Cite as U.S. v. Elliott, 128 F.3d 671 (8th Cir. 1997)

      United States Court of Appeals for the eighth circuit

                          No. 97-1945SI

               United States of America, Appellee,

                               v.

                 William W. Elliott, Appellant.

                  Submitted:  October 20, 1997

                     Filed: October 30, 1997

     Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa.

                           [PUBLISHED]

     Before FAGG, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit
Judges.

     PER CURIAM.

     After a conservation officer encountered William W. Elliott
with two handguns in his van and local law enforcement officers
seized an unregistered AK-47 fully automatic machinegun at
Elliott's home, a jury convicted Elliott on three counts of being
a felon in possession of a firearm, and one count each of
possessing an illegal firearm and failing to register a firearm. 
See 18 U.S.C. sections 922(g)(1) and 922(o)(1) (1994); 26 U.S.C.
section 5861(d) (1994).  Elliott appeals his convictions and
sentence.  We affirm.

     In challenging his convictions for being a felon in possession
of a firearm, Elliott contends he has no valid underlying felony
conviction for the purposes of Section(s) 922(g)(1).  Elliott
argues his counseled guilty plea to an earlier Arkansas felony
charge is constitutionally infirm because the trial judge failed to
comply with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969).  The
holdings of the United States Supreme Court, however, foreclose
Elliott's collateral attack on his earlier plea-based conviction. 
See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60-65 (1980); see also
Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496-97 (1994).

     Because this Court gave Elliott permission to file a pro se
brief, we now turn to the arguments in Elliott's brief.  See
Hoggard v. Purkett, 29 F.3d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1994) (pro se briefs
not accepted when a party is represented by counsel).  Elliott
contends his section 5861(d) conviction for failure to register the
machinegun violates due process. Elliott argues section 5861(d) was
implicitly repealed by the later-enacted 922(o)(1), which prohibits
possession of a machinegun.  Because Elliott can comply with both
statutes by simply refusing to possess the machinegun, we agree
with the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits that
the statutes are reconcilable.  See Hunter v. United States, 73
F.3d 260, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rivera, 58 F.3d
600, 601-02 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ardoin, 19 F.3d 177,
179-80 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Ross, 9 F.3d 1182, 1193-94
(7th Cir. 1993), vacated on other grounds, 511 U.S. 1124 (1994);
United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 182-83 (4th Cir. 1992); but
see United States v. Dalton, 960 F.2d 121, 123-24 (10th Cir. 1992). 
In sum, Elliott was fairly convicted under section 5861(d). 
Claiming he never fired the machinegun and did not know it was an
automatic, Elliott also contends the Government failed to prove he
knowingly possessed the weapon.  Because Elliott possessed the
machinegun and observed its characteristics, Elliott's contention
is foreclosed by our holding in United States v. Farrell, 69 F.3d
891, 894 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1283 (1996).  We
also reject Elliott's challenge to his sentence.  Our review shows
the district court's guideline sentence was correct.  Finally, we
have considered Elliott's remaining contentions and find them
without merit.

     We affirm Elliott's convictions and sentence.

     A true copy.

     Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.