Cite as U.S. v. Lamplugh, Case No. 3:CR-95-0169 (M.D.Pa., August 6, 1998) IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 3:CR-95-0169 vs. (HON. THOMAS I. VANASKIE) HARRY C. LAMPLUGH, THERESA L. LAMPLUGH, and JOHN LAMPLUGH, Defendants. MEMORANDUM On June 29, 1995, the government filed a twenty-one count indictment against defendants Harry C. Lamplugh, Theresa L. Lamplugh and John Lamplugh. On April 16, 1997, a superseding indictment that added four additional counts was filed. (Dkt. Entry 105). The defendants have been charged with the following violations: (1) defendants Harry C. Lamplugh and Theresa L. Lamplugh conspired to violate various federal firearms possession and distribution laws (Dkt. Entry 1, Count 1); defendant Harry C. Lamplugh willfully engaged in the business of dealing in firearms without a federal license in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 922(a)(1)(A) and 924(a)(1)(D) (Count 2); defendant Harry C. Lamplugh, a convicted felon, knowingly possessed firearms and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 922(9)(1) (Counts 3-17); defendant Harry C. Lamplugh made false statements to a licensed firearms dealers in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(1)(B) (Counts 18-20); defendant Harry C. Lamplugh knowingly possessed a firearm with a barrel length of less than 18 inches without proper registration in violation of 26 U.S.C. sections 5841, 5861(d) and 5871 (Count 21); defendant John Lamplugh knowingly possessed a firearm with a barrel length of less than 18 inches without proper registration in violation of 26 U.S.C. sections 5841, 5861(d) and 5871 (Count 22); defendant Theresa L. Lamplugh knowingly made false material declarations under the penalty of perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1623 (Count 23); defendants Harry C. Lamplugh and Theresa L. Lamplugh failed to file income tax returns for the 1991 and 1992 calendar years in violation of 26 U.S.C. section 7203 (Counts 2425). Harry C. Lamplugh and Theresa L. Lamplugh filed a motion to suppress evidence and statements which were obtained during a May 25, 1994 search of their residence located in Wellsboro, Pennsylvania. (Dkt. Entry 38.) Moreover, Harry C. Lamplugh and Theresa L. Lamplugh have also moved to suppress evidence which was obtained during a May 25, 1994 search of John Lamplugh's residence in Troy, Pennsylvania. (Dkt. Entry 38.) Defendant John Lamplugh also filed a motion to suppress evidence and statements which were obtained during the same searches. (Dkt. Entry 203.) Because there were disputed issues of fact, this Court conducted an eight-day suppression hearing which spanned several months. The motions have been briefed and the parties have filed their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, this matter is ripe for disposition. Because Harry and Theresa Lamplugh lack standing to challenge the search of the Troy property and the government has certified that it does not seek to use any evidence seized at the Troy property against John Lamplugh, the evidence seized at the Troy property will not be suppressed. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find the warrant to search the Wellsboro property was supported by probable cause. Specifically, the affidavit executed in connection with the application for the issuance of the warrant provided a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause. Further, the defendants have failed to show that the affiant misrepresented and/or omitted any facts in the supporting affidavit in bad faith. In any event, the supporting affidavit is sufficient to support a probable cause finding even with the deletion of the alleged misrepresentations from the affidavit as well as the inclusion of the alleged omissions. Also without merit is the defendants' contention that the warrant was too general. The warrant provided a reasonably detailed description of the property to be seized. Moreover, given the nature of the alleged crimes, the warrant could not have been crafted more narrowly. Even assuming that the warrant was somehow defective, the law enforcement officers relied upon the warrant in good faith and suppression would be inappropriate. The defendants have also failed to establish that the law enforcement officers did not knock and announce their presence. To the contrary, the credible evidence presented at the suppression hearing demonstrated that the law enforcement officers did knock and announce their presence and that they entered the Wellsboro residence in a reasonable manner. The defendants have likewise failed to bear their burden of demonstrating that the law enforcement officers engaged in outrageous conduct in the execution of the search warrant. Finally, John Lamplugh has failed to demonstrate that Miranda warnings were applicable to an interview of him conducted during the search. For all of these reasons, the defendants' motions to suppress will be denied. I. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The defendants in this case are Harry C. Lamplugh, Theresa L. Lamplugh and John Lamplugh. Harry and Theresa Lamplugh are husband and wife, and John Lamplugh is their son. During the pertinent time period, Harry and Theresa Lamplugh worked as gun show promoters, organizing regular gatherings of federally licensed firearm dealers who display, buy, sell and trade firearms and related merchandise to each other and to the general public. 2. John Lamplugh regularly assisted his parents in their gun show promotion activities and attended many of the gun shows with his parents. 3. Harry and Theresa Lamplugh coordinated their gun show promotion activities through a corporation entitled Borderline Gun Collectors Association (BGCA). BGCA is a lawfully registered Pennsylvania corporation with offices located at R.D. #2, Box 172, Wellsboro, Pennsylvania. 4. At one time, Theresa Lamplugh had a federal firearms license and conducted business under the name of Terry's Gun Shop. (Govt Exhibit (GX) 55.) 5. Harry and Theresa Lamplugh live at R.D. #2 Box 172, Wellsboro, Charleston Township in Tioga County, Pennsylvania (Wellsboro property). 6. John Lamplugh resides at a residence located at the intersection of Pennsylvania Route 6 and Timber Lane (TR 644) in Columbia Township, Bradford County, Pennsylvania (Troy property). 7. As a result of information received from its agents, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) became interested in the gun show promotional activities of BGCA and the Lamplughs. 8. On July 18, 1992, ATF Compliance Inspector James Ebert (Ebert) set up an ATF informational booth at the BGCA show conducted at the Stabler Arena in Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania. (9/12/97 Tr. at 110-12.) [footnote 1] 9. At that Stabler Arena show, Ebert saw Theresa Lamplugh collecting money at the front door of the show. (GX 1042, at 3.) Ebert also observed Harry Lamplugh walking through the show and exhibits. (Id.) Further, Ebert spoke with a man who claimed that Harry Lamplugh was his father and stated that Harry Lamplugh was selling guns at the show. (Id.) 10. Some time prior to May of 1993, Ebert was contacted by ATF Agents Robinson and Hogue concerning an investigation they were conducting that involved an individual who had allegedly received a machine gun from Harry Lamplugh. (9/12/97 Tr. at 115.) From previous interactions with Ebert, the agents were aware that Ebert had been investigating Harry Lamplugh. (Id.) 11. In approximately May of 1993, Ebert informed IRS Special Agent Barry Bittenbender (Bittenbender) that Harry Lamplugh was a gun show promoter who conducted sizeable gun shows, generating sizable amounts of cash, and that the IRS might be interested in investigating his activities. (10/15/97 Tr. at 9.) 12. As a result of this information, Bittenbender ran a "transcript" of Harry Lamplugh's account to see whether he had filed income tax returns. Although Bittenbender did not inform Ebert of the results, he told Ebert that if the ATF decided to investigate Harry Lamplugh, the IRS would be interested in participating in such an investigation. (Id. at 10-11.) 13. Bittenbender then turned over the results of his "transcript" search to IRS Special Agent Ned Tyler (Tyler). Bittenbender was not again involved in the investigation of Harry Lamplugh until a few weeks before the execution of the search warrants on May 25, 1994. (Id. at 18.) 14. On May 24, 1993, Ebert received information concerning Harry and Theresa Lamplugh from a confidential informant, James Cashman (Cashman). Cashman told Ebert that he knew Harry Lamplugh from attending his gun shows and had spoken with Harry Lamplugh regarding Theresa Lamplugh's federal firearms license. Cashman claimed that Harry Lamplugh had indicated that the federal firearms license was in Theresa Lamplugh's name because he was a convicted felon. (9/12/97 Tr. at 31-36.) [footnote 2] 15. Cashman also told Ebert that he believed Harry Lamplugh stockpiled handguns and sold handguns "off paper" at gun shows, i.e., Harry Lamplugh was failing to fill out the proper paperwork with regard to his transactions. (Id. at 37.) 16. Cashman also stated that while at a gun show he had observed Harry Lamplugh purchase a Walther P-38 for cash and place the handgun under his table. (Id. at 37-38.) 17. Cashman related that on another occasion he believed an individual was selling handguns as an agent for Harry Lamplugh because when Cashman began to bargain with this individual over the price of a Colt handgun, which was on display with other handguns at a show table, the individual excused himself and had a conversation with Harry Lamplugh. The individual then returned to Cashman and told him that the offer was not acceptable. (Id. at 38.) 18. ATF Special Agent Scott Endy (Endy), who prepared the affidavit in support of the search warrants, had been informed by ATF Agent Robert Koestel that Cashman had provided information in the past to ATF agents in the Reading Office which resulted in the issuance of six search warrants, the seizure of approximately 50 illegal weapons, and the arrest and conviction of five individuals. (9/8/97 Tr. at 66.) Endy, however, never personally spoke with Cashman. 19. In July of 1993, after having the investigation transferred to him by Bittenbender, Tyler prepared and submitted a criminal information item form to the IRS District Office. The form authorized him to "gather information" and "conduct inquiries" concerning the activities of BGCA. (9/11/97 Tr. at 158-59.) 20. On July 27, 1993, Ebert was contacted by another confidential informant, Russ Jones (Jones). (9/12/97 Tr. at 126.) [footnote 3] Jones stated that he knew Harry Lamplugh from attending various gun shows and that he saw Harry Lamplugh selling rifles and shotguns from a table at the Stabler Arena gun show on July 10 and 11, 1993. (Id. at 127.) 21. Endy had been informed by Ebert and other agents in the Reading ATF Office that Jones had provided credible and reliable information in past investigations. (9/8/97 Tr. at 73-74.) Endy, however, did not personally speak with Jones. 22. On August 14, 1993, Ebert attended on his personal time a BGCA gun show at the Lancaster Host Farm Resort where he observed Harry Lamplugh behind some tables upon which were displayed various firearms. (9/12/97 Tr. at 113.) 23. Ebert prepared a chronological history of his investigation outlining the information he had received on the Lamplughs and BGCA. Ebert attached various memoranda of interviews which memorialized certain conversations with various individuals. These documents were given to ATF Special Agent Purnell, who was conducting an investigation of other individuals involved in illegal firearms transactions with fraudulent licenses. (Id. at 85-87.) Eventually, Ebert discussed his investigation of Harry Lamplugh with Endy. Ebert, however, cannot recall the exact date of that conversation. (Id. at 116.) 24. In August of 1993, Ebert reviewed the "out of business" records of Terry's Gun Shop obtained from ATF's out-of-business center. [footnote 4] The records revealed that on September 29, 1985, Terry's Gun Shop sold a Remington Model 760, .308 rifle, to Harry Lamplugh. (Id. at 75-79.) [footnote 5] 25. In August of 1993, Ebert and Endy conducted a surveillance of the Wellsboro property and ran a motor vehicle check on a vehicle parked in the driveway of the Wellsboro property. (9/12/97 Tr. at 78.) 26. On January 15, 1994, Ebert, along with other ATF agents, attended a BGCA gun show in Bristol, Pennsylvania. Ebert went into the gun show, observed Harry Lamplugh behind a table with firearms, and came out of the show and reported his observations to Special Agent Purnell. (Id. at 81-82.) 27. At that point, Special Agent Tim Wilson (Wilson) entered the gun show and observed Harry Lamplugh at a table with 15 to 20 guns for sale. Wilson negotiated with Harry Lamplugh and ultimately purchased a shotgun from him for $460.00. (HCL-4(s).) [footnote 6] 28. During their negotiations, Harry Lamplugh informed Agent Wilson that he had obtained the gun as a trade-in, and the price was $460.00 with "tax included." (Id.) 29. During this conversation, Harry Lamplugh also stated that he was president of the gun show and that he conducted 40 gun shows per year. (Id.) 30. On April 11, 1994, Endy received a telephone call from a confidential informant, William Hissam (Hissam), who indicated that he had attended a BGCA show the previous day at the Stabler Arena in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. [footnote 7] Hissam had been apprehended by ATF for firearms violations and was cooperating with the ATF. (9/9/97 Tr. at 158.) Hissam indicated that he was concerned about a transaction he had with an individual at the gun show. (id.) [footnote 8] 31. Hissam sold two handguns for $400.00 to an individual who identified himself as being associated with Terry's Gun Shop and BGCA. (Id. 159-60.) Hissam stated that this individual was standing at a series of tables with rifles and shotguns for sale, and that he produced a large roll of currency from which he counted out $400.00 in cash. (Id.) Hissam claimed that the individual told him that he did not need to see any identification. Hissam also maintained that the individual asked him whether he was a dealer, to which Hissam answered no. (Id.) Finally, Hissam also asserted that the individual represented that he was a federal firearms licensee. (Id at 160.) 32. Based upon this information, Endy believed that the buyer may have been Harry Lamplugh and he directed Hissam to call the purchaser to confirm that it had been Harry Lamplugh. (Id. at 161.) Endy also directed Hissam to request that the purchaser fill out a Pennsylvania Application to Purchase and Record of Sale Form for the transfer of the handgun. (Id.) 33. Later that evening, Hissam called Endy to inform him that he had made a telephone call and spoke with "Terry," who claimed that she and her husband "Harry" had purchased Hissam's handguns the previous day. (id.) In response to Hissam's request for the requisite state form, on April 16, 1994, the informant received through the mail an envelope with a handwritten receipt for two handguns. (Id.) This receipt listed the two guns that had been purchased and read: "These were bought at Stabler Arena Gun Show and paid for in full by myself." (GX 6.2.) The receipt was signed by Harry Lamplugh. (Id.) 34. Between April 11, 1994 and April 16, 1994, Endy contacted`Special Agent Purnell of the Reading ATF Office to obtain more information about Harry Lamplugh and to report the handgun transaction between Hissam and Harry Lamplugh. (9/9/97 Tr. at 163.) At that time, Purnell informed Endy that Harry Lamplugh was a convicted felon and provided Endy with a certified copy of Harry Lamplugh's conviction as well as a copy of a certification of non-licensee status. (Id. at 163-65.) Purnell also informed Endy about the undercover purchase conducted by Wilson. (Id. at 163.) 35. Purnell and Endy agreed to have Hissam registered as an ATF informant with the intent to use him to gather evidence through a telephone sting operation. (Id. at 165.) 36. On April 28, 1994, pursuant to directions from Purnell and Endy, Hissam made a recorded telephone call to Harry Lamplugh to confirm that Harry Lamplugh still had the two handguns that had been sold to him by Hissam. (Id. at 166.) Hissam was also directed to again request the relevant Pennsylvania forms and confirm that Harry Lamplugh had executed and delivered the receipt that Hissam had received through the mail. (Id. at 165-66.) 37. During this recorded telephone conversation, Hissam told Harry Lamplugh that he needed an application to purchase, or some other paperwork from the state to get the handguns out of his name. (GX 6.5.) In response to Hissam's requests for paperwork, Harry Lamplugh stated that Hissam only needed a receipt. (Id.) [footnote 9] 38. After this recorded telephone call, Endy also contacted Ebert and Tyler to discover whether they were still looking into the activities of Harry Lamplugh and to inform them of the recorded telephone call. (9/9/97 Tr. at 167.) At that point, Ebert provided Endy with a copy of this chronological history of the Harry Lamplugh investigation (GX 1042) and orally reported the results of his investigation to Endy. (9/9/97 Tr. at 168.) Endy then used this information from Ebert in the drafting of his affidavit in support of the search warrant application. (Id.) 39. On approximately April 29, 1994, Wilson discussed with Endy the details of his undercover purchase of a shotgun from Harry Lamplugh. Based upon statements that Harry Lamplugh made to Wilson during the undercover purchase, Wilson indicated to Endy that Harry Lamplugh was holding himself out as a firearms dealer. (10/14/97 Tr. at 213-17.) 40. On April 29, 1994, Endy contacted the Pennsylvania Department of State, Corporation Bureau, and learned that BGCA became incorporated on November 19, 1992, with a business address listed as R.D. #2, Box 172, Wellsboro, Pennsylvania. Harry Lamplugh was listed as Chief Executive Officer, Secretary and Officer for the Corporation. No other individuals were listed as officers. (9/9/97 Tr. at 177-78.) On that same date, Endy checked with the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and learned that Harry Lamplugh had a drivers license listed to the Wellsboro address. (Id. at 177.) 41. Endy also received from Purnell a certified copy of Terry Lamplugh's application for and receipt of a federal firearms license. Endy confirmed this information with a telephone call to the licensing section in Atlanta, Georgia. The records established that Terry Lamplugh was issued a federal firearms license on May 23, 1984, and maintained the license until June 22, 1990, when she surrendered her license voluntarily, went out of business, and surrendered her Acquisition and Disposition Book. (Id. at 171-73.) 42. In early May of 1994, Endy and Ebert conducted a Surveillance of the Wellsboro and Troy properties. They observed the Troy residence for approximately twenty minutes during which there was no activity. (Id. at 174-75.) Endy subsequently conducted another ground surveillance and an aerial surveillance of the Troy residence and again observed no activity at that location. (Id. at 174-75.) 43. On May 3, 1994, in trying to determine who resided at the Troy residence, Endy conducted a Pennsylvania Bureau of Motor Vehicles check and learned that John Lamplugh's driver's license listed his address as R.D. 2, Box 172. Wellsboro, Pennsylvania -- not the Troy Address. (Id. at 175.) 44. On May 3, 1994, Endy contacted the Pennsylvania Board of Pardons and learned that Harry Lamplugh had never received a pardon for his conviction. Endy also contacted ATF Firearms Enforcement Branch in Washington, D.C. and learned that Harry Lamplugh never applied for nor received restoration of his firearms privileges. (Id. at 178.) [footnote 10] 45. On May 3, 1994, Tyler informed Endy that the real estate records of Tioga County and Bradford County were searched to determined the record owners of the Wellsboro and Troy properties. The records revealed that Harry and Theresa Lamplugh were the record owners of the Wellsboro property, and that Harry, Theresa and John Lamplugh were the record owners of the Troy properties. (9/9/97 Tr. at 179.) 46. On May 3, 1994, Endy received information pursuant to a subpoena that telephone number (717) 724-7918 was issued to BGCA, c/o Harry Lamplugh, R.D. #2, Box 172, Wellsboro, Pennsylvania, 16901. (Id.) 47. On May 19, 1994, Tyler faxed to Endy various fliers and newspaper articles concerning BGCA gun shows which had been originally obtained from Ebert and given to Bittenbender. Based on his calculations of income generated by table rentals and attendees of the gun shows, Tyler concluded that as a result of 14 shows in 1993, BGCA could have received $228,250 from table rentals alone. (9/11/97 Tr. at 172-73.) Tyler also estimated that for three shows in 1992 the table rentals could have resulted in income of $86,500. (TLL-9(s).) Finally, in 1994, Tyler estimated that the income from one show based on the number of patrons attending that show approximated $10,000. (Id.) 48. As a result of an ex parte order issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C. section 6103 by United States District Judge Edwin M. Kosik, Tyler was provided with tax return information concerning Harry Lamplugh, Theresa Lamplugh and BGCA. [footnote 11] On May 23, 1994, Tyler orally provided this tax information to Endy, who incorporated the information into his affidavit in support of the search warrants. The information revealed that in 1988 Harry and Theresa Lamplugh filed a joint return which showed a $28,966 loss from the promotion of gun shows by Theresa Lamplugh doing business as Terry's Gun Shop. (Id. at 173; Search Warrant Affidavit (GX 7) para. 21.) No record existed for Harry Lamplugh filing a tax return from 1989 to the date of the search warrant. (9/11/97 Tr. at 173; Search Warrant Affidavit (GX 7) para. 21.) Theresa Lamplugh did not file any tax returns after 1989. (9/11/97 Tr. at 173; Search Warrant Affidavit (GX 7) para. 21.) In 1992, BGCA was recognized as a business in the IRS master business file, but since that date BGCA had not filed a U.S. Corporate Income Tax Return. (9/11/97 Tr. at 173; Search Warrant Affidavit (GX 7) para. 21.) 49. In his preparation of the search warrant affidavit, Endy received assistance from Tyler concerning items to be searched for and legal citations for IRS violations. Endy and Tyler decided to seek a joint search warrant rather than separate warrants. Tyler believed that there was probable cause to believe that a tax violation had occurred. (9/9/97 Tr. at 180-81; 9/11/97 Tr. at 200-211.) 50. After preparing the search warrant and supporting affidavit, Endy reviewed the affidavit with Assistant United States Attorney Wayne Samuelson and applied for search warrants for both the Wellsboro and Troy properties on May 23, 1994. The same affidavit of probable cause was submitted to support each warrant. The warrant did not seek authority to search the offices of BGCA, but did request permission to seize BGCA records in the possession of the Lamplughs. Magistrate Judge Blewitt reviewed the affidavit, did not ask Endy any questions, and signed the search warrants for the Wellsboro and Troy properties. (9/9/97 Tr. at 5-10.) Agent Endy was not accompanied by any IRS agent when he applied for the warrants. 51. On May 25, 1994, the search warrants were executed by ATF agents and IRS agents, accompanied by ATF compliance inspectors and plain clothed and uniformed members of the Pennsylvania State Police. Prior to executing the warrants, a briefing for the participants was conducted at 7:30 a.m. at the Mansfield State Police Barracks where the raid plan and assignments were explained. (9/8/97 Tr. at 139-41.) No detailed instructions were provided, however, as to what items could be seized. (9/9/97 Tr. at 29- 52. Several unmarked vehicles as well as a Pennsylvania State Police vehicle with a uniformed trooper transported the search participants to the Wellsboro residence. The ATF agents wore vests with the letters "ATF" on them. Jackets were worn over the vests, but the jackets were open in the front to enable the "ATF" letters to be seen. The IRS agents wore IRS raid jackets with an IRS badge on the front. ATF raid jackets with the letters "ATF" displayed prominently on the back were not worn because the agents hoped Harry Lamplugh would cooperate with them and the agents did not want Harry Lamplugh's neighbors to see ATF agents at either the Wellsboro property or the Troy residence. (9/8/97 Tr. at 134-38.) 53. The ATF agents, IRS agents and Pennsylvania State Troopers all carried handguns. ATF Agent Seiler (Seiler) carried an MP-5 semi-automatic gun slung over his shoulder and pointed to the ground. (10/14/97 Tr. at 109, 121.) 54. The search plan called for Endy, Seiler, Tyler and two plain clothes and one uniformed Pennsylvania State Trooper to approach the front door of the Wellsboro residence. Wilson, Bittenbender and ATF Agent Donna Slusser (Slusser) were ordered to go to the back of the residence for rear security to prevent occupants from fleeing the scene. (9/8/97 Tr. at 150-53.) 55. As the agents and officers approached the front door of the Wellsboro residence, John Lamplugh was encountered in the front yard. Endy, accompanied by two plain clothes troopers (Corrigan and Green), went over to John Lamplugh, identified themselves with their credentials, and requested identification from John Lamplugh. John Lamplugh produced his driver's license. (9/9/97 Tr. at 181-82.) 56. Endy explained to John Lamplugh that they were executing a search warrant for the premises, that the investigation involved his father, and that he was not a target of the investigation. Endy also informed John Lamplugh that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave. None of the agents pointed any weapon at John Lamplugh nor was he threatened in any manner. (9/9/97 Tr. at 182, 185; 10/14/97 Tr. at 109-110; 10/15/97 Tr. at 94-95.) John Lamplugh was not given any Miranda warnings. (10115/97 Tr. [missing pages 17-18 of the opinion] warrant." Harry Lamplugh responded "You can't come in here until I read a copy of the search warrant." Seiler responded that they were there with a warrant signed by a judge and that prior to leaving the premises, Harry Lamplugh would be provided with a copy of the warrant and a receipt for any items taken. (10/14/97 Tr. at 112-13.) 65. Because Seiler was still concerned with the security of the premises, he asked Harry Lamplugh if there were other persons in the residence. Harry Lamplugh responded that his wife and son were present. Seiler then conducted a security sweep of the premises. (Id. at 113.) 66. Harry Lamplugh returned to the kitchen where he took a seat at the kitchen table with two Pennsylvania State Troopers. After conducting the security sweep, Seiler returned to the kitchen and identified himself with his credentials. Seiler told Harry Lamplugh that Endy was outside with John Lamplugh. Further, Seiler informed Harry Lamplugh that the law enforcement officers were present to execute a search warrant. Seiler also told Harry Lamplugh that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave. Because the search of the premises involved firearms, Seiler told Harry Lamplugh that if he chose to stay, that he would have to remain at the kitchen table and that he would not be permitted to wander throughout the residence. (Id. at 113-14.) 67. While Seiler was at the kitchen table talking with Harry Lamplugh, Theresa Lamplugh joined them and asked the agents to be careful because there were a number of cats on the premises, some of which were blind or infirm and could not be let out of the house. Seiler advised the search team and told them to be cautious and not to let the cats out of the house. (Id. at 116-17.) 68. After speaking with John Lamplugh for ten to fifteen minutes in the front yard, Endy informed him that he was free to leave or that he could stay. If he stayed, however, Endy made it clear to John Lamplugh that he had to remain in one central location because of the presence of firearms. John Lamplugh indicated that he wanted to stay, so Endy escorted him into the residence and seated him with his parents at their kitchen table. (9/9/97 Tr. at 184-88.) [footnote 15] 69. When Endy and John Lamplugh reached the kitchen area, Harry Lamplugh was seated at the kitchen table. Endy identified himself to Harry Lamplugh, informed him that they had come to execute a search warrant, and asked Harry Lamplugh if he could come into the bedroom to speak with them. Endy, Seiler and Bittenbender then met with Harry Lamplugh in the bedroom. Endy again identified himself with his credentials and informed Harry Lamplugh that he was not under arrest, that he was free to go, and that a search warrant was being executed. Harry Lamplugh was then given a copy of the search warrant, but was not provided with a copy of the affidavit. Harry Lamplugh was informed that a criminal investigation had been ongoing for a period of time and that Endy wished to interview him. (9/9/97 Tr. at 188-90; 10/14/97 Tr. at 117-18.) 70. The search of the Wellsboro property continued throughout the day. During this time John Lamplugh was not confined to the kitchen table, but was permitted to walk around the house and answer the telephone. He assisted Tyler in photocopying documents in the garage, and was outside when Seiler searched the vehicles on the property. At no time did John Lamplugh ask to leave, nor was he ever told that he could not leave the property. (9/9/97 Tr. at 186-87.) [footnote 16] 71. During the search of the garage, IRS agents discovered a box that contained a shotgun with a shortened barrel. A stock for the weapon was in the box, but not on the shotgun. ATF Agent Rossman (Rossman) had a photograph of the shotgun taken in place. (10/16/97 Tr. at 175-76; GX 7.4A.) 72. John Lamplugh was in the garage at that time photocopying documents with other agents. Rossman called John Lamplugh over and asked him about the sawed-off shotgun. John Lamplugh told Rossman that he had obtained the shotgun at a gun show several weeks earlier from an elderly lady. He claimed that he knew that it was illegal, but that he intended to destroy it at a later date. He stated that he put the shotgun in a box in his truck, and it stayed there a few weeks and he forgot about it. (10/16/97 Tr. at 176-77.) 73. Rossman did not give Miranda warnings to John Lamplugh. At that time, John Lamplugh was not arrested nor handcuffed, was free to move around the area, and was willing to provide information concerning the gun. The shotgun was seized as evidence. (Id. at 177-78.) 74. During the search of the garage, approximately 500 quarter stick-type explosive devises (M-80s in common parlance) were located wrapped in a garbage bag. Rather than seize the items as evidence, the agents obtained Harry Lamplugh's permission to abandon the items and allow destruction of them. Harry Lamplugh voluntarily signed a property form abandoning the items. (9/9/97 Tr. at 207-08.) 75. The actual search of the Wellsboro property was executed in a professional manner. (10/14/97 Tr. at 108-09.) 76. At no time did any law enforcement agent threaten or use force of any kind against any of the Lamplughs. Although informed that they were free to leave, the Lamplughs stayed at the Wellsboro residence, mainly in the kitchen area, where they were free to do what they wished. Although Theresa Lamplugh remained in her nightgown throughout the day, Slusser had offered to allow Theresa Lamplugh to change her clothes but she refused. (10/16/97 Tr. at 73, 133; 11/17/97 Tr. at 115.) 77. Although the agents and Pennsylvania State Troopers were armed, no handgun was ever unholstered in the house and no firearms were ever pointed at the Lamplughs either inside or outside their residence. (10/16/97 Tr. at 68, 120-21, 126-32, 174-75; 9/9/97 Tr. at 182, 188-89; 10/15/97 Tr. at 20.) 78. While Harry and Theresa Lamplugh smoked in their residence throughout the day, no law enforcement personnel smoked in the house. (9/9/97 Tr. at 213-14; 10/14/97 Tr. at 128; 11/17/97 Tr. at 115-16.) 79. At approximately noon, the agents went to a nearby restaurant and purchased pizza and sodas which were eaten by the agents in shifts in the garage. Prior to leaving the Wellsboro residence, the agents stacked the pizza boxes and soda cans next to the garage door. (9/9/97 Tr. at 204-06.) 80. Prescription medications were not spilled or scattered on any of the floors in the house. (10/14/97 Tr. at 122; 11/17/97 Tr. at 120.) 81. No agent stomped or kicked a kitten either during the search or after the search was completed. (11/17/97 Tr. at 120-22.) 82. After the search was completed, Slusser gave a copy of the evidence control log, listing all items of evidence seized, to Harry and Theresa Lamplugh. Slusser went over the listing with them, item by item, at the kitchen table. (10/14/97 Tr. at 120-21; 11/17/97 Tr. at 117-19.) II. DISCUSSION Harry Lamplugh and Theresa Lamplugh seek to suppress the property seized from both the Wellsboro and Troy properties, arguing (1) the search warrants were issued without probable cause; (2) Endy made deliberate misstatements and misrepresentations to Magistrate Judge Blewitt and omitted material facts which would have refuted certain facts relied upon by Magistrate Judge Blewitt; (3) the search warrants were general warrant that lacked particularity in describing the items to be seized; (4) the law enforcement officers failed to properly knock and announce their presence prior to entering the Wellsboro residence and conducting the search; and (5) the law enforcement officers engaged in outrageous acts and conduct during the execution of the search of the Wellsboro property. (Defs' Findings of Fact (Dkt. Entry 264) at 2.) John Lamplugh also seeks the suppression of the sawed-off shotgun seized at the Wellsboro property, apparently based upon the same grounds as those asserted by his parents. Further, John Lamplugh also seeks the suppression of the statements he made regarding his ownership of the sawed-off shotgun because he was not given the Miranda warnings. A. Standing to Challenge the Search Warrant [footnote 17] 1. The Troy Property It is undisputed that John Lamplugh was a co-owner of the Troy property and that he lived there. Therefore, there can be no doubt that John Lamplugh would have standing to challenge a search of the Troy home. The government, however, has certified "that it does not intend to use any evidence seized at the Troy residence, pursuant to search warrants executed on May 25, 1994, against defendant John Lamplugh." (Dkt. Entry 243.) In this regard, the only charge pending against John Lamplugh concerns the sawed-off shotgun seized from the Wellsboro property. Given that the government will not use any evidence seized at the Troy residence against John Lamplugh, he cannot challenge the search of the Troy property in this proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 209, 212 (D.D.C. 1979) ("It has been the government's position throughout this litigation before this Court that none of the documents seized at the District of Columbia location ... would be used at the trial in this case. Thus, the propriety of the ... search is not an issue before this Court."). As to Harry and Theresa Lamplugh, there is very little evidence as to their connection to the Troy property. The record establishes that Harry Lamplugh "co-signed" with John Lamplugh in order to enable John Lamplugh to purchase the Troy property. Further, the Troy property is held jointly by Harry, Theresa and John Lamplugh. Harry Lamplugh made clear in his testimony, however, that his connection to the property was limited to assisting John Lamplugh with financing the purchase. In this regard, Harry Lamplugh testified that he did not keep any clothes in the Troy property or any other personal belongings. Further, John Lamplugh had resided at the premises for over two years, whereas Harry Lamplugh had never lived there. Indeed, Harry Lamplugh did not even have a key to the Troy residence. [footnote 18] The government did, however, seize certain weapons from the Troy property which allegedly belonged to Harry Lamplugh. Therefore, Harry Lamplugh was allegedly using the Troy property for storage of some of his firearms. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the United States Supreme Court determined that in order to have standing to challenge a search a defendant must demonstrate that a Personal right has been violated. Id. at 140 ("A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by the search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed."). The Court made clear that standing in Fourth Amendment cases does not depend "upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Id. at 143 (emphasis added). As explained in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), "[w]hile property ownership is clearly a factor to be considered in determining whether an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, property rights are neither the beginning nor the end of [the] inquiry." Id. at 92. As noted by one court: Other factors to be weighed include whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the thing seized or the place searched, whether he has the right to exclude others from that place, whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that it would remain free from governmental invasion, whether he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy and whether he was legitimately on the premises. As the very listing of these factors demonstrates, the expectation must be based on considerations outside the fourth amendment. United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1154-55 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982). Therefore, Harry and Theresa Lamplugh's co-ownership of the Troy property is an element to be considered in determining whether they possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Troy premises. But an ownership interest in a premises will not automatically create a reasonable expectation of privacy. See LaFave, 5 Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment section 11.3(a), at 123 (3d Ed. 1996) ("Though an owner-occupant has ... standing, the mere fact of ownership standing alone will not necessarily suffice."). In Bonds v. Cox, 20 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 1994), the court determined that the record owner of property lacked standing to bring a section 1983 action for the allegedly illegal search of that premises. Id. at 701. In that case, the plaintiff-owner was not occupying her home at the time of the search. Instead, she was living with her son approximately a fifteen minute drive from her residence. Id. at 704. The plaintiff-owner had been forced to leave her home because of illness; however, her belongings as well as her pets remained at her premises. The plaintiff-owner's son visited the house on a daily basis to feed his mother's dogs. Id. Eventually, the plaintiff-owner allowed a third party to live in the house while she continued to live with her son. Considering these facts, the court stated: "By allowing [a third party] to live at the house while she lived [with her son], [plaintiff] failed to manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in the premises. Accordingly, [plaintiff] does not have standing to contest the search of the officers." Id.; see United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1345 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding that defendant had no reasonable expectation to privacy in his mobile home because he was not actually living in the mobile home at the time of the search); United States v. Dyar, 574 F.2d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir.) ("Even if we were to assume that Streeter and Dyar had a leasehold interest in the searched aircraft sufficient to create a traditional property right, when they gave possession [of the aircraft] to Flemming they abandoned any expectation of personal privacy in the aircraft."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978); see also Trepal v. Florida, 621 So.2d 1361, 1365 (Fla. 1993) (finding that owner of house lacked standing to challenge search of premises which was leased to another party), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077 (1994); Illinois v. Koris, 438 N.E.2d 593, 597 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) ("lt is abundantly clear that by the lease [defendant] had surrendered his right to possession [therefore he had no expectation of privacy in the premises]."); North Dakota v. Benjamin, 417 N.W.2d 838, 840 (N.D. 1988) (holding that defendant lacked standing to suppress drugs because defendant had failed to demonstrate that he had any property interest in the trailer); Tennessee v. Smith, 656 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Tenn. App. Ct. 1983) ('The general rule is that a tenant, not the landlord, has the expectation of privacy in leased premises, unless the lessor has specifically reserved any rights of possession for himself."); LaFave, 5 Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment section 11.3(a), at 123 (3d Ed. 1996) ("ln particular, if the owner of certain premises has leased them to another without reserving any right of possession to himself, then it cannot be said that a police intrusion into those premises encroaches upon his expectation of privacy."). But see Florida v. Suco, 521 So. 2d 1100, 1102-03 (Fla. 1988) (finding that landlord had standing to challenge search of leased premises because landlord retained key, retained right to enter the premises, and had repeatedly entered the leased premises without announcing his presence). Although this case involves the interests of a tenant in common as opposed to the interests of a landlord, the landlord- tenant cases cited above are instructive. The underlying principle in the landlord-standing cases is the control that the landlord retains over the property. If the landlord retains a key and the right to re-enter the premises, then the courts have been more willing to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the landlord, even though he has leased his premises to a third party. Although Harry and Theresa Lamplugh are co-tenants with John Lamplugh, there is no indication that they ever evidenced any control over the property. Aside from assisting their son in obtaining the necessary financing so that he could purchase the Troy residence, there is no other evidence on this record to suggest that Harry and Theresa Lamplugh had any other interest in the Troy property. [footnote 19] Harry Lamplugh also asserts that his ownership of the firearms in question affords him standing to contest the validity of their seizure, even if he did not have a protectible interest in the place where they were found. (Defs' Brf. on Standing (Dkt. Entry 263) at 4-5.) Ownership of property, however, does not "automatically" confer standing. See Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 84-85 (overruling "automatic" standing rule set forth in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), and holding that "defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated"). The focus of the inquiry is on the legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. "In order to embark on a suppression challenge, a 'defendant must show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched and in relation to the item seized.'" See United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Aguirre, 839 F.2d 854, 856 (1st Cir. 1988)); see also Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 90-92. The fact that Harry Lamplugh owned items seized from the Troy property would not give him standing to challenge the validity of a warrant to search a place in which he had no legitimate expectation of privacy. In United States v. Najarian, 915 F. Supp. 1441 (D. Minn. 1995), the defendant attempted to suppress certain records that were seized from a third person's residence. Id. at 1450. Although the court acknowledged that the defendant had a possessory interest in the records, it concluded that such ownership was simply a single factor to be considered. Id. at 1450 n.5 ("Consequently, we consider the Defendant's possessory interest in the items seized as a part of our analysis, but that is not solely determinative of the issue before us."). Because the defendant had failed to demonstrate that he had any control or access to the third person's residence, the court determined he had failed to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence and that he lacked standing to challenge the warrant. Id., see also Kimball, 25 F.3d at 9-10 ("Certainly the fact that Kimball owned the tools was a factor working in his favor in the standing determination. Without any evidence that Kimball left the tools in a place that could justifiably give rise to an expectation of privacy, however, he simply has not sustained his burden of demonstrating that his own Fourth Amendment rights were affected by the investigatory search of the vehicle."); United States v. Dall, 608 F.2d 910, 914 (1st Cir. 1979) ("Ownership alone is not enough to establish a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy. Ownership is relevant to the inquiry ... but the total circumstances determine whether the one challenging the search has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the locus of the search."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 918 (1980). In this action, as noted in the analysis concerning Harry and Theresa Lamplugh's ownership interest in the Troy property, there has been no showing that Harry and Theresa Lamplugh had any access to the Troy property. The mere legal relationship of tenants in common does not suffice to create a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home of their son. Even when this interest in the Troy property is coupled with Harry Lamplugh's alleged ownership of the weapons seized at the Troy property, Harry and Theresa Lamplugh have failed to demonstrate that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their son's residence. Therefore, Harry and Theresa Lamplugh lack standing to challenge the search of the Troy property. [footnote 20] 2. The Wellsboro Property Harry and Theresa Lamplugh resided at the Wellsboro property. Therefore, they clearly have standing to object to any unlawful search of that residence as well as any unlawful seizures. Harry and Theresa Lamplugh have asserted, however, that the Wellsboro property also encompassed the property of BGCA. In this regard, they contend that the government failed to obtain a warrant to search the premises occupied by BGCA. (Defs' Findings of Fact (Dkt. Entry 264) para. 5-6.) Presumably, Harry and Theresa Lamplugh seek the suppression of BGCA records. BGCA, however, is not a party to this prosecution. Even assuming that BGCA had some recognizable expectation of privacy to its "corporate" offices that were maintained on Harry and Theresa Lamplugh's Wellsboro residence, the fact that the government may have illegally searched BGCA's "corporate" office and illegally seized BGCA's corporate documents and records will not assist Harry and Theresa Lamplugh in their effort to suppress the evidence. Although BGCA would have standing to challenge the government's actions in relation to its alleged "corporate" office, Harry and Theresa Lamplugh cannot assert the privacy interest of BGCA as a means to suppress evidence that the government is attempting to use against them. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140 ("A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by the search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed."). In terms of John Lamplugh, he claims that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy to his parents' home because he was a houseguest of his parents at the time of the search. John Lamplugh seeks to suppress the shotgun seized from the detached garage in which Harry and Theresa Lamplugh stored merchandise for their gun shows. The testimony provided at the suppression hearing was that John Lamplugh had arrived at his parents' home in the morning hours of May 25th in order to go hunting. As any child, John Lamplugh was surely a guest of his parents on a regular basis. The testimony reflects, however, that John Lamplugh did not live at his parents' home. Instead, John Lamplugh lived at the Troy property. There was no testimony that John Lamplugh had a key to his parents' residence. Further, there was no testimony that John Lamplugh commonly stored material at his parents residence. In United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d ?152 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982), the government entered the defendant's parents' home and seized certain gambling records that he had stored under his parents' bed. The court found the following factors to be relevant in determining the standing of a child to challenge the search of his parents' home: [Defendant's] parents had given him permission to use their home and had given him a key. His access, therefore, was for all practical purposes unencumbered. Although he did not reside regularly at his parents' home, he kept clothing there and had occasionally remained overnight. Moreover, he conducted a significant portion of his gambling activities at the home and owned the records that were seized. Although the district court did not explicitly hold, it is reasonable to assume that [the defendant] had the authority to exclude persons other than his parents and their guests from the home. Finally, it is clear from his actions that [the defendant] exhibited a subjective expectation that the contents of the box stowed under parents' bed were to remain private. Id. at 1155. In this case, there is no evidence that John Lamplugh had unencumbered access to his parents' home. Further, there is no evidence as to how often he stayed at his parents' home. There was also no evidence as to the extent to which John Lamplugh could have been denied access to his parents' home. On the other hand, it is clear that John Lamplugh had a subjective expectation that the contents of the box that he stored in his parents' garage would remain private. When standing alone, this expectation of privacy is insufficient. Without some indication that John Lamplugh had some interest in his parents' home aside from serving as a place of storage, he has no standing to challenge the validity of the search of his parents' residence. [footnote 21] B. The Search Warrant Affidavit and the Warrant itself 1. Lack of Probable Cause The defendants claim that the search warrant lacked probable cause. In determining whether probable cause exists to support a warrant, a court must apply the totality-of-the-circumstances approach. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Probable cause has been defined as 'a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Id.; see also united States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 1993) (defining the probable cause test as a "reasonable common sense likelihood" that evidence of an alleged crime will be uncovered). The United States Supreme Court noted that probable cause was a concept that was not easily limited to a distinct set of legal rules. Id. at 232. There are many factors that are relevant to a magistrate judge's finding of probable cause. In this case, as in many others, the government must rely upon information received from informants to develop probable cause for a search. In assessing an informant's information, a magistrate should consider "the reliability of the informant, the informer's basis of knowledge, corroboration of information through other sources, an informer's prediction of future plans, and the level of detail of the information provided." United States v. Daly, 937 F. Supp. 401, 408 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a magistrate judge's determination of probable cause is entitled to "great deference." See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984). As noted by the Third Circuit: [T]he district court [may] exercise only a deferential review of the initial probable cause determination by the magistrate. A magistrate's determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts. The duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Keeping in mind the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to determine whether there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place, a reviewing court is to uphold the warrant as long as there is substantial basis for a fair probability that the evidence will be found. United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1205 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The fact that a different judge may reach a different conclusion on the existence of probable cause is insufficient to strike a warrant; rather, a reviewing court must only determine whether a sufficient basis exists to support the magistrate judge's finding of probable cause. Id.; see also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965) ("although in a particular case it may be difficult to determine whether an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants"); United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1057 (3d Cir. 1993). In this case, the affidavit prepared by Endy supplied ample information to Magistrate Judge Blewitt to support his finding of probable cause: (1) Cashman (CI-1) alleged that Harry Lamplugh was involved in selling firearms and that Cashman had actually seen Harry Lamplugh purchase firearms (TLL-5(s), para. 3(a)); (2) Ebert attended a gun show and spoke with one of Harry Lamplugh's sons who indicated that Harry Lamplugh was selling guns at the show (Id. para. 3(c)); (3) Jones (CI-2) stated that he had personally observed Harry Lamplugh buying and selling firearms at a gun show (Id. para. 3(d)); (4) Ebert attended a gun show and personally saw Harry Lamplugh sitting at a table which had several rifles and shotguns for sale (Id. para. 3(e)); (5) Ebert had information indicating that Harry Lamplugh had been convicted of a felony under Pennsylvania law (Id. para. 4-6); (6) Theresa Lamplugh applied for and received a federal firearms license in 1984 under the name Terry's Gun Shop (Id. para. 7); (7) Harry Lamplugh had never applied for or received a federal firearms license (Id. para. 8); (8) Ebert provided information acquired from a review of Terry's Gun Shop records that indicated that Terry's Gun Shop sold Harry Lamplugh a rifle in 1985; (9) Wilson made an undercover purchase of a shotgun from Harry Lamplugh at one of his [missing page 36] As to the tax claims, the defendants of willful evasion and that the affidavit lacks argue that 26 U.S.C. section 7201 requires a showing any support for a finding of willful conduct. (Def's Supp. Brf (Dkt. Entry 41)at 2.) According to the defendants, the affidavit lacks any information that would support a conclusion that the defendants even owe any taxes. (Id.) Thus, the defendants argue that it cannot be determined that a tax violation has occurred. (Id.) In determining whether tax evasion has occurred, the government must attempt to reconstruct a defendant's income from any available source. See Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 274, 224 (1965) ("Establishment of grounds for belief that the offense of tax evasion has been committed often requires a reconstruction of the taxpayer's income from many individually unrevealing facts which are not susceptible of a concise statement in a complaint."). As noted by the Eighth Circuit: [Defendant's] assertion that the affidavits are deficient unless they state a specific, 'substantial' amount of tax deficiency is simply unsupported. The essence of the inquiry was whether there was tax due and whether [defendant] willfully attempted to evade the tax. Where the affidavit made the clear connection between the existence of the unexplained funds and the allegations of underreporting (citing the applicable criminal statute), we hold that sufficient facts were set forth to establish the probability of criminal activity. United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d 254, 258 (8th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 814 (1993); United States v. Premises Known as 1007 Morningside Ave., 625 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (N.D. Iowa 1985) (finding probable cause for tax evasion where defendant had failed to file any income tax returns for a number of successive years, gross receipts were established from bank records, and net profits were calculated based upon averages for other individuals in the same profession). In this case, Endy, with the assistance of Tyler, relied upon various advertisements for BGCA gun shows. These advertisements provided the rates for table rentals. Further, Endy and Tyler were aware that individuals were charged for admission to the gun shows. Without considering the amount generated from admission charges, Endy and Tyler were able to estimate the amount of revenue potentially generated from BGCA table rentals at its gun shows in 1993. "From the affidavit the magistrate need only conclude that criminal activity is probably shown; a prima facie demonstration is not required." United States v. Fried, 576 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978). Given the amount of potential income coupled with the failure of Harry and Theresa Lamplugh to file any income tax return, Endy's affidavit provided a sufficient basis for a conclusion that criminal activity in the form of tax evasion was probably taking place and that evidence of this criminal activity would probably be found in the places to be searched. [footnote 22] 2. Deliberate Misrepresentations and Omissions in Affidavit The defendants claim that Endy deliberately misrepresented and/or omitted certain information from his supporting affidavit. A defendant asserting that an affidavit has false information bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the misrepresentation was made in bad faith or reckless disregard of the truth; and (2) that there would have been no probable cause but for the false information. See United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 743 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1001 (1993); see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). In terms of an omission, the same test applies, but the court adds the omission to the search warrant to determine whether such inclusion would have affected the probable cause determination. See Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 1997) ("As we have stated in the past, a court, when confronted with a false affidavit used to obtain a search warrant, must remove a falsehood created by an omission by supplying the omitted information to the original affidavit."). In this case, the defendants have failed to meet their burden. First, there has been no showing that Endy misrepresented and/or omitted facts in his affidavit with bad faith or reckless disregard of the truth. Further, even if such misrepresentations were removed from the affidavit and the omissions were included, the affidavit would still provide a sufficient basis to find probable cause to search the Wellsboro property. First, the defendants contend that the warrant was not properly reviewed or approved by Endy's supervisor, Seiler, prior to Endy seeking court approval. (Defs' Finding of Fact (Dkt. Entry 264) para. 9.) In this regard, Endy and Seiler both asserted on May 20, 1994 on an ATF pre-search checklist that the affidavit had been reviewed and was complete. Endy, however, did not actually finalize the affidavit until May 23, 1994, when he received the tax information from Tyler and included that within the affidavit. The fact that Seiler did not review the final draft of the supporting affidavit is simply not relevant to the ultimate probable cause determination. The defendants have listed numerous perceived shortcomings in the affidavit itself. For example, the affidavit failed to include the criminal record of Cashman (CI-1) and did not indicate he was a financial competitor of Harry Lamplugh. (Defs' Finding of Fact (Dkt. Entry 264) para. 11.) Likewise, information concerning Hissam's criminal violations was not disclosed in the affidavit, and the affidavit failed to reveal Hissam's knowledge of relevant firearms procedures and requirements. (Id. para. 16.) In terms of the recorded conversation between Hissam and Harry Lamplugh, the defendants contend that Endy improperly stated that Harry Lamplugh represented himself as a firearms dealer, when, in fact, Harry Lamplugh never made such a representation to Hissam in the recorded telephone conversation. (Id. para. 15.) Furthermore, the affidavit fails to make any mention of the income that the defendants received in the relevant years. Instead, the affidavit only states that the defendants had not filed income tax returns. In this regard, the defendants suggest that the affidavit only relates to income that BGCA may have received from gun shows and that the affidavit fails to include any information about Harry and Theresa Lamplugh receiving any income. Further, the defendants contend that the warrant lacks any information concerning the business and operating expenses of BGCA. Thus, the defendants claim that the affidavit fails to demonstrate whether there was any tax owing. The defendants also assert that Endy should have made Magistrate Judge Blewitt aware that the section 6103 order had been obtained for non-tax administration purposes. (Id. para. 30.) Considering all of these alleged omissions and misrepresentations, the defendants have failed to meet their burden. First, despite an extensive cross-examination of the affiant, Agent Endy, the defendants did not show that he had omitted any information in bad faith or reckless disregard of the truth. The search warrant affidavit covered an extensive investigation. Endy testified that he thought that he had included all of the pertinent information. His testimony was credible. Therefore, this Court does not find that Endy acted in bad faith or reckless disregard of the truth in relation to any of the alleged omissions and/or misrepresentations. Further, even if all of the alleged misrepresentations were removed and the omissions were included, the affidavit still provides a solid basis for probable cause to conduct this search. The alleged information concerning the credibility of the confidential informants may have affected the probable cause determination if there was only a single confidential informant or the ATF was relying solely upon information from confidential informants. In this case, however, the ATF actually made a controlled purchase of a gun from Harry Lamplugh. Further, the ATF had a signed receipt from Harry Lamplugh for the purchase of two guns as well as a taped telephone conversation in which he admitted to purchasing the handguns. This information standing alone would have been sufficient to find probable cause that Harry Lamplugh was illegally dealing in firearms. [footnote 23] As to the claims regarding the income tax investigation, they are without merit. The mere fact that the IRS obtained a section 6103 order for non-tax administration purposes does not alter the fact that the Harry and Theresa Lamplugh had not filed an income tax return since 1989. As to the relationship between the ATF and the IRS, the existence of such a relationship has no bearing upon whether there is probable cause to believe that Harry and Theresa Lamplugh have evaded taxes. The defendants' contention that there is no indication as to the business or operating expenses of BGCA is likewise without merit. The affidavit indicated that based upon advertisements and estimated table rentals, the 1993 gun shows could have generated $228,000 in revenue from the rentals of tables alone. Although there were certainly business and operating expenses, the fact remains that Harry and Theresa Lamplugh failed to file an income tax return in 1993 despite the fact that their closely-held corporation had conducted various gun shows resulting in a substantial potential for cash income. Simply stated, the affidavit provided an ample basis upon which to find probable cause for tax evasion. [footnote 24] Although the defendants have provided a litany of alleged errors in the affidavit, the totality of the claimed misrepresentations and omissions do not undermine the issuance of the search warrant. The affidavit contained information that showed that the ATF had conducted a careful investigation of Harry and Theresa Lamplugh. Endy disclosed information from three confidential informants, one ATF compliance inspector, one ATF special agent, a controlled purchase of a shotgun from Harry Lamplugh coupled with an electronic recording of the deal, records of Terry's Gun Shop recording a sale of a rifle to Harry Lamplugh, a hand-written receipt from Harry Lamplugh admitting that he purchased two handguns, an electronically recorded telephone conversation in which Harry Lamplugh admitted purchasing two handguns, evidence of extensive gun shows which could potentially generate substantial cash income, and evidence that Harry and Theresa Lamplugh had not filed an income tax return in four years. With all of this information, any alleged misrepresentations or omissions would not have affected the determination that probable cause existed to support the issuance of the search warrant. [footnote 25] 3. General Warrant A warrant must describe the area to be searched and the items to be seized with particularity such that the law enforcement officers know the items they may seize and the items that may not be seized. See United States v. American Investors of Pittsburgh, Inc., 879 F.2d 1087, 1106 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989). In American investors the law enforcement officers sought and received a warrant to search for and seize various categories of business records that constituted evidence of money laundering. The only manner in which the government could establish that a crime had been committed was through the seizure of the business documents. To this extent, the government sought a wide assortment of documents, totaling 23 categories in all. Id. at 1105. The Third Circuit stated: The affidavit clearly supported the fact that a broad range of documents would be entailed in sorting out the details of this sophisticated scheme. The fact that the warrant authorized a search for a large number of documents and records does not necessarily render the search invalid so long as there exists a sufficient nexus between the evidence to be seized and the alleged offenses. Given the complex nature of the money- laundering enterprise, we cannot say that the categories overdescribed the extent of the evidence to be seized. Id. at 1105-06. As explained in United States v. Singh, 973 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1997), "[t]o address the [difficulty of adequately describing business records in a search warrant], courts have allowed more general warrants to proceed when applicants for warrants can either show probable cause to believe that more detailed descriptions are not possible, or by showing the entire business is permeated by fraud." Id at 11-12. In American Investors, the Third Circuit explicitly distinguished United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1988), in which the Tenth Circuit stated that a warrant for business records must be as specific as possible under the circumstances. American Investors, 879 F.2d at 1106. The Third Circuit stated that the descriptions in the warrant could not have been drawn any narrower. By the very nature of the offense, a wide variety of documents had to be collected and reviewed. Id As noted by another court in considering a broad description of items to be seized under a warrant in a tax evasion case: Under the circumstances here it would be impossible to describe the exact identity of each document and piece of evidence which could be seized. Describing the generic classes of documents set reasonable parameters for the search here. The description in the warrant here is limited to items likely to provide information concerning [defendant's] taxable income for the years involved. ... The Court believes the generic description of the other documents (i.e. Books, records, receipts, etc.) was sufficient to describe the classifications of items to be seized, greater specificity under the circumstances was virtually impossible. United States v. Premises Known as 1007 Morningside Ave., 625 F. Supp. 1343, 1347-48 (N.D. iowa 1985). But see United States v. Stubbs, 873 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that where the IRS knew the exact nature of the suspect documents and where the documents were stored, the warrant was defective because it authorized the seizure of all of an individual's business records). In this case, the warrant contained the following description of property to be seized: Firearms, ammunition, evidence of the purchase, possession and/or sale of firearms and/or ammunition, to include but not limited to, any media for which records of firearms and financial transactions can be maintained or stored in the form of magnetic or electronic coding on computer media or on media capable of being read by a computer or with the aid of a computer related equipment, to include but not limited to, floppy diskettes, fixed hard disks, removable hard disk cartridges, tapes, laser disks, video cassettes, and any other media which is capable of storing magnetic coding and computer operating manuals, receipts, invoices, order forms, price lists, customer files, currency, and any other documents related to sales and purchases of firearms and firearms related accessories, to include, boxes, holsters, cleaning kits, and gun cases. Financial and business records of Harry and Theresa Lamplugh, Terry's Gun Shop and Borderline Gun Collectors Association Inc. for the years 1988 to the present, to include but not limited to, canceled checks, check stubs, duplicate deposit slips, check registers, bank statements, bank correspondence, general journal, cash receipts journal, cash disbursement journal, general ledger, subsidiary ledgers, accounts receivable ledgers, accounts payable ledgers, retained copies of forms 941, 1040, 1120, UC-2's and supporting workpapers, forms W-3, forms W-4, forms 1099, forms W-2, driver logs and time cards. (Exhibit TLL-5(s).) Although the defendants claim that the description in the search warrant is overly broad, it is difficult to imagine how the language could have been crafted in a narrower fashion. As to the description relative to the tax evasion charges, reconstructing an individual's income requires a myriad of documents that allow an investigator to piece together the amount of money that an individual received and/or expended in the subject year. Although the defendants contend that this warrant authorized the seizure of virtually any document, such a contention is clearly hyperbole. The law enforcement investigators were searching for financial information relating to the alleged tax evasion charges. In terms of identifying the questionable documents, IRS agents accompanied the ATF in the search of the properties in an attempt to ensure that only relevant documents were seized. Given the specificity of the documents outlined, the reference in the warrant to tax evasion charges, and the presence of IRS agents at the search to assist in identifying relevant documents, the search warrant was not too broad in terms of the description of the financial and business records to be seized. In terms of the firearms violations, the warrant provides a detailed description of the items to be seized. Aside from actual firearms and ammunition, the warrant also sought records relating to purchases and sales of firearms. Given the advances of modern technology, the search for such records required the inclusion within the warrant for the seizure of electronic means of recording information. In short, the warrant provided sufficient specificity given the nature of the crimes alleged. Therefore, the defendants' contention that the Wellsboro warrant constituted an impermissible general warrants is without merit. 4. Good Faith Exception In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984), the United States Supreme Court determined that even where a warrant is defective, evidence will not be suppressed if the law enforcement officers relied upon the warrant in good faith. Id. ("[O]ur evaluation of the costs and benefits of suppressing reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate leads to the conclusion that such evidence should be admissible in the prosecution's case in chief."). There are four general exceptions to the good faith exception: (1) the magistrate issued the warrant in reliance on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit; (2) the magistrate abandoned his judicial role and failed to perform his neutral and detached function; (3) the warrant was based on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable'; or (4) the warrant was so facially deficient that it failed to particularize the place to searched or the things to be seized. American Investors, 879 F.2d at 1106-07 (quoting United States v. Medlin, 798 F.2d 407, 409 (10th Cir. 1986)) (citations omitted). As noted earlier, the defendants have failed to demonstrate that Endy acted in bad faith or reckless disregard of the truth in preparing his supporting affidavit. Further, even with the deletion of the alleged misrepresentations from the affidavit and the inclusion of the alleged omissions, the supporting affidavit provides ample grounds to support a finding of probable cause. There is no evidence in this record that Magistrate Blewitt abandoned his neutral and detached role. [footnote 26] Finally, the warrant was not facially deficient; rather, it described the premises to be seized as well as the items to be seized with sufficient particularity. Furthermore, the evidence established a goad faith attempt to stay within the bounds of the warrant. For instance, the agents found a handgun in Theresa Lamplugh's purse. Although this firearm clearly fell within the ambit of the warrant's description, the agents allowed Theresa Lamplugh to retain the handgun because her possession of that handgun did not violate any laws. Further, the agents also relied upon the representations of John Lamplugh in terms of the firearms at the Troy property and did not seize the weapons that John Lamplugh identified as his possessions (with the exception of one rifle that was inadvertently seized). Moreover, Endy reviewed the search warrant affidavit with Assistant United States Attorney Wayne Samuelson prior to seeking and obtaining Magistrate Judge Blewitt's approval. Even assuming that there were any defects or errors that might call into question the validity of the warrants, the agents sought the warrants in good faith, relied upon Magistrate Judge Blewitt's determination in good faith, and executed the warrants in good faith. See e.g., Ortiz v. Van Auken, 887 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that the good faith exception applied where officer relied upon the opinions of a district attorney and a judge that the warrant was supported by probable cause); United States v. Rosenberger, 872 F.2d 240, 242 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that good faith exception applied where agents had not acted "in flagrant disregard of the limitations of the warrant"); United States v. Stelton, 867 F.2d 446, 451 (8th Cir.) (applying good faith exception where supporting affidavit was very detailed and had been reviewed by a United States Attorney), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 828 (1989). Accordingly, suppression of the seized evidence on the basis of purported defects in the affidavit and warrant is not appropriate. C. Execution of the Warrant 1. Knock and Announce Rule The "knock and announce" rule is part of an individual's Fourth Amendment protections and must be considered in determining whether a search was reasonable. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995); see also Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1418 (1997); Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 1997). The requirement is also codified by statute. See 18 U.S.C. section 3109. [footnote 27] The United States Supreme Court, however, has rejected an automatic "knock and announce" rule for every entrance into a building; instead, it has allowed the lower courts to determine the circumstances under which an unannounced entry was reasonable. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 924; Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1418; United States v. Conley, 92 F.3d 157, 171 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1244 (1997). As explained in Richards: In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence. Richards, 1 17 S. Ct. at 1421; see also Kornegay, 120 F.3d at 397. In Conley, the Third Circuit found that a search was reasonable despite the failure of the police to immediately "knock and announce" prior to their entrance into a commercial storage area. The court summarized the facts of that case as follows: On September 23, 1988, after Detective Bosetti secured a search warrant for the 930 Saw Mill Run premises, he, Detective Quinlan and a uniformed police officer parked in front of 930 Saw Mill Run. While walking along the side of the building to the back, the officers were able to see [the defendant] and an office in operation behind him. At the same time, [the defendant] saw the uniformed police officer and the two detectives. The storm door in the back was closed but unlocked. Without knocking or otherwise announcing their presence, the officers entered the storage room and walked through the storage room and into the first floor office area where they identified themselves as police officers and announced that they were there to serve a search warrant. Conley, 92 F.3d at 170. Given that the building was a commercial building, the entrance was made during business hours, the defendant saw the law enforcement officers prior to their entrance, the door was unlocked, and the officers immediately identified themselves upon entrance, the court concluded that the failure to knock and announce prior to their entry was permissible and that the search was reasonable. Id. at 171. [footnote 28] In the present case, there are several different versions of the manner in which the entrance took place. Harry Lamplugh contends that the officers did not knock and announce prior to entering his residence. He testified that the first thing he heard was Slusser yelling outside behind his house. Within three seconds, Harry Lamplugh contends that Slusser forced entry into his home through his back door and was repeatedly yelling to other agents that Theresa Lamplugh was in the bathroom. (10/15/97 Tr. at 281) He also testified that agents entered through his front door without knocking or announcing. (Id. at 283.) John Lamplugh stated that he did not hear the agents knock and announce themselves prior to entering into his parents' home. (Id. at 166.) John Lamplugh also testified that if Seiler had raised his voice in the manner that he demonstrated at the suppression hearing, then he would have heard him announcing his presence. (Id. at 167.) Theresa Lamplugh never testified at the suppression hearing. Seiler testified that he knocked on the front storm door and identified himself in a loud voice as a federal agent with a search warrant. (10/14/97 Tr. at 110-11.) Seiler indicated that he looked back to John Lamplugh when there was no immediate response and that John Lamplugh told him that his father was in the house. (Id. at 111.) Seiler then testified that he yelled: "Harry, are you in there." (Id.) At that point, Seiler stated that he saw Harry Lamplugh appear in the living room area. (Id.) Because Seiler was concerned for his safety and the safety of the other officers, he opened the unlocked storm door and entered the home. (Id. at 111-12.) Seiler claims that Harry Lamplugh then stated that Seiler could not enter his home until he had been read a search warrant, to which Seiler responded by indicating that Harry Lamplugh would be provided with a copy of the warrant at the conclusion of the search. (Id. at 112.) Endy testified that while he was interviewing John Lamplugh in the front yard, he heard someone knock and that the agents or troopers at the front door were yelling. "Harry, are you in there, Harry, are you in there? If you are, you know, show yourself, come out, something to that effect." (9/8/97 Tr. at 158-59.) Tyler testified that he believed that John Lamplugh had allowed the agents to enter or that he called out to someone in the house to let the agents into the residence. (9/1//97 Tr. at 99.) Wilson testified that he was assigned to rear guard, but that as he was walking to the back of the house, he heard Seiler yelling something at the front door. (10/14/97 Tr. at 172-73.) Wilson also testified that when he got to the rear of the house, he saw Slusser talking to someone in the. house through the storm door. (Id. at 174.) Wilson stated that he went to the front of the house to enter the residence. (Id.) Bittenbender was also part of the rear guard. He indicated that he did not enter the premises until the back door opened and another agent indicated that the home was secured. (10/15/97 Tr. at 20.) Trooper Vacula testified that he was one of the first law enforcement officials that entered the premises, although an ATF agent may have entered before him. (10/16/97 Tr. at 121.) Vacula stated that he believed that a male individual had opened the door for them or indicated from the living room that they could enter the residence. (Id. at 122.) Trooper Green testified that he accompanied Endy while he interviewed John Lamplugh and that he entered the residence approximately ten minutes after meeting John Lamplugh. (10/16/97 Tr. at 69.) Green testified that he entered the premises with Endy and Corrigan. (Id.) Trooper Corrigan testified that he did not see any other agents when he entered the house. He indicated that he simply shouted to Harry Lamplugh who responded that he could enter the home, then opened the unlocked storm door to enter the residence. (Id. at 143-44.) Corrigan, however, was initially with Endy interviewing John Lamplugh. He testified that John Lamplugh stated that his parents were in the house and that he could enter the residence. (Id. 162-63.) If Corrigan briefly assisted Endy with John Lamplugh, then the other agents already would have been in the residence by the time Corrigan entered the residence. When Corrigan's testimony is considered in connection with Trooper Green's testimony, Green and Corrigan entered the house after Seiler and Vacula. Corrigan testified that he did not recall hearing anyone knock and announce. (Id. at 142.) Corrigan stated that he was assigned to the front door and that the officers intended to knock and announce their presence. (Id. at 136.) Corrigan also testified that he did not hear any shouting from the rear of the house. (Id. at 143.) Slusser testified that she approached the rear of the residence and that she saw Theresa Lamplugh in the bathroom. Slusser stated that she radioed to the team in the front of the house that Theresa Lamplugh was in the bathroom. (Id at 112.) Slusser testified that she did not enter the house until she had been informed that everything had been secured. (Id.) Further, Slusser testified that she went around to the front of the house to enter the premises. (Id.) Although there are many different versions of the initial entrance to the Wellsboro property, it is important to note that the suppression hearing took place three years after the search. [footnote 29] In considering all of the testimony and observing the witnesses, I conclude that Seiler's version of the story is likely the most accurate. Wilson and Endy both testified that they saw Seiler approach the front door. Further, both Wilson and Endy also testified that they heard Seiler yelling to Harry Lamplugh inside the residence prior to his entrance. Vacula was standing with Seiler in the front of the residence. He testified that the entrance was very low key and that he believed that someone had granted permission for them to enter. In this regard, he corroborates Seiler's testimony in that Vacula stated that he believed that there was a male in the living room. Given this evidence, I find that Seiler knocked and announced his presence prior to entering the residence. Although he did not wait to be admitted by Harry Lamplugh, he saw Harry Lamplugh in the living room and entered through an unlocked storm door. It is undisputed that Harry Lamplugh possessed many firearms in the Wellsboro property. When Seiler had made eye contact with Harry Lamplugh, it was reasonable for him to enter the premises without force and secure the area for the protection of the other officers. In short, the evidence demonstrates that the officers knocked and announced their presence prior to the entrance into the residence and that the entrance into the residence without waiting to be admitted was reasonable. See United States v. Pearson, 746 F.2d 787, 792 (11th Cir. 1984). In this regard, Harry Lamplugh's testimony cannot be corroborated. Although John Lamplugh stated that he did not hear Seiler knock and announce, his attention was diverted from the front door by his own concerns with Endy and the other officers. Further, John Lamplugh also stated that he did not hear any shouts coming from the back of the house, thereby contradicting his father's testimony that Slusser was yelling in the back of the residence. Further, Theresa Lamplugh, who may have been able to corroborate some of Harry Lamplugh's testimony, did not testify at the suppression hearing. In assessing the credibility of the different individuals involved in this matter, I find that the testimony of Seiler and Endy is more believable than the testimony of Harry Lamplugh and John Lamplugh. Accordingly, suppression of the evidence based on an alleged violation of the knock and announce rule is not appropriate. 2. Outrageous Conduct During the Search Harry and Theresa Lamplugh have made numerous allegations concerning the conduct of the officers during the search. Each of these allegations will be addressed separately. First, as to the contention that the law enforcement agents seized property unrelated to the justifications for the search, the agents credibly testified that they acted in good faith in attempting to comply with the description of the property to be seized. In this regard, if there was a questionable document, the officers or agents would inquire with a supervisor as to whether such a document should be seized. The government has conceded that certain documents and other evidence not called for by the warrant were inadvertently seized, but such evidence has been returned to the Lamplughs. [footnote 30] In terms of the allegation that the defendants were held at gunpoint, such claims are not supported by credible testimony. Although Harry Lamplugh testified to several instances in which, inter alia, he had the barrel of a handgun pressed to his ribs by some of the officers, his assertions are not corroborated. All of the agents testified that there were no guns drawn in the home. Further, John Lamplugh failed to substantiate his father's assertion and Theresa Lamplugh never testified. In weighing the credibility of the various individuals, I find that the law enforcement officers involved in this search did not hold Harry and Theresa Lamplugh at gunpoint in their home. Likewise, there is no support for the contention that Slusser stomped a kitten on her way out of the Lamplugh residence. [footnote 31] The defendants have also alleged that the agents involved in the search improperly ate lunch on their premises, leaving a mess within the garage/office area of the Wellsboro property. To support this contention, Harry Lamplugh has submitted photographs of the state of the garage/office area. [footnote 32] It should be noted that the agents testified that they had stacked their garbage neatly in the garage prior to leaving. But even assuming that the officers left such a mess, this conduct would not suggest the type of behavior that would warrant a finding of a constitutional violation. The defendants have cited no case in which a court determined that the failure of law enforcement officers to properly dispose of their garbage from their lunch results in a constitutional violation warranting suppression of the evidence seized from the search. Therefore, the defendants' contentions concerning the agents alleged failure to properly clean up the garbage from their lunch will not support a suppression motion. In their "Memorandum In Support of Motion to Suppress ... For Denial of Due Process," the Lamplughs quote Justice Brandeis' poignant dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928), in which Justice Brandeis noted that "a court will not redress a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands." Id. at 483. Had there been credible evidence of the conduct alleged by the Lamplughs, Justice Brandeis' declaration that the courts must stand firm in the face of lawless governmental action - justified by the government agents as essential to combat crime - would be heeded. But the credible evidence in this case is that, with the exception of bringing pizza and soda into the Wellsboro property, the government agents acted in a professional manner. As to the pizza and soda mess, I doubt that Justice Brandeis' allusion to the "clean hands" doctrine was intended to require the suppression of evidence or the dismissal of a prosecution for such a trivial breach of professional decorum. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to suppress based upon the alleged improper conduct of the law enforcement officers will be denied. D. John Lamplugh's Statements It is well-settled that an individual is entitled to Miranda warnings where the government seeks to perform a custodial interrogation. See, e.g., United States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024, 1026 (3d Cir. 1993). There is little dispute that John Lamplugh was questioned regarding the sawed-off shotgun that was found in the garage of the Wellsboro property. See e.g., United States v. Calisto, 838 F.2d 711, 716-17 (3d Cir. 1988). Therefore, a determination as to whether John Lamplugh was entitled to Miranda warnings must focus upon whether John Lamplugh was in custody. As recently noted by the United Supreme Court: Two discrete determinations are essential to the determination [of whether an individual is "in custody" for Miranda purposes]: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt that he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene is set and the players' lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve "the ultimate inquiry": "[was] there a 'formal arrest or restraint of freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (citations and footnote omitted); See also Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 244 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that custody exists where the law enforcement officers acted in a manner that indicates that the individual is not free to leave). In making the custody determination, the court must apply the totality of the circumstances test. See Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112 n.11. The court should consider such factors as "whether a suspect is or is not told that she is free to leave, the location and atmosphere of the interrogation, the language and tone used by the police, whether the suspect is searched, frisked, or patted down, and the length of the interrogation." Tankleff, 135 F.3d at 244. In this case, John Lamplugh testified that when he initially encountered Endy and the other officers in his parents' lawn, Endy made clear to him that he was not being investigated and that they had come to search his parents' home. (10/15/97 Tr. at 95.) John Lamplugh also testified that Endy stated that he "would like" John Lamplugh to stay. (Id.) John Lamplugh stated, however, that Endy never indicated that he was under arrest. (Id. at 96.) Further, John Lamplugh also testified that he told Endy which firearms belonged to him at the Troy property. (Id.) These guns were not seized from the Troy property. John Lamplugh then stated that Endy led him into the house and had him sit at the kitchen table with his mother. John Lamplugh testified that two state troopers were placed in the kitchen to guard him and his mother, that he did not feel that he could leave the kitchen table, and he was escorted whenever he left the kitchen table to go to other areas of the Wellsboro residence, including the garage/office area. (Id at 102-05.) In terms of the sawed-off shotgun, John Lamplugh stated that he was questioned "very briefly" concerning that item. (Id. at 106.) According to Endy, John Lamplugh was not confined to the kitchen table, but was permitted to walk around the house and answer the telephone, [footnote 33] he assisted Tyler in photocopying documents in the garage, and was outside when Seiler searched the vehicles on the property. (9/9/97 Tr. at 186-87.) Finally, Endy testified that he never heard John Lamplugh ask to leave and that he was never told that he could not leave the property. (Id.) [footnote 34] Although there are different versions of the events that occurred during the execution of the search warrant at the Wellsboro property, these distinctions do not influence the ultimate determination that John Lamplugh was not in custody for the purposes of Miranda. John Lamplugh conceded that Endy made it clear to him from the initial contact in the front lawn that John Lamplugh was not in any trouble. Given that John Lamplugh was made aware of the fact that he was not being investigated, he cannot demonstrate that he reasonably believed that he was under police custody. The mere fact that his movement within his parents' home was restricted will not support such a finding. The agents were executing a search warrant for firearms. The restrictions placed upon the movement of John Lamplugh and his parents were entirely reasonable considering the [missing page 60] testified that he did not direct any agent to tell the Crawfords that they were not free to leave. Marsh, however, also testified that during the search, the Crawfords could not go from room to room within the shop, without being accompanied by an agent. [Edward] also testified at the suppression hearing. When he arrived at the shop, he stated, he found men in suits wearing guns. When he sat in the back room, he was "sandwiched between two men at all times" and felt intimidated; no one told him that he was free to leave or move about the shop, and he felt as if he had no freedom. Edward continued by stating that he did not feel free to refuse to answer questions and did not feel free to make any telephone calls. Although no one drew or displayed a weapon, Edward testified that it was easy to see that the agents were wearing weapons. No one ever told him to sit in a specific place, but he had the impression that he should sit down. He was not allowed to be in Margaret's presence, but he was not told that. ... Margaret also testified. When Fuelling presented himself and the search warrant, Margaret stated that she asked permission to call Edward, which was given. Margaret continued by stating that she had the impression that the agents were reaching for their guns and felt that she had to ask permission to make the call. Margaret also testified that during the search, agents prevented her from waiting on customers, and that she did not attempt to leave because she did not think that she would be allowed to leave. ... Margaret also testified that the agents permitted her out of their presence only when she went to the bathroom and that she did not feel that she could refuse to answer the agents' questions. A Meridian police officer testified that, while the search was in progress, he called the business on an unrelated matter. He asked to speak with either Margaret or Edward. and Fuelling refused to let him speak to them. United States v. Crawford, 52 F.3d 1303, 1307-08 (5th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). Despite these facts suggesting that the law enforcement officers virtually took over control of the defendants' business and limited their movement within their premises as well as their ability to communicate with customers, the district court determined that the defendants were not in custody for the purposes of Miranda. Id. at 1309. The Fifth Circuit stated that this was not a clearly erroneous determination and affirmed the lack of custody holding. Id. John Lamplugh has presented less evidence than that presented by the defendants in Crawford. By his own admission, it was made clear to him that he was not under investigation. The only reason that he was questioned was in an effort to obtain his assistance in the search. To this extent, his questioning was the result of chance as he happened to be in the garage/office area at the time that the sawed-off shotgun was located. Even as to the alleged questions concerning the sawed-off shotgun, John Lamplugh admitted that such questioning was spontaneous and brief. Given these circumstances, it cannot be said that John Lamplugh reasonably believed that he was in custody as required under Miranda and its progeny. Therefore, John Lamplughs' motion to suppress will be denied. [footnote 35] III. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth herein, the motion to suppress filed by Harry and Theresa Lamplugh is denied. Likewise, the motion to suppress filed by John Lamplugh is also denied. An appropriate Order is attached. Thomas I. Vanaskie United States District Judge Date: August 6, 1998 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 3:CR-95-0169 vs. (HON. THOMAS I. VANASKIE) HARRY C. LAMPLUGH, THERESA L. LAMPLUGH, and JOHN LAMPLUGH, Defendants. ORDER August 6, 1998 NOW, therefore, in accordance with the attached Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED THAT: 1) Defendant Harry and Theresa Lamplugh's motion to suppress (Dkt. Entry 38) is DENIED. 2) Defendant John Lamplugh's motions to suppress (Dkt. Entries 201 & 203) is DENIED. [signed] Thomas I. Vanaskie United States District Judge FOOTNOTES 1. The search warrant affidavit contains a typographical error in that it states that Ebert attended the gun show on June 18, 1992, rather than July 18, 1992. (9/9197 Tr. at 169-70.) 2. Cashman was identified as confidential informant 1 (CI-1) in the affidavit in support of the search warrant. 3. Jones was identified as confidential informant 2 ("CI-2") in the affidavit in support of the search warrant. 4. When a dealer goes out of business, he or she is required to submit all bound record books to the ATF out-of-business center. These record books contain entries for every purchase or sale of a firearm. The records are then microfilmed so that they can be used to trace guns that are recovered by the ATF. (Id. at 75-76.) 5. Although Ebert testified at the suppression hearing regarding his review of Terry's Gun Shop's records, he did not explicitly stated that such records indicated that Harry Lamplugh had purchased a rifle from Terry's Gun Shop in 1985. The government, however, has provided this Court with a binder filled with its exhibits in which a copy of the records of Terry's Gun Shop can be found. (GX 55.1.) Unfortunately, the government failed to introduce these records at the suppression hearing. Therefore, these records do not officially appear as an exhibit presented at the suppression hearing. 6. Defendant's Exhibit HCL-4(s) is a transcribed copy of the tape recording of the transaction between Wilson and Harry Lamplugh. 7. Hissam was identified as confidential informant three ("CI-3") in the affidavit in support of the search warrant. 8. As part of Hissam's deal with the ATF, Hissam apparently was required to liquidate his gun collection. Hissam attended the gun show in compliance with this directive. 9. Under Pennsylvania state law, when a handgun is transferred to a dealer, there is no requirement that the state registration/transfer forms be completed. (9/8/97 Tr. at 109-10.) 10. Subsequent to the search of defendants' residences, Endy actually received written certified confirmation of these facts from the relevant state and federal agencies. (GX 1.6 & 1.7.) 11. Section 6103(l)(1) authorizes the disclosure of tax return information to law enforcement agencies other than the IRS for purposes other than the administration of the Revenue Code. 15. John Lamplugh testified that there were two Pennsylvania State Police officers watching over his family in the kitchen. John Lamplugh testified that he did not feel that he was free to walk anywhere in the house. (10/15/97 Tr. at 103.) John Lamplugh also testified that he was escorted by a Pennsylvania State Police officer when he was allowed to leave the kitchen. (Id.) 16. John Lamplugh testified that he told the Pennsylvania State Police officers in the kitchen that he had to leave for Philadelphia. (10/15/97 Tr. at 133.) He never indicated, however, to any of the ATF agents that he had to leave. (Id.) 17. The term "standing" is used solely for convenience. As noted by one court: We use the term "standing" as a shorthand method of referring to the issue of whether the defendant's own Fourth Amendment interests were implicated by the challenged governmental action. "Technically, the concept of 'standing' has not had a place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for more than a decade, since the Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), indicated that matters of standing in the context of searches and seizures actually involved substantive Fourth Amendment law." United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 5 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 943 F.2d 110, 113 n.1 (1st Cir. 1991). 18. Unfortunately, Theresa Lamplugh did not testify at the suppression hearing. Therefore, the only evidence of her interest in the Troy property was the fact that she was a co-owner. 19. To hold that Harry and Theresa Lamplugh have standing in this case would require a finding that any parent who co-signs on a child's ownership interest in order to allow the child to purchase a home or car would automatically have standing under the Fourth Amendment to contest any search of that home or car. Although the property interest created in the act of co-signing is important, it should not be viewed as protected by the Fourth Amendment unless there is some further indication that the parent exercised some control over the property which suggested an expectation of privacy. Where the parent has totally surrendered control of the premises, there appears to be little basis to assert that the parent had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property, unless a court were to blindly rely upon arcane principles of property law. The United States Supreme Court has indicated that such blind application of property law should be tempered by the actual expectation of privacy that an individual has demonstrated in a certain property. 20. At the suppression hearing, Harry and Theresa Lamplugh took the position that Endy had misled Magistrate Judge Blewitt regarding the Troy property. In particular, Harry and Theresa Lamplugh emphasized that the investigation had failed to provide any connection between Harry and Theresa Lamplugh and the Troy property. Counsel for both Harry and Theresa Lamplugh cross-examined Endy and attempted to elicit an admission from him that he was aware that John Lamplugh resided at the Troy property, not Harry and Theresa Lamplugh. As noted, Harry Lamplugh also testified to his limited relationship to the property, i.e., that he co-signed to enable his son to finance the purchase of his first home. After carefully developing this argument and detaching Harry and Theresa Lamplugh from the Troy property as a means to challenge the assertion in the search warrant affidavit that the Troy property was one of Harry Lamplugh's residences, Harry and Theresa Lamplugh now contend that they have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Troy residence by virtue of their ownership interest. Therefore, the defendants argue that their mere ownership interest in the Troy property was not a sufficient basis upon which to seek a warrant because there was no evidence that the property was ever used by Harry and Theresa Lamplugh, then the defendants alter their argument to claim that the mere ownership interest in the Troy property is sufficient to create a reasonable expectation to privacy in the Troy residence. The circuity of this argument is apparent. 21. In any event, as explained below, there is no basis for suppressing evidence taken from the Wellsboro property. 22. Harry and Theresa Lamplugh have contested that the search warrant affidavit provided insufficient evidence to connect the Troy property with the allegedly illegal acts in this case. Because Harry and Theresa Lamplugh lack standing to challenge the search of the Troy property, these arguments will not be considered. 23. Admittedly, Harry Lamplugh does not openly contend that he is a firearms dealer in the taped telephone conversation, as alleged by Endy in his affidavit. Endy conceded in his testimony that he had used his knowledge of state law to determine that Harry Lamplugh was contending that he was a dealer of firearms. Although Endy may have inadvertently included this information in the affidavit, this error simply has no effect on the ultimate probable cause determination, and certainly does not support a bad faith finding. 24. Tyler did testify that he did not feel that there was any basis to seek a "currency violation based search warrant" when the search warrant was issued in this case. (9/11/97 Tr. at 222.) Tyler made clear, however, that tax evasion was a different matter than a currency violation and that the he believed that tax evasion had occurred prior to the issuance of the search warrant. (Id. at 220-21.) Tyler also testified that the only reason that the IRS was not seeking a search warrant in this case was that ATF had indicated that they were going to obtain the warrant. (Id. at 166-67.) Tyler also testified that it was common practice for the IRS and ATF to work together in this manner. (Id. at 232.) Therefore, the defendants' contention that the IRS conceded that it lacked probable cause is without merit. 25. In terms of the Troy property, this issue would pose a more difficult problem. There is no connection between the Troy property and the alleged activities of Harry and Theresa Lamplugh aside from the fact that they are listed a cc-owners of the property. This issue need not be decided, however, as it has already been determined that Harry and Theresa Lamplugh lack standing to challenge the search of the Troy property. 26. Although the defendants claim that Magistrate Blewitt failed to asked any questions of Endy with regard to his supporting affidavit, Magistrate Judge Blewitt's decision not to ask any questions does not support a claim that he was not neutral or detached. In this regard, the supporting affidavit provides multiple instances of illegal conduct and provides an ample basis to support the warrant. Given the length of the investigation and the detailed nature of Endy's supporting affidavit, there was no need to question Endy concerning the contents of the supporting affidavit. 27. Section 3109 provides: The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant. 28. Conley was decided prior to Richards. One could question the validity of the Conley holding in light of Richards minimal reasonableness test to determine whether a no-knock entry was justified. Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1421 ("The police must have reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime. .. ."). Given the facts of Conley, however, it is unlikely that Richards would have altered the outcome. The fact that the police entered a commercial building during business hours through an unlocked door would be reasonable under Richards. The fact that the commercial building was open to the general public and the police did not use force to enter should weigh in favor of upholding the entrance. 29. It should also be noted that the witnesses were sequestered. 30. As to the defendants' complaints that they failed to receive an inventory, this claim is without merit. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(d), the defendants were entitled to an inventory of the property seized. The defendants were provided with an inventory of the seized property at the conclusion of the search. In this regard, the defendants argue that the inventory lacked sufficient detail. Even if the inventory was somehow deficient, the Third Circuit has stated that the requirements of Rule 41(d) are ministerial in nature. See United States v, Hall, 505 F.2d 961, 963 (3d Cir. 1974). Where there has been a failure to adhere to the requirements of Rule 41(d), a motion to suppress should be granted only where the defendants can demonstrate some prejudice as a result of the alleged violation. Id. at 964; see also United States u. Motz, 936 F.2d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Wyder, 674 F.2d 224, 225 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 457 U.S. 1125 (1982); United States v. Harrington, 504 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir. 1974). The defendants have failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the alleged failure to provide a detailed inventory of the items seized. The defendants also contend that valuable personal property was also improperly seized during the search, i.e., a one carat diamond wedding ring, a one-third carat diamond ring, a diamond and ruby ring, an emerald and ruby ring, a one carat bracelet, a Rolex watch, five jars of sausages, a Morgan silver dollar, a Cross pen and pencil set, and four volumes of World War I and World War II commemorative books. Each of the agents involved with the search were specifically questioned with regard to those items and each testified that such items were not seized during the search of the Wellsboro property. Although Harry Lamplugh testified to the seizure of this property, his testimony was not credible, especially in light of the fact that his wife failed to testify. Further, his son John Lamplugh did not testify to observing the agents seizing any such personal items. 31. In fact, Slusser testified that she had three pets, two dogs and a cat. (10/17/97 Tr. at 121.) Slusser also stated that she was a vegetarian because she could not stand the thought of an animal being killed. (Id.) Finally, Slusser testified that she was a member of numerous animal right groups, such as the World Wildlife Fund, Environmental Defense Fund, Center for Marine Conservation and Sierra Club. (Id.) Given these statements, it is simply incredible to believe that Slusser would have stomped a kitten to death. 32. Interestingly, while the Lamplugh's contended that the search team had left the Wellsboro property in shambles, they did not present photographs or a videotape to substantiate that assertion, even though John Lamplugh testified that he had videotaped the Wellsboro house after the search. (10/15/97 Tr. at 202.) 33. John Lamplugh contends that he was not permitted to answer the telephone. (10/15/97 Tr. at 104.) 34. John Lamplugh testified that he told the Pennsylvania State Police officers in the kitchen that he had to leave for Philadelphia. (10/15/97 Tr. at 133.) He never indicated to any of the ATF agents that he had to leave. (Id.) 35. Harry and Theresa Lamplugh have not sought to suppress any statements for alleged failures to provide Miranda warnings.