shop on the other side
town to get the bolt carrier.  Perhaps doing so by arrangement with
the other vendor would be a single transfer, but a customer who
picks up a part at a time from independent proprietors does not
subject any of them to a claim of forbidden transfer.  All sorts of
intermediate cases could be put.  Fortunately for us (unfortunately
for Bradley), his deeds pose no such complexities.  Sequentially
furnishing all six parts sufficient to convert a weapon to a
machine gun is a "transfer" in gross, and the seller needs the
Secretary's permission before handing over the last, critical part.

     AFFIRMED