Cite as U.S. v. Bryan, 122 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1997) THIS SUMMARY ORDER WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REPORTER AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT, BUT MAY BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR IN ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 10th day of February, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-seven. PRESENT: Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., Honorable Fred I. Parker, Honorable Gerald W. Heaney,* Circuit Judges. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, -- v. -- SILLASSE BRYAN, aka "Uzi," Defendant-Appellant. No. 96-1450 APPEARING FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Roger Bennet Adler, New York, New York. APPEARING FOR APPELLEES: Elaine D. Banar, Assistant United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York. Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. This cause came to be heard on the transcript of record from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (David G. Trager, Judge) and was argued. ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York is AFFIRMED. Sillasse Bryan appeals from a judgment of conviction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Bryan was convicted on July 3, 1996, after a jury trial, of conspiring to engage in the sale of firearms without a license as well as actually engaging in the sale of firearms without a license in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 371, 922(a)(1)(A). Judge Trager sentenced Bryan to a term of 57 months in prison and to supervision upon release for three years. Bryan seeks reversal of his conviction on three grounds: first, that jury had before it insufficient evidence upon which to convict him of the violations charged; second, that the court erred in failing to charge the jury properly with respect to the credibility of certain witnesses for the government; and, third, that the court erred in instructing the jury that an overt act not set forth in the indictment may constitute an act in furtherance of a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. section 371. Each of these claims is without merit. Bryan's first contention is that the jury had insufficient evidence on which to convict him of the willfulness necessary under 18 U.S.C. section 921(a)(1). Defendant's argument, however, rests on a misunderstanding of the law of this circuit. The willfulness element of unlawful sale of firearms does not require proof "that defendant had specific knowledge of the statute he is accused of violating, nor that he had specific intent to violate the statute." See United States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468, 1473 (2d Cir. 1995). Rather, this circuit reads the willfulness requirement more "broadly requir[ing] only that the government prove that the defendant's conduct was knowing and purposeful and that the defendant intended to commit an act which the law forbids." United States v. Collins, 957 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1992). Thus, while we acknowledge that several of our sister circuits have construed the law more narrowly, see, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Corcino, 85 F.3d 549, 553 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that "in order for the Government to prove the offence of willfully dealing in firearms without a license . . . it must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge of the licensing requirement"), defendant's argument for such a construction of the law in this circuit is foreclosed. With the proper understanding of the requirement of willfulness in this circuit, defendant's insufficiency argument is unavailing. It is axiomatic that a defendant faces a heavy burden when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's verdict. See United States v. Soto, 716 F.2d 989, 991 (2d Cir. 1983). In passing on such a challenge, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). At trial, the government elicited ample proof that defendant's conduct "was knowing and purposeful" and that he "intended to commit an act which the law forbids." United States v. Collins, 957 F.2d at 76. In brief, the government established that Bryan made several trips from his home in New York City to Ohio for the purpose of purchasing firearms that he was unable to obtain legally in New York; that he enlisted the aid of two Ohio women to purchase the firearms on his behalf, knowing that in Ohio purchase was possible with an in-state driver's license alone; that he provided the women the funds to purchase the guns and accompanied them to the dealer; that Bryan confessed to purchasing firearms in Ohio with the intention of transporting them to New York for resale; and, most important, that defendant removed the serial numbers of the firearms purchased to avoid detection. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, this evidence is sufficient to establish that Bryan knowingly intended to commit an act which the law forbids. Id. Defendant's second argument on appeal concerns the court's instructions regarding the credibility of two of the government's witnesses, women who aided Bryan in purchasing firearms during his trips to Ohio. As an initial matter, we note that defendant's counsel failed to object to the credibility charge given by the district court. Joint Appendix 128-29. Thus, notwithstanding the inclusion of the sought after charge in defendant's proposed instruction submitted to the court, we review for plain error. See United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 942 (2d Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we will reverse only "in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result." Id. at 942 (quotations omitted). Here no such error occurred. Defendant sought an instruction (1) that would have specifically informed the jury that both the witnesses were drug abusers and that they were abusing drugs at the time certain events at issue allegedly occurred and (2) that the witnesses were interested in the outcome of the trial. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 24-25. As to the proposed drug abuse charge, the district court did not err in refusing to accept it as there was contradictory evidence on the matter with respect to one of the witnesses at issue. See United States v. Lam Lek Chong, 544 F.2d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that a requested charge "must be accurate in every respect before a trial judge is held in error for refusing it") (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101 (1977). Even were this not the case, we cannot conclude that the district court's refusal of this instruction was plain error. As to the credibility instruction, the district court took care to instruct the jury of the dangers inherent in accomplice testimony and of the need to give the two witnesses' testimony special attention because both had entered into cooperation agreements with the government. Thus, defendant's argument in this regard is meritless. Finally, defendant argues that the district court erred in charging the jury that an overt act not included in the indictment can constitute the foundation of a conspiracy conviction. Defendant's argument fails. The court has specifically held that a conspiracy "conviction may rest on an overt act not charged in the indictment." United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385, 400 (2d Cir. 1966) (Feinberg, C.J.). For the foregoing reasons, we find defendant's arguments to be without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.